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ABSTRACT
Essays on Multinational Production and International Trade
by
Vanessa Alviarez
Chair: Andrei A. Levchenko
This dissertation studies the determinants and the consequences of multinational
production. Using unique datasets and extending extant theories, it analyzes two
channels by which multinational networks affect economic performance: comparative
advantage and intra-firm trade.
In the first chapter, “Multinational Production and Comparative Advantage,” I
assemble a unique industry-level dataset of foreign affiliate sales to document a new
empirical regularity: multinational production is disproportionately allocated to in-
dustries where local producers exhibit comparative disadvantage. Then, it shows
analytically and quantitatively that multinational production raises average produc-
tivity while lowers sectoral productivity dispersion in the host economy. By inducing
a larger transfer of technology in sectors where the host economy is relatively less pro-
ductive, multinational production weakens the host country’s comparative advantage.
To measure these channels, this paper incorporates sectoral heterogeneity into a Ri-
cardian general equilibrium model of trade and multinational production. The model
is estimated to measure the extent of technology transfers across countries and sectors
as well as to quantify the welfare effects of multinational activity. The heterogene-
ity of foreign affiliate sales across sectors is quantitatively important in accounting
for welfare gains from multinational activity. In particular, gains from multinational
production are 15 percentage points higher compared with a counterfactual scenario
in which foreign affiliate sales are homogeneous across sectors. Furthermore, as a
consequence of the impact of multinational production on comparative advantage,
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gains from trade are about half of what they would be without sectoral heterogeneity
in multinational activity (10 percent rather than 19 percent).
The second chapter, coauthored with Ayhab Saad, focuses on the interaction be-
tween multinational production and intra-firm trade in the global economy. A salient
empirical regularity of multinational production (MP) is that foreign affiliate sales
decrease with trade costs, a fact that is at odds with the proximity-concentration
theory of multinational activity. As a response, intra-firm trade, from parents to for-
eign affiliates, has been combined with standard models of horizontal MP to generate
complementarities between trade and MP that deliver gravity-style predictions for
foreign affiliate sales. Nevertheless, two other stylized facts pose further challenges to
this attempt to rationalize the gravity of MP. First, as documented by (Ramondo et
al., 2014) intra-firm trade is not common across foreign affiliates but rather concen-
trated among a small set of large multinational firms. Second, as shown in this paper,
not only firms in the upper tail of the firm size distribution are subject to gravity
forces, but also sales of relatively small foreign affiliates are significantly affected by
geographical barriers even when they rarely conduct intra-firm transactions. Two
puzzles emerge: (i) why is intra-firm trade concentrated among the largest multina-
tional firms? and (ii) what are the mechanisms that drive affiliate sales in the lower
tail of the distribution to obey gravity forces, even in the absence of intra-firm trade?
In this paper we construct a framework to address these questions. To account
for the extensive margin of intra-firm trade and the gravity of MP for firms of all
sizes, including those that do not engage in intra-firm trade; this paper develops a
multi-country model of heterogeneous firms, in which parents decide whether or not
to supply foreign affiliates with intermediate inputs and if so, optimally decide the
fraction that will be imported from the parent company. In our model an affiliate’s
marginal cost is affected by the parent’s decision regarding the method of knowledge
transfer. On the one hand, exporting intermediate inputs embodying knowledge to
an affiliate entails the standard iceberg-type trade costs as well as a fixed cost of
establishing an adequate platform to carry on cross-border transactions within the
boundaries of the firm. On the other hand the marginal cost of direct knowledge
transfer from parent to affiliates through remotely communication increase with ge-
ographical barriers but rise less than the costs of exporting intermediate inputs. As
a result, in equilibrium (i) only the most productive multinational firms choose to
export to their affiliates and (ii) foreign sales for both the affiliates who import from
their parent and those who do not are affected by gravity forces.
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CHAPTER I
Multinational Production and
Comparative Advantage
1.1 Introduction
Multinational firms are responsible for a large fraction of global output, employment,
and trade. Their production is almost twice as high as world exports and they ac-
count for 20–25 percent of manufacturing employment in developed countries.1 Given
the relevance of multinational production, an extensive literature in international eco-
nomics searches for the key forces driving the patterns of production of multinational
firms around the world. Among the most common explanatory factors are the differ-
ences in factor prices across countries and differences in the cost of exporting relative
to the cost of producing abroad. The bulk of existing literature, however, uses a
one-sector framework. The role of relative productivity differences across sectors—
or comparative advantage—has received considerably less attention, in spite of the
significant heterogeneity observed in multinational production (MP) at the sectoral
level.
To examine the interaction between multinational production and productivity at
the sectoral level, this paper assembles a novel dataset of bilateral foreign affiliate
sales that, for the first time, incorporates the sectoral dimension into a multi-country
framework. Using this unique dataset of MP sales for thirty-five countries, nine
tradable sectors, and one non-tradable sector, this paper establishes a new stylized
fact: foreign affiliate sales are larger in sectors where the host economy exhibits
comparative disadvantage. Building on this fact, this paper shows that comparative
1World Investment Report, UNCTAD (2011).
1
advantage plays a crucial role in determining the sectoral allocation of multinational
production, with less-productive sectors receiving the largest fraction of MP relative
to output.
Multinational production, unlike trade, entails a direct transfer of technology
across countries, which increases productivity in the host economy.2 This paper
shows, both analytically and quantitatively, that multinational production weakens
a country’s comparative advantage. Multinational activity not only closes the ab-
solute technology gap across countries, it also reduces the relative productivity gap
across sectors. By inducing larger transfers of technology into comparative disadvan-
tage sectors—due to the relatively large presence of MP—multinational production
weakens the host country’s comparative advantage.
The welfare implications of the interaction between comparative advantage and
multinational production are significant. This paper shows that by omitting the sec-
toral heterogeneity of MP sales, and therefore its impact on comparative advantage,
existing uni-sectoral models of trade and MP systematically overstate the gains from
trade and understate the gains from MP. Thus, distinguishing between the absolute
and comparative advantage effects of MP is essential to improve our understanding,
and the quantification, of the impact of multinational production.
Three main questions are addressed by this paper. The first is whether the ob-
served uneven allocation of MP across sectors is significantly related to differences in
sectoral productivity. The second question is whether multinational activity affects a
country’s comparative advantage by affecting the average productivity of each indus-
try differently. Third, the paper evaluates analytically and quantitatively, the welfare
implications of the interaction between MP and comparative advantage.
In order to answer these research questions, this paper assembles a novel dataset
that provides detailed information on production and employment of foreign affiliates
in each host country, distinguishing the sector of operation and the source country
where the parent firm is located. These data of bilateral MP activity at the sectoral
level contains information of thirty-five countries, nine tradable sectors, and one non-
tradable sector for the period 2003–2007. Using this data we establish the following
2Recent empirical literature has shown a positive and significant impact of foreign affiliate ac-
tivity on host country aggregate productivity. By opening a subsidiary abroad—greenfield—or by
acquiring an existing company in the target market, multinational production activity brings inno-
vation in products and processes through adoption of new machinery and organizational practices,
improving the overall level of technology in the host economy. See (e.g., Guadalupe et al., 2012;
Alfaro and Chen, 2013; Chen and Moore, 2010; Arnold and Javorcik, 2009). By using instrumental
variables estimation(Fons-Rosen et al., 2013) finds that the higher productivity of multinational affil-
iates over local producers is due to investors cherry-picking firms with high future growth potential.
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new stylized facts about MP activity at the sectoral level: (1) for each source-host
country pair, the MP share on output is significantly heterogeneous across sectors; (2)
sectoral heterogeneity remains even after aggregating foreign affiliate sales for each
host-sector pair, across all source countries; and (3) MP activity is disproportionately
allocated to industries where local producers exhibit comparative disadvantage.
To capture these stylized facts, analytically and quantitatively, we incorporate dif-
fering productivity levels across industries into a Ricardian general equilibrium model
of trade and multinational production. The model features asymmetric MP and trade
barriers; multiple factors of production (labor and capital); differences in factor and
intermediate input intensities across sectors; a realistic input-output matrix between
sectors; inter- and intra-sectoral trade; and a non-tradable sector. By combining
these features into a unified framework, this paper offers the first set of productivity
estimates at the sectoral level for local producers as well as for the entire economy.
Compared with uni-sectoral models, this paper offers more reliable estimates of fun-
damental technology, since it effectively isolate the technology corresponding to local
producers. Notice that total factor productivity calculated directly from data at the
sectoral level does not distinguish between the productivity corresponding to local
producers from overall productivity. Because the presence of multinational firms im-
plies a transfer of technology into the host market, we proceeded to disentangle the
productivity corresponding to local producers from the overall sectoral productivity.
Breaking down the productivity by its ownership structure allows us to evaluate the
extent to which sectoral differences in local producers’ productivity determine the
uneven allocation of foreign affiliate sales across sectors. Separating local and overall
productivity also allows us to measure the extent and sectoral heterogeneity of the
technology transfer implied by multinational activity.
The analytical results and quantitative estimations reveal that the effect of multi-
national production on the state of technology is higher in those sectors in which
local producers are relatively less productive, implying that MP weakens a country’s
comparative advantage. Four analytical predictions emerge from the model. The
first two highlight the channels of interaction between sectoral productivity differ-
ences and MP patterns in any equilibrium. The other two are concerned with the
general equilibrium responses of aggregate trade flows and welfare in a counterfactual
scenario where the MP-to-output ratios are homogeneous across sectors. The four
analytical predictions are: (1) relative sectoral differences in local producers’ produc-
tivity determine the sectoral allocation of MP in the host economy; (2) sectors with a
larger MP share will have higher productivity increases due to multinational activity;
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(3) any deviation from homogeneous MP shares across sectors—holding aggregate
MP volumes relative to output constant—leads to larger gains from MP than what
is implied by uni-sectoral models; (4) gains from trade are lower than they would be
if MP were to affect productivity in all sectors homogeneously.
The assembled dataset is then used to quantitatively estimate the parameters
of the model and also to test the model’s analytical predictions. In particular, for
each country-sector pair, we extract the productivity of local producers and show
that, compared with all producers in the economy, local producers have a larger
dispersion of relative productivity across sectors. This implies that the comparative
advantage of all producers in the economy—both local and foreign firms—is weaker
than the comparative advantage corresponding exclusively to local producers. These
differences are explained by the larger presence of MP in sectors where local producers
in the host economy are relatively less productive. As a result, the productivity
enhancement due to MP is uneven and biased toward sectors in which local firms
exhibit comparative disadvantage. These results are robust to potential selection
effects, wherein the least productive firms exit because of the higher competition
imposed by foreign firms; and they are also robust to the presence of knowledge
spillovers through which local producers can benefit from the superior technology
used by their foreign counterparts.3
Three counterfactual exercises are conducted to explore quantitatively the im-
pact of MP on welfare, based on the estimated parameters. First, we show that
the heterogeneity of foreign affiliate sales across sectors is quantitatively important
in accounting for welfare gains associated with MP. In particular, these gains are 15
percentage points higher compared with a scenario of homogeneous multinational pro-
duction. Second, we calculate the consequences for trade flows and welfare when we
allow multinational activity to affect only the average productivity of the host econ-
omy, while keeping comparative advantage intact. Results show that the gains from
trade are nearly twice as large as in the benchmark estimation, where MP changes
both absolute and comparative advantage—19 percent compared with 10 percent.
Consequently, recognizing that sectoral differences in MP allocation affect the com-
parative advantage of the host country is crucial for understanding the apparently
modest gains from trade found in the literature. Finally, we evaluate the role of MP
in the production of non-tradables and its potential effects on the competitiveness of
3Technology transfer and technology diffusion are used interchangeably. Note that these are
different from knowledge spillovers, a term we reserve for the process by which domestic firms learn
from foreign affiliates operating in the same market.
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tradable sectors. Results show that welfare increases by 4.6 percent, and the price
index of tradables decreases by 1.6 percent, when we allow foreign affiliates to operate
in the non-tradable sector.
This paper contributes to a voluminous body of research on economic growth and
international technology diffusion (e.g., Alvarez et al., 2011; Chaney, 2012; Rodr´ıguez-
Clare, 2007; Li, 2011). In these models, international technology transfer is a mecha-
nism that explains economic growth, but most of them leave unspecified the channels
through which this type of diffusion takes place. An exception is (Li, 2011), who
assesses the impact of trade on knowledge by using data on payments for interna-
tional trade in royalties, license fees, and information-intensive services for a sample
of thirty-one countries. This paper differs from previous research in that it uses multi-
national bilateral sales at the sectoral level to measure quantitatively the extent of
technology transfer associated with MP. In particular, for this exercise a dataset is
assembled for a sample of thirty-five countries and ten sectors for the period 2003–
2007.
This paper is also closely related to previous efforts to quantify the impact of multi-
national production in a general equilibrium framework. (Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-
Clare, 2013a) develop a general equilibrium model of trade and multinational produc-
tion under perfect competition to measure the gains from openness associated with
the interaction of trade and MP. Using a similar framework, (Shikher, 2012) measures
the extent of technology diffusion across countries. (Arkolakis et al., 2013) develop
a quantitative multi-country general equilibrium model of monopolistic competition
in which the location of innovation and production is endogenous and geographically
separable. There are important differences between the present work and those pa-
pers, however. First, they use a uni-sectoral framework, and therefore by design they
are silent with respect to how multinational production affects relative technology
differences across sectors in the host economy. This gap is filled by estimating a
multi-sector general equilibrium model of trade and multinational production, which
offers a set of productivity estimates at the sectoral level for local producers exclu-
sively as well as for the entire economy. A second difference in this paper is that
it provides more reliable estimates of local producers’ productivity and allows for
asymmetries in multinational production barriers at the industry level.4
4Previous literature uses measures of effective labor and the fraction of workers in the R&D sector
to estimate a country’s productivity. This could potentially be a misleading indicator given that
an important fraction of the private R&D in developed countries is conducted by foreign affiliates.
Instead, this paper uses a gravity equation derived from a sectoral model of trade and multinational
production to estimate jointly the technology parameters, as well as trade and MP barriers, for every
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An important way in which this paper contributes to the literature pertains to wel-
fare gains from trade. (e.g., Caliendo and Parro, 2014; Costinot et al., 2012; Levchenko
and Zhang, 2012; Hsieh and Ossa, 2011) incorporate sectoral heterogeneity, interme-
diate input usage, and sectoral linkages in order to understand the contributions of
these components to the welfare increase associated with a reduction in trade barriers.
To highlight the interaction between multinational activity and a country’s compar-
ative advantage, this paper extends the structure of these models by expanding the
firm’s set of choices to allow the possibility of serving a country through multinational
production.
Finally, this paper joins in the debate on whether the primary motive for MP is
(1) to satisfy final demand—horizontal MP (e.g., Ramondo et al., 2013; Bernard et
al., 2009, 2011; Guadalupe et al., 2012), or (2) to take advantage of international
differences in factor prices by producing intermediate inputs that will be used by the
parent firm or by another affiliate in a third country in later stages of the production
process—vertical MP (e.g., Antras and Helpman, 2004a; Alfaro and Chen, 2013). The
existence of a negative and significant relationship between sectoral MP sales and total
factor productivity is consistent with a horizontal view of MP activity where foreign
affiliates compete with local producers to satisfy the host market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the
pattern of multinational production at the sectoral level. Section 1.3 lays out the
theoretical framework and derives analytical results on the impact of sectoral disper-
sion in MP on gains from trade and gains from multinational activity. Section 1.4
sets up the quantitative framework and estimates the parameters of the model. Sec-
tion 1.5 presents the results and discusses the effect of MP on comparative advantage.
Section 1.6 measures the welfare gains of multinational activity. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Facts: MP and Comparative Ad-
vantage
1.2.1 Data Description
The analysis of the relationship between multinational production and relative tech-
nology differences across sectors requires three types of information: (1) production
and employment of foreign affiliates in each host country, distinguishing the sector of
country-sector pair in the sample.
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operation and the source country where the parent firm is located; (2) bilateral trade
data at the country-sector level; and (3) country-level macroeconomic indicators such
as sectoral output and employment.
This paper assembles a dataset of foreign affiliate sales, employment, and number
of affiliates, which adds a sectoral dimension to the aggregate bilateral data used
in previous work.5 The dataset contains information for thirty-five countries,6 nine
tradable sectors, and three non-tradable sectors.7 This dataset enables the breakdown
of domestic production and employment into their corresponding foreign and domestic
components at the sectoral level. Each observation is a triplet formed by the source
country, host country, and sector, averaged over the period 2003–2007. Table 2.1 in
the Tables and Figures section shows the list of countries in the sample.
This dataset includes information only for majority-owned foreign affiliates, that
is, those in which 50 percent or more of the control is exerted by a foreign country.8
The main source of information is unpublished OECD data, drawn from the Inter-
national Direct Investment Statistics and the Statistics on Measuring Globalisation.
For European countries that do not belong to the OECD, information is drawn from
the Foreign Affiliates Statistics provided by Eurostat. Section 1.8.2 in the Appendix
provides detailed information about the construction and validation of the dataset.
Note that the activities of foreign affiliates are measured not by foreign direct
investment (FDI) but rather by their real activities. The use of these data has several
advantages. First, the data we use considers only majority-owned foreign affiliates,
whereas a foreign direct investment dataset considers all affiliates in which 10 percent
or more of their equity capital is foreign-owned. The extent of ownership is important,
5In contrast to bilateral trade data, which is available for many countries at different levels of
sectoral disaggregation, there is no systematic dataset of bilateral MP sales broken down by sectors.
An exception is (Fukui and Lakatos, 2012), which is also an attempt to introduce a sectoral dimension
to bilateral data on foreign affiliate sales. The methodology used in constructing the dataset for the
present paper differs substantially from theirs, mainly in the primary sources of information used
and the methods implemented. A discussion of the differences between the two datasets is presented
in section 1.8.2 in the Appendix.
6All thirty-five countries are reporting countries. A reporting country is one that reports or
declares the foreign affiliate activity. The other country involved in the transaction is called the
partner country. The activity reported by the reporting country could refer either to the sales of
affiliates from other countries operating in its territory—or inward MP—or to the sales of locally
based multinationals with affiliates operating in foreign markets—or outward MP.
7The nine tradable sectors are all manufactures. The non-tradable sectors are construction;
wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels; and transport, storage, and communication. Agricul-
ture and mining sectors were excluded, as well as some service sectors for which data on production
were not available.
8A country secures control over a corporation by owning more than half of the voting shares or
otherwise controlling more than half of the shareholders’ voting power.
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given that a transfer of technology is more likely to occur if the parent exerts a strong
control over its affiliates, and it is unclear how much control a 10-percent investor
has over an affiliate. Second, having majority-owned affiliates ensures that the source
country is where the parent company is located, while FDI statistics register only the
country of the immediate investor, even when the capital is passing through a third
country.
1.2.2 Sectoral Multinational Production
There are three necessary conditions for comparative advantage to be weakened by
multinational activity. First, foreign affiliates must be large enough to affect aggre-
gate productivity in host economies. Second, the presence of multinational activity
in total production must be significantly heterogeneous across sectors. And third,
the heterogeneous allocation of MP across sectors must be related to comparative
advantage; in particular, MP must be disproportionately allocated to comparative
disadvantage sectors. In this section, we provide evidence of each of these conditions,
which guides the model and the quantitative exercise carried out in later sections.
1.2.2.1 Relevance of Multinational Production
The presence of multinational firms in a given host market can be measured by the
share of MP in total output, which is calculated by summing up the production of
all foreign-controlled firms, regardless of where their parent firms are located. Let
Ijhs denote the sales of source country s in location h in sector j, and I
j
h denote the
production in sector j in country h regardless of the nationality of the producers.
The MP share is given by:
MP sharejh =
∑
s 6=h
Ijhs
Ijh
=
∑
s 6=h I
j
hs
Ijh
where the relative importance of a given source country s in country h and sector j
is given by
∑
s 6=h
Ijhs
Ijh
.9 Table 1.8 in Tables and Figures reports summary statistics
on the share of MP for the countries in the sample. As the first column in the table
shows, foreign affiliates account for 24 percent of the production of tradables and
28 percent of non-tradables. There is an important variation in the presence of MP
across countries, though. For some countries, MP in tradables accounts for more than
9Note that MP does not include the production of domestic multinationals. It considers only
the output being produced by foreign affiliates of multinational parents based abroad.
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40 percent of the output (e.g., Canada, United Kingdom, Poland, Romania, among
others), while it accounts for only 5 percent in others (e.g., Greece, Israel, Japan, New
Zealand). For non-tradables, the presence of foreign activity can be more pervasive
in some countries, accounting for up to 84 percent of total production.10
The presence of multinational production in many countries is patently visible.
The second and fourth columns in Table 1.10 in Tables and Figures display the num-
ber of source countries with multinational operations in each reported country and
the number of host countries in which they keep operations abroad, respectively. Of
thirty-five declaring countries in the sample, twenty-four serve as host of multinational
operations for more than ten source countries; and twenty-two countries have multi-
national operations in more than ten host countries. However, there is significant
variation across countries. The United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States
have affiliates in most foreign markets and they host operations for many source
countries, whereas Australia, Greece, and New Zealand host MP operations for no
more than two source countries. The third and fifth columns in Table 1.10 represent
the weighted average of the MP share of each reported country as host and source,
respectively.11 As can be observed in some high-income OECD economies, such as
Austria, Canada, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, there is a very high presence
of foreign firms, with about 40 percent of the output in tradables in the hands of
foreign affiliate firms. Some countries, such as Japan, are an important source of
MP (accounting for 25 percent of total Japanese production), while in contrast, the
relative importance of foreign multinational corporations in Japan is limited (foreign
affiliates’ production reaches only 10 percent of total output).
1.2.2.2 Cross-Sector Heterogeneity of Multinational Production
There is clear heterogeneity in MP across sectors. Figure 1.9 shows this heterogeneity
pattern for four selected host economies. The x-axis represents the source countries;
the y-axis represents the sectors; and the bubbles represent the MP shares for each
source-host-sector triplet. Source countries with more presence in the host economies
10As revealed by the input-output tables, non-tradables are an important component of the set of
intermediate inputs used by all industries. On average, about 40 percent of the intermediate inputs
used by an industry are from the non-tradable sector, which implies that the effect of multinational
production on the technology of non-tradables could have a sizable impact on the structure of prices
in all sectors of the economy. Section 1.6.4 provides an analysis of what would happen in a scenario
where multinational production in the non-tradable sector is prohibitively costly.
11Averages are weighted by relative size of the sector in the host economy.
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will have bigger bubbles in most sectors.12 Nevertheless, for each source country
operating in a given host economy, there is a great deal of heterogeneity in MP shares
among sectors—which can be seen by the difference in the size of the bubbles in
each vertical alignment. Also notice that the patterns of MP among sectors within a
source country, represented by each vertical alignment of bubbles, are substantially
different across source countries, which suggests that these patterns are not driven
by sector-specific characteristics.13 A similar pattern emerges if we examine the same
four economies as before, but now each of them represents a source instead of a host
country, as shown in Figure 1.10. As before, we are interested in the heterogeneity of
the bubble size among sectors for each host economy.14
It is noteworthy that the MP heterogeneity among sectors still remains even after
aggregating MP across all source countries that operate in the host market. In fact,
MP shares aggregated across source countries exhibit substantial heterogeneity among
sectors within a country as well as across countries within a sector. Figures 1.11
and 1.12 in Tables and Figures show these patterns for all of the countries in the
sample. As an illustration, Figure 1.11 focuses on France and the United Kingdom.
For instance, for some sectors in the United Kingdom, MP as a share of output is less
than 20 percent, but in other sectors, MP accounts for more than 60 percent of local
production. More important, this heterogeneity is not explained by sector-specific
characteristics. Figure 1.12 shows that within any sector, there is an important
variation in the MP output ratio across countries. For instance, in chemicals, some
countries have only 5 percent of their output in the hands of foreign affiliates, while
in other countries more than 60 percent of their chemical production comes from
multinational companies.
1.2.3 MP Sales and Productivity: A Negative Relationship
The observed heterogeneity of MP among sectors does not follow a random pattern.
Instead, MP shares are negatively correlated with sectoral productivity. To measure
productivity at the sectoral level, we calculate the total factor productivity or Solow
residual (T ) for the set of countries for which data were available on labor and capital
endowment and intermediate inputs, as well as a price deflector for these components.
Table 1.12 shows the results of the correlation as well as the coefficient of the
12Differences in the average size of the bubble across source countries can be explained in part
by the size of the source country and its distance from the host country.
13The patterns shown in this illustration are representative of most countries in the sample.
14Similarly, differences in the average size of the bubble across host countries can be explained
by factors such as market size and distance from the source country, among others.
10
regression between the share of MP for each source-host-sector triplet (MP sharejhs)
and the ratio of productivities (TFPh/TFPs). To further explore the variation among
sectors within a given source-host country pair, the second column of Table 1.12 shows
the results after including source-host fixed effects, which capture all country-pair-
specific characteristics that may explain the relation between productivity and MP
shares. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant; Figure 1.14 depicts
the conditional correlation between the two variables. The relationship between MP
and productivity holds even after aggregating foreign affiliate sales for each host-
country pair, across all possible source countries. Figure 1.1 shows the negative
correlations between productivity and the share of MP in each host country-sector
pair. The relationship between relative productivity and the cross-sector variation of
MP shares constitutes preliminary evidence supporting the predictions that emerge
from the model presented in next section.
Figure 1.1: MP and Comparative Advantage
To ensure the robustness of this result, we perform a set of sensitivity checks using
different samples and alternative definitions of the variables of interest. The fact
that some sectors are more suitable for multinational activity than others could raise
concerns about the stability of the relationship after controlling for characteristics
that are specific to a given sector but common across all source-host country pairs
in the sample. The third column in Table 1.12 shows that the results hold after
including the sector fixed effects in the specification.
Another potential concern is the extent to which the size of foreign affiliate sales in
a given host country might be influenced by the tax strategies followed by the parent
firm (Hines 2003). Results could be biased, for instance, in cases where the tax regime
is host-sector–specific, and therefore not controlled by the set of fixed effects included
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in the specification. To alleviate this concern, we use the share of employment as an
alternative measure of MP activity, since it is less subject to manipulation for tax
reasons. As Table 1.15 shows, results are robust to this definition of MP activity.
Although the mechanism highlighted in this paper is based on a horizontal per-
spective of multinational activity, both horizontal and vertical MP sales coexist in
reality. Even when is not possible to disentangle horizontal from vertical MP, it is
possible to make some inferences based on the commercial international transactions
of multinationals. A roughly way to distinguish between vertical and foreign MP
sales is by analyzing the destination markets of the foreign affiliates production. In
particular, the share of foreign affiliate output sold back to the source country, where
the headquarters is located, is likely to be vertical MP sales.15 It is even possible
that sales to a third country are not meant to satisfy final consumers—using the host
economy as an export platform—but to continue a following stage of the production
process within the firm. Therefore, subtracting foreign affiliate exports from total MP
sales in a given country-sector pair gives us the part of MP sales that take place in the
host market, which almost certainly are driven by a horizontal motive. Unfortunately,
while the dataset assembled in this paper has information on sales, employment, and
number of affiliates per source-host-sector triplet, it does not have information on
international trade transactions—exports and imports—by foreign affiliate firms.
Nevertheless, to address concerns about the influence of vertical MP on the rela-
tionship between productivity and MP activity, we explore the correlation between
MP sales and sectoral productivity using Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data
for U.S. multinationals operating abroad. The BEA dataset contains information
about foreign affiliate sales, value added, imports, and exports, from which we can
construct domestic sales of foreign U.S. affiliates abroad. Note that domestic sales
of foreign affiliates likely underestimate horizontal MP, given that part of affiliate
exports are meant to satisfy final demand in other markets, using the host country
as an export platform. Therefore, domestic sales are a conservative measure of the
multinational production conducted by U.S. foreign affiliates with horizontal motives.
This does allow us, however, to explore the mechanism highlighted in this paper in
a cleaner way. As reported in Figure 1.16 (and Figure 1.17), the results are similar:
U.S. foreign affiliate sales as a share of output are relatively higher in sectors where
15Note that this is not always the case, given that an MP-horizontal firm could produce abroad
and ship the final goods back home to satisfy final demand rather than selling to their parent or
another related party firm. This scenario can take place if the cost of the input bundle is low enough
that the gains from reduction in input cost more than compensate for the transportation cost from
the host market to the source country.
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the host economies have comparative disadvantage. This relationship is even stronger
when using value added instead of output.
There are some necessary observations to be made in this regard. First, more than
two-thirds of foreign affiliate sales occur in the host market.16 Second, most countries
in our sample are middle- and high-income OECD countries, which makes the vertical
hypothesis less appealing.17 Third, even when the observed MP sales are indeed a
reflection of both horizontal and vertical multinational production, if the majority of
MP sales were vertical, we would expect either none or a positive correlation between
MP and sectoral productivity.18
More important, this relationship remains stable when using different datasets
to calculate the total factor productivity (TFP) for each country-sector pair. In
particular, we use the Structural Analysis Database (STAN) as well as the Gronin-
gen Growth and Development Centre (GDDC) database to test for this relationship.
Alternatively, we use the productivity estimates obtained from a multi-sector trade
model, which increases the coverage of countries and sectors; those estimates are
highly correlated with the previous TFP measures. Finally, we also test this rela-
tionship using the dataset constructed by Fukui et al. (2012). Our main results are
remarkably similar.
1.3 Model
In order to illustrate the mechanism of the model analytically, this section presents a
two-country, two-sector model of trade and multinational production. In Section 1.4,
the model is generalized to make it quantitatively informative by including asym-
metric MP barriers; multiple factors of production (labor and capital); differences
in factor and intermediate input intensities across sectors; a realistic input-output
matrix between sectors; inter- and intra-sectoral trade; and a non-tradable sector.
Allowing countries to interact through trade and MP in a multi-sectoral envi-
ronment has important analytical and quantitative implications compared with the
16Using BEA data, Ramondo et al. (2012) report that the median manufacturing affiliate receives
none of its inputs from its parent firm, and sells 91 percent of its production to unrelated parties,
mostly in the host country.
17Vertical foreign affiliates tend to produce intermediate inputs abroad to take advantage of low
factor prices. Then, the intermediate inputs are exported to their parent company or other affiliates
within the organization.
18Foreign affiliates that are vertically integrated could benefit from operating in sectors where
local producers are relatively more productive. This would be the case if, for instance, foreign firms
can use specialized workers from the comparative advantage industry, which increases productivity
and lowers the cost of production of intermediate inputs.
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benchmark, a uni-sectoral MP-trade model developed by (Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-
Clare, 2013a). Those implications can be summarized in the following four analytical
predictions: (1) relative sectoral differences in local producers’ productivity deter-
mine the sectoral allocation of MP in the host economy; (2) sectors with a larger
MP share will have higher productivity increases due to multinational activity; (3)
gains from trade are lower than they would be if MP were to affect productivity in all
sectors homogeneously; and (4) any deviation from homogeneous MP shares across
sectors—holding aggregate MP volumes relative to output constant—leads to larger
gains from MP than what is implied by uni-sectoral models.
1.3.1 A Simple Model: Environment
Consider an economy with two countries, and labor as the only factor of production.
There are two sectors j = {a, b}, and each has an infinite number of varieties produced
with constant returns to scale, indexed by ω. In every country and sector, each variety
is produced by many firms engaging in perfect competition. Both sectors are subject
to international trade and MP barriers.
Let s denote the source country of the technology, h the host country, and m
the destination market. In order to serve any given market at the lowest possible
price, a firm in sector j chooses between (1) producing at home s and exporting to
the destination market m; (2) building up an affiliate at the destination market m
to produce and sell locally (h=m); or (3) setting a foreign affiliate in a third country
(h 6= m) used as an export platform, to ship goods to the final destination m.19
A firm that chooses to produce at home to serve country m uses its technology to
full extent, but faces a transportation cost of exporting (djms). A firm that chooses
to produce at the destination market instead (h=m) completely avoids the trans-
portation cost of exporting but suffers a loss in productivity when implementing its
technology in a foreign country (gjhs). In addition, if the foreign affiliate uses a third
country h to produce and export to country m, it also faces the transportation cost
associated with exporting from h to m (djmh).
Technology: Each source country s has a technology to produce each variety ω,
at home and abroad. Let zjhs(ω) denote the number of units of the ωth variety in
sector j that can be produced with one unit of labor by a firm from a source country
19Note that, without symmetry, an export platform can exist even in a two-country setting. A
country may find it profitable to produce abroad to satisfy the home market if factor prices are low
enough overseas. This pattern of production does not reflect vertical MP; in this case, the purpose
of producing in a foreign country is to produce final goods rather than intermediate inputs.
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s that is located in host country h = {1, 2}.
The technology of each country s in sector j (zjs), is described by a vector in
which each element represents the source country’s productivity in each host country
h (zjhs).
zjs (ω) ≡
{
zj1s (ω) , z
j
2s (ω)
} ∀i, j = {1, 2}. (1.1)
Then, the productivity of a source country s in sector j (zjs) is drawn independently
across goods, countries, and sectors from a multivariate Frechet distribution.20.
F js (z) = exp
{−T js [(zj1s)−θ + (zj2s)−θ]} . (1.2)
Equation (1.2) states that productivities across locations are related in two ways.
First, they are drawn from a distribution with the same location parameter, or mean
productivity (T js ): a higher T
j
s leads to a larger productivity draw on average, at home
and abroad. Note that regardless of the location of production, the mean productiv-
ity that matters is the productivity of the source country s. Second, the stochastic
component of the productivity is governed by the dispersion parameter θ, which is
assumed to be common across countries and sectors and reflects idiosyncratic differ-
ences in technology know-how across varieties in any given sector j. The larger is θ,
the lower is the dispersion of productivities within a sector. Finally, albeit produc-
tivities across locations are drawn from a distribution with the same mean (T js ) and
variance (θ), productivities are assumed to be independent across host countries.21
Therefore, productivity differences in this model are characterized by: (1) differ-
ences in relative productivity across industries (T 1s /T
2
s )—or Ricardian comparative
advantage at the industry level; and (2) intra-industry heterogeneity governed by θ.
In this stochastic model, a higher T a1 (T
a
1 > T
a
2 ) captures the idea that country 1
is relatively better at producing zah1 goods in any host country h—including its own
20Note that whenever zjhs (ω) = 0 for s 6= i ∀ω ∈ {0, 1} and ∀j = 1, 2 , then the model collapses
to a multi-sector general equilibrium model of international trade without multinational production
(e.g., Caliendo and Parro, 2014; Levchenko and Zhang, 2012)
21The assumption of independence across locations corresponds to a particular case of a more
general specification in which the degree of correlation among the elements of vector zjs is governed
by the parameter ρ in the equation below
F js (z) = exp
{
−T js
[
(zj1s)
−θ/(1−ρ) + (zj2s)
−θ/(1−ρ)
]1−ρ}
.
The simplified assumption used in this paper (ρ = 0) gives us the tractability to rely on gravity
equations to estimate the parameters of interest. It also allows us to compare our results with
previous work that has focused on the estimation of the mean productivity parameters using trade
data at the sectoral level.
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market. But whatever the magnitude of T js , country 2 may still have lower labor
requirements for some varieties. This does not imply that country 1 should only
produce varieties from sector a in any given location h, but instead that it should
produce relatively more of these goods.
Production: In providing variety ω in sector j to any country m, country s’s
firms have two strategies available to them, from which they will choose the most
cost-efficient one. These strategies are:
(1) Exporting from home country : A firm can use its technology to produce at
home and export to market m, in which case the source of technology and the location
of production are the same (h = s). The output of variety ω in sector j produced at
home to serve market m is given by:
Qjmhs (ω) = Q
j
mss (ω) = L
j
s
(
zjss (ω)
gjs
)
= Ljsz
j
ss (ω) , (1.3)
where zjss (ω) represents the productivity of a firm when it produces at home. There
are no additional costs (or efficiency losses) for operating in its own market; therefore,
gss = 1.
(2) Multinational production: A firm could set an affiliate in any other location
h 6= s, and from there sell to market m:
Qjmhs (ω) = L
j
h
(
zjhs (ω)
gjhs
)
. (1.4)
The output level associated with MP depends on the factor endowments in the
country where production takes place (Ljh); the penalty associated with implement-
ing the home country’s technology abroad (gjhs > 1); and the productivity of firms
from country s producing at location h (zjhs (ω)). The penalty parameter g
j
hs is a
deterministic measure of the efficiency losses a country faces in producing in some
location outside home, which is source-host-sector–specific and common across vari-
eties. Therefore, a higher gjhs reflects lower productivity of affiliates from s in h, for
all varieties in sector j.
Finally, output in each sector j is produced using a CES production function that
aggregates a continuum of varieties ω ∈ [0, 1] that do not overlap across sectors. Qjh
is a CES aggregate and Qjh(ω) is the amount of variety ω used in production in sector
j and country h. The elasticity of substitution across varieties ω is denoted by εj.
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Qjh =
 1∫
0
Qjh (ω)
εj−1
εj dω

εj
εj−1
. (1.5)
Note that in a two-country environment, the host country and the destination
country are the same (h = m).
Preferences: Preferences are Cobb-Douglas over the broad sectors of the econ-
omy.22
Ym = (Y
a
m)
ξm
(
Y bm
)1−ξm
, (1.6)
where ξm denotes the Cobb-Douglas weight for sector a. The resources constraint
faced by consumers in this two-country, two-sector model is given by:
PmYm = p
a
mY
a
m + p
b
mY
b
m = wmLm, (1.7)
where Y jm represents the expenditure of country m on sector j goods and p
j
m is the
price of the sector j composite.
Trade and MP Costs: Trade frictions take the standard iceberg form. For-
mally, it is assumed that for each unit of variety ω shipped from country of produc-
tion h to the target country m, only 1/djmh arrives, with d
j
mh such that d
j
mh = 1 and
djmh < d
j
mkd
j
kh for any country k, ruling out any third-country arbitrage opportuni-
ties.23 More important, trade barriers are not symmetric
(
djmh 6= djhm
)
, and they can
be decomposed into a symmetric component
(
djmh
)
and a specific (exporter-sector)
component
(
djh
)
.
Barriers to investment are described in a similar manner. These are non-symmetric
as well
(
gjhs 6= gjsh
)
, and they can also be decomposed into a symmetric component(
gjhs
)
and a specific (source-sector) component (gjs). These modeling choices for trade
and MP barriers will be discussed in detail in Section ?? in the Appendix.
Market Structure: The features of the model outlined above imply that pro-
ducing one unit of variety ω in sector j in country h with technologies from country
s requires gjhs/z
j
hs (ω) input bundles. Since labor is the only factor of production, the
cost of an input bundle is given by:
cjh (ω) = w
j
h. (1.8)
22In the N-sector, N-country model, the preferences are generalized to a CES specification, adding
flexibility to the elasticity of substitution across sectors.
23The last property is binding only in an N > 2 model, such as the one presented in the next
section.
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Equation (1.8) is based on the assumption that every firm operating in country h uses
the local input bundle regardless of its country of origin.24 Under perfect competition
and given the assumptions made for trade and investment barriers, the price at which
country s can supply variety ω in sector j to country m, when producing in country
h, is equal to:
pjmhs (ω) =
(
cjhg
j
hs
zjhs (ω)
)
djmh. (1.9)
Therefore, seller s will choose the location h = {1, 2} that allows him to reach
country m with the lowest possible price, pjms (q) = min
{
pjm1s (ω) ; p
j
m2s (ω)
}
. Condi-
tional on each provider being at the cheapest possible location, consumers in market
m will choose to buy from the source technology country s = {1, 2} that offers the
lowest price pjm (ω) = min
{
pjm1 (ω) ; p
j
m2 (ω)
}
.
Hence, the probability that country m imports good ω in sector j from country
h, using technologies from country s, is given by:
pijmhs =
(
T js∆
j
ms
−θj
T j1 ∆
j
m1
−θj
+ T j2 ∆
j
m2
−θj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 1
(
δjmhs
−θj
δjm1s
−θj
+ δjm2s
−θj
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Term 2
, (1.10)
where ∆jms =
[(
δjm1s
)−θj
+
(
δjm2s
)−θj]− 1θj and δjmhs = djmhcjhgjhs.
The right-hand side of equation (1.10) can be easily interpreted as the product of
two independent events: Term 1 on the left describes the event whereby a producer
from country s is the lowest-price supplier of ω in country m independently of the
location of production. Term 2 on the right describes the event whereby country h is
the host country that offers the lowest cost of production for source country s selling
to market m. In this equation, pijmhs represents the share of goods in sector j that
country m buys from firms located in country h whose source is country s. pijmhs
collapses to the following equation:
pijmhs =
[
T js δ
j
mhs
−θj
T j1 ∆
j
m1
−θj
+ T j2 ∆
j
m2
−θj
]
, (1.11)
The actual price paid by consumers in country m to buy goods in sector j is given
24This assumption implies that foreign affiliates do not require input bundles from the source
country s to produce variety ω in the host country h. The assumption is made only for simplicity,
to better highlight the channel proposed in this paper.
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by:
pjm = Γj
(
T j1 ∆
j
m1
−θj
+ T j2 ∆
j
m2
−θj)− 1θj , (1.12)
where Γj =
[
Γ
(
θj+1−εj
θj
)] 1
1−εj and Γ is the Gamma function.
Trade and MP Shares: The share of goods that country m imports from
country h
(
pijmh
)
, can be calculated by aggregating pijmhs across all source countries.
Therefore, the probability that country m will buy a sector j variety from country h
is calculated by summing up the probabilities of importing goods produced in country
h using technologies from every source country s, including itself:
pijmh = pi
j
mh1 + pi
j
mh2
By substituting (1.11) in the above equation, we get:
pijmh =
T˜ jh
(
cjhd
j
mh
)−θ
T˜ j1
(
cj1d
j
m1
)−θ
+ T˜ j2
(
cj2d
j
m2
)−θ , (1.13)
where T˜ jh is the effective technology and is given by:
T˜ jh = T
j
1 g
j
h1
−θ
+ T j2 g
j
h2
−θ
. (1.14)
The above equation states that in the presence of multinational production, the
set of available technologies for each country is enlarged. Each country-sector pair
has an effective productivity that equals its local productivity in that sector plus
the productivity of the foreign affiliates producing in the country, discounted by the
investment barriers gjhs. How much a country could benefit from foreign technologies
depends on the barriers to MP represented by gjhs, which limit the host economy’s ca-
pacity to absorb the productivity of foreign affiliates from country s, so as to enhance
their overall productivity. Note that technology T˜ jh is not available to all—local and
foreign— producers in country h. Instead, each firm producing in host country h uses
technology from its own source country T js and T˜
j
h . The model does not internalize
the potential knowledge spillovers that may take place from foreign to local produc-
ers. The productivity in the host country is enlarged as a result of the coexistence of
local and foreign producers with different levels of technology, and not because local
producers become more productive by learning from their foreign counterparts.
The value of foreign output in sector j, produced in country h using country s’s
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technologies to serve country m, is then given by pijmhsp
j
mQ
j
m, where p
j
mQ
j
m is the total
expenditure on sector j goods by consumers in country m.25 Total output of foreign
affiliates from country s located in country h can be calculated by summing foreign
affiliate sales over all destination markets (m). Thus, total MP in sector j by affiliates
from country s located in country h is given by:
Ijhs = pi
j
1hsX
j
1 + pi
j
2hsX
j
2 ∀j = {1, 2},
where Xm = p
j
mQ
j
m. Substituting (12) in the former expression, we get:
Ijhs =
T js
(
gjhsc
j
h
)−θ(
pjh
)−θ Ξjh, (1.15)
where Ξjh =
∑2
m=1
(
djmhp
j
h/p
j
m
)−θ
Xjm = Ih
(
Xh
Xhh
)
26 Therefore, the share of goods
produced in country h with s technologies—or MP share—is given by:
yjhs =
Ijhs∑
i I
j
hs
=
Ijhs
Ijh
=
T js
(
gjhs
)−θ
T˜ js
. (1.16)
1.3.2 Welfare: Analytical Predictions
Welfare in country h is given by the indirect utility function and corresponds to real
income:
Wh =
∏
j=a,b
ws(
pjs
)ξj , (1.17)
25Note that for a given host and source country pair (h, s) pijmhs is not mutually exclusive across
destination countries (m), given that some foreign affiliates could serve more markets than others
26Normalizing the bilateral trade shares by the share of country s′s expenditure devoted to locally
produced goods
(
xˆjhh =
Xjhh
Xjh
)
yields:
xˆjmh
xˆjhh
=
(
djmh
pjh
pjm
)−θ
Xjmh = xˆ
j
hh
(
djmhp
j
h/p
j
m
)−θ
Xjm
Summing over m:
Ijh =
∑
m
Xjmh = xˆ
j
hh
∑
m
(
djmhp
j
h/p
j
m
)−θ
Xjm
Ijh = xˆ
j
hhΞh
The optimal sectoral factor allocations must satisfy Ijh =
whL
j
h
αjβj
; therefore, Ξjh can be rewritten as a
function of observables only: Ξjh =
1
xˆjhh
whL
j
h
αjβj
= Ih
(
Xh
Xhh
)
.
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where pjh is the price in country h of goods in sector j (see equation (1.12)). An
expression for wh/p
j
h as a function of local producers’ technology
(
T jh
)
, along with
the expenditure share on domestically produced goods (pijhh) and the share of goods
produced domestically by local producers (yjhh), can be derived using equation (1.15)
when h = s:
wh
pjh
=
(
T js
) 1
θ
(
yjhh
)− 1
θ
(
pijhh
)− 1
θ , (1.18)
where yjhh =
Ijhh
Ijh
and pijhh =
Xjhh
Xjh
.
Taking the product of (1.18) for both sectors and weighting by ξj, we derive an
expression for real wages in country h:
Wh =
∏
j=a,b
[(
T jh
) 1
θ
(
yjhh
)− 1
θ
(
pijhh
)− 1
θ
]ξj
. (1.19)
Following (Levchenko and Zhang, 2013), in deriving analytical predictions for
welfare, it is further assumed that the expenditure shares in the two sectors are equal
(ξj = 1/2). Therefore, welfare is expressed by:
Wh =
wh(
pahp
b
h
) 1
2
=
(
T ahT
b
h
) 1
2θ
(
piahhpi
b
hh
)− 1
2θ
(
yahhy
b
hh
)− 1
2θ . (1.20)
In addition, it is assumed that the average productivity in both countries is the
same, and that they differ only in their comparative advantage. Therefore, country 1
in sector a has the same productivity as country 2 in sector b, and country 2 in sector
a has the same productivity as country 1 in sector b: T a1 = T
b
2 and T
b
1 = T
a
2 . Without
loss of generality, let us assume that country 2 has comparative advantage in sector a
(T a2 > T
b
1 ), and also that trade and investment barriers are symmetric along country
pairs as well as across sectors:
dj12 = d
j
21 = d ∀j = {a, b}
gj12 = g
j
21 = g ∀j = {a, b}
The assumption with regard to productivities, utility function, and symmetry in
trade barriers and investment barriers, together with the normalization of the labor
endowments, ensures that in general equilibrium wages are equal in the two countries
(w1 = w2 = 1), which have been normalized to one.
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1.3.2.1 Analytical Prediction 1: MP sales are disproportionately higher
in comparative disadvantage sectors.
Proposition I.1. In a two-country, two-sector world economy, the lower the tech-
nology of country 1 in sector a (country 1’s comparative disadvantage sector) relative
to sector b, the higher the probability that firms from country 2 will produce in sector
a relative to sector b in country 1.
Proof. See Appendix (1.10.1).
When T a1 increases, the comparative disadvantage of country 1 in sector a is
weaker, reducing the proportion of MP in sector 1 carried out by country 2 firms.
When T a2 increases, the comparative disadvantage of country 1 in sector a is more
pronounced, increasing the proportion of multinational production in sector 1 car-
ried out by country 2 firms.27 This analytical prediction finds empirical support in
the negative and significant relationship between productivity and MP shares at the
sectoral level.
1.3.2.2 Analytical Prediction 2: The higher the heterogeneity of MP
across sectors, the higher the gains from MP.
Analogous to trade, the gains from MP are the proportional change in country h’s
real wage as one moves from a counterfactual equilibrium with trade but no MP
(investment barriers are prohibitively costly) to the actual equilibrium with positive
MP and trade flows. Using equation (1.18) and comparing the results both with and
without MP, we get an expression for the welfare gains:
GMPh =
W sg>0
W sg→∞
=

∑
j=a,b
(
1 +
T 6=j1
T j1
d−θ
)
∑
j=a,b
(1 + (dgj)−θ) + T
6=j
1
T j1
(gj−θ + d−θ)

− 1
2θ
, (1.21)
GMPh = W
h
g>0/W
h
g→∞ =
(
yahhy
b
hh
)− 1
2θ
(
piahhpi
b
hh
p¯iahhp¯i
b
hh
)− 1
2θ
, (1.22)
27A similar argument can be constructed for the following case: when T b2 increases, the compar-
ative disadvantage of country 2 in sector a is weaker, reducing the proportion of MP in sector a
carried out by country 2 firms in that sector.
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where p¯ijhh is the domestic demand share in the counterfactual equilibrium with no
MP, and where the MP shares are given by:
(
yahhy
b
hh
)− 1
2θ =
(
T ah
T˜ ah
T bh
T˜ bh
)− 1
2θ
.
Proposition I.2. The higher the heterogeneity of MP across sectors, the higher the
gains from MP. When the share of domestically produced goods is the same across
sectors (yahh = y
b
hh), the gains from MP attain a minimum. Therefore, uni-sectoral
trade-MP models understate the actual gains from MP as long as yahh 6= ybhh.
Proof. See Appendix (1.10.3).
Note that gains from trade depend on the heterogeneity of the effective produc-
tivity parameters—effective or Ricardian comparative advantage—and not on the
heterogeneity of the fundamental productivity parameters—fundamental comparative
advantage—while the gains from MP depend on the heterogeneity of fundamental
productivities across sectors. The latter is reflected in differences in MP shares across
sectors, as countries will have less MP as a share of total production in their fundamen-
tal comparative advantage sectors, and more MP in their fundamental disadvantage
sectors. Figure 1.2 depicts the actual gains from MP in the two-sector analytical
model as well as the gains from MP implied by uni-sectoral models of trade and MP
(denoted by the horizontal dashed line).
In Section 1.4, actual data on manufacturing production and MP sales are used
for a sample of ten sectors and thirty-five countries to assess the magnitude of the
disparities between the gains from MP implied by both uni-sector and multi-sector
models of trade and MP.
1.3.2.3 Analytical Prediction 3: Gains from trade are lower the more
heterogeneous the technology upgrade across sectors.
Formally, gains from trade are the proportional change in real wages in country h
as we move from a counterfactual equilibrium, with MP but not trade; to the actual
equilibrium, with both MP and trade.
From equation (1.20), the gains from trade are expressed as:
W hd>0/W
h
d→∞ = GTh =
(
piahhpi
b
hh
)− 1
2θ . (1.23)
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Figure 1.2: Sectoral Heterogeneity and Gains from MP
As can be observed in equation (1.23), gains from trade are a function of trade
shares and the dispersion parameter θ, similar to the result obtained in a multi-sector
trade-only model.28 Nevertheless, the focus of this paper is to understand to what
extent the gains from trade are affected by the reduction in effective productivity
differences induced by multinational production.
Given the fact that labor is the only factor of production and wages are equal to
one,29 equation (1.13) collapses to:
pijmh =
T˜ jh
T˜ jh + d
−θT˜ j2
=
T˜ jh/T
j
1
(1 + (dgj)−θ) + T
6=j
h
T jh
(gj−θ + d−θ)
. (1.24)
28The focus of this paper is on measuring gains from trade based on primitives rather than on
observables. For a complete review of the literature on this topic, see (Costas et al., 2012) and
(Levchenko and Zhang, 2013)
29Investment barriers are now ga12 = g
b
21 and g
a
21 = g
b
12. Given the rest of the assumptions, wages
are still the same across countries.
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Substituting (1.24) in (1.23), the expression for gains from trade (GT) is:
GT =

(
T˜ ah/T
a
h
)(
T˜ bh/T
b
h
)
(
(1 + (dga)−θ) + T
b
h
Tah
(ga−θ + d−θ)
)(
(1 + (dgb)−θ) + T
a
h
T bh
(gb−θ + d−θ)
)
−1/2θ .
(1.25)
Proposition I.3. The more heterogeneous the technology upgrade across sectors to-
ward comparative disadvantage sectors, the lower the dispersion of effective technolo-
gies and the lower the gains from trade.
Proof. See Appendix (1.10.2).
The result stated in Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the
percentage difference between the gains from trade implied by a proportional tech-
nology transfer across sectors
(
T˜ a1 /T
a
1 = T˜
b
1/T
b
1
)
and the actual gains from trade, as
a function of the dispersion in T jh across sectors, measured by the standard devia-
tion between T ah and T
b
h. Greater relative sectoral productivity differences lead to
larger disparities between the gains in the actual equilibrium and the gains in the
counterfactual scenario.
Figure 1.3: MP Technology Transfer and Gains from Trade
Ricardian comparative advantage at the industry level plays an important role in
the magnitude and sectoral distribution of technology transfer that takes place when
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firms decide to produce overseas. Results indicate that the stronger the reduction in
comparative advantage due to MP, the lower the estimated gains from trade. Also, the
stronger the comparative advantage of local producers in the host country, the bigger
the effect of MP on the observed differences in relative technology across sectors.
1.4 Quantitative Framework
In order to take the model to the data, in this section we quantitative estimate a
multi-country multi-sector version of the model, with labor and capital as factors of
production, intermediate inputs, and inter-linkages across sectors. This environment
incorporates N countries and J + 1 sectors; the first J sectors are tradables and the
J+1 sector is a non-tradable. Both capital Kh and labor Lh are mobile across sectors
and immobile across countries; and wh and rh represent the wage rate and the rental
return of capital, respectively.
Finally, with N > 2, firms have the option to locate a foreign affiliate directly
in the destination market to serve it locally or in a third country, used as an export
platform, to ship goods to the final destination. In addition to gjhs, a firm that uses
a third country h to produce and export to country m also faces the transportation
cost djmh associated with exporting from h to m. Note that in order to serve any
foreign market with a variety from sector J + 1, the only option is to locate a plant
in the target market. Therefore, for all non-tradable varieties, the host economy and
the destination market are necessarily the same (h = m).
The main equations of the model are extended below in order to incorporate mul-
tiple countries, multiple tradable sectors, a non-tradable sector, capital, intermediate
inputs usage, and linkages across sectors.
Preferences: Utility of the representative consumer in country m is linear in the
composite final good Ym, and is given by:
Ym =
(
J∑
j=1
ω
1
η
j
(
Y jm
) η−1
η
) η
η−1 ξm (
Y J+1m
)1−ξm
, (1.26)
where ξm denotes the Cobb-Douglas weight for the tradable sector composite good
and Y J+1m is the non-tradable sector composite good. The elasticity of substitution
between the tradable sectors is denoted by η, and ωj is the test parameter for tradable
sector j. Note that the consumer’s utility is CES on tradable sectors, allowing η
to be different from one (in the previous section, with Cobb-Douglas preferences,
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η=1). Moreover, in the quantitative exercise, ξm will vary across countries, to capture
the positive relationship between income and the non-tradable consumption shares
observed in the data.
Production: Production of variety ω in sector j, by firms from country s pro-
ducing in country h in order to sell to market m, is given by:
Qjmhs (ω) =
[(
Ljh
)αj (
Kjh
)1−αj]βj [J+1∏
k=1
(
Qks
)γkj]1−βj (zjhs (ω)
gjhs
)
,
where value-added-based labor intensity is given by αj, while the share of value added
in total output is given by βj—both of which vary by sector. The weight of interme-
diate inputs from sector k used by sectorj is denoted by γkj. Therefore, the unit cost
cjh is given by:
cjh =
[(
wjh
)αj (
rjh
)1−αj]βj [J+1∏
k=1
(
pkh
)γkj]1−βj . (1.27)
Technology: Any firm gets a productivity draw zjhs (ω) in each of the N possible
host countries h, as described by the vector below:
zjs (ω) ≡
{
zjhs (ω)
}N
h=1
∀s = 1, ...N,
where zjs (ω) is drawn independently across goods, countries, and sectors from a mul-
tivariate Frechet distribution:
F js (z) = exp
[
−T js
(∑
s
(
zjhs
)−θj)]
. (1.28)
Productivities zjhs (ω) are assumed to be independent across host countries.
Market Structure: The probability that country m will import good ω in sector
j from country h, using technologies from country s, is given by:
pijmhs =
T js (∆
j
ms)
−θj∑
k T
j
k
(
∆jmk
)−θj ·
(
δjmhs
)−θj∑
m
(
δjmhs
)−θj . (1.29)
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The actual price of any variety in sector j in country m is given by:
pjm = Γj
(
∆˜jm
)− 1
θj
= Γj
(∑
s
T js
(
∆jms
)−θj)− 1θj . (1.30)
Closing the Model: Given the set of prices
{
wh, rh, Ph,
{
pjh
}J+1
j=1
}N
h=1
, we first
describe how production is allocated across countries and sectors. Let Qjh denote the
total sectoral demand in country h and sector j. Qjh is used for both final consumption(
pjhY
j
h
)
and intermediate inputs in domestic production of all sectors. How much all
sectors k in country h require from sector j depends on the world demand of country
h’s sector j goods,
∑J+1
k=1 (1− βk) γj,k
(∑N
m=1
∑N
h=1 pi
k
mhsp
k
mQ
k
m
)
. Therefore, the goods
market clearing condition is given by:
pjhQ
j
h = p
j
hY
j
h +
J+1∑
k=1
(1− βk) γj,k
(
N∑
m=1
N∑
s=1
pikmhsp
k
mQ
k
m
)
∀j = {1, ..., J + 1} ,
where
∑N
m=1
∑N
s=1 pi
J+1
mhs = 0 whenever m 6= h. Also note that in this specifica-
tion the requirements of every tradable sector k for inputs from sector j depend on
pikmh =
∑N
s=1 pi
k
mhs, which is the probability that country m will import from country h
regardless of the origin of the technology used in production. Also, the requirements
of the non-tradable sector J+1 from any other sector j depend on piJ+1hh =
∑N
s=1 pi
J+1
hhs ,
where piJ+1hhs is the probability that country h will produce in non-tradable sectors using
the technologies from country s’s foreign affiliates.
The goods market clearing condition stated above takes into account that the
majority of world trade is in intermediate inputs, and the fact that a good is traded
several times before being consumed, as well as the existence of two-way input linkages
between the tradable and non-tradable sectors.
Solving for the consumer’s problem, the final demand of sector j in country h is
given by:
Y jh = ξh
whLh + rhKh
pjh
ωj
(
pjh
)1−η∑J
k=1 ωk
(
pkh
)1−η ∀j = {1, ..., J} ,
and
Y J+1h = (1− ξh)
whLh + rhKh
pJ+1h
j = J + 1.
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Trade: In each tradable sector j, some varieties ω are imported from abroad
and some varieties ω are exported to the rest of the world. Country k’s exports and
imports in sector j are given by:
EXjk =
N∑
m 6=k
N∑
s=1
pijmksp
j
mQ
j
m IM
j
k =
N∑
h6=k
N∑
s=1
pijkhsp
j
kQ
j
k,
and total exports and total imports are given by:
EXk =
J∑
j=1
EXjk IMk =
J∑
j=1
IM jk .
The trade balance condition will equalize IM jk = EX
j
k as well as IMk = EXk.
Multinational Production: The value of MP in tradable sector j from country
s in country h to serve country m is pijmhsp
j
mQ
j
m, where p
j
mQ
j
m is the total expenditure
on goods on tradable sector j by country m. Thus, total MP in tradable sector j by
country s in country h is:
Ijhs =
∑
m
pijmhsp
j
mQ
j
m ∀j = 1, ..., J, (1.31)
IJ+1hs = pi
J+1
hhs p
J+1
h Q
J+1
h j = J + 1. (1.32)
Total inward MP in country h from the rest of the world in sector j can be obtained
by summing (1.31) and (1.32) over all source-of-technology countries s.
Ijh =
∑
s
Ijhs ∀j = 1, ..., J + 1.
In the same way, outward MP in tradable sector j by country s in country h is
given by:
Ojhs =
∑
m
pijmhsp
j
mQ
j
m ∀j = 1, ..., J, (1.33)
OJ+1hs = pi
J+1
hhs p
J+1
h Q
J+1
h  = J + 1. (1.34)
Similarly, total outward MP from country s to the rest of the world in sector j can
be obtained by summing (1.33) and (1.34) over all location-of-production countries
h:
Ojs =
∑
h
OJ+1hs ∀j = 1, ..., J + 1.
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Factor Allocations: The factor allocations are now calculated across sectors.
The total production revenue in tradable sector j in country h is given by
∑N
m=1
∑N
i=1 pi
j
nsip
j
nQ
j
n.
The optimal sectoral factor allocations in country h and tradable sector j must thus
satisfy:
N∑
m=1
N∑
s=1
pijmhsp
j
mQ
j
m =
whL
j
h
αjβj
=
rhK
j
h
(1− αj) βj . (1.35)
For the non-tradable sector J + 1, the optimal factor allocations in country m are
given by:
N∑
s=1
piJ+1hhs p
J+1
h Q
J+1
h =
whL
J+1
h
αJ+1βJ+1
=
rhK
J+1
h
(1− αJ+1) βJ+1 . (1.36)
1.4.1 Estimating the Model’s Parameters: T˜ jh , T
j
h , g
j
hs, and
djmh
In this section, we estimate the sector-level technology parameters for local producers
(T jh) in thirty-five countries, nine tradable sectors, and one non-tradable sector, in
two steps. First, the effective technology parameter (T˜ jh) is estimated by fitting the
structural trade gravity equation implied by the model, using trade and production
data.30 In this step, we also estimate the bilateral trade cost at the sectoral level.
Then, we proceed to estimate the corresponding MP barriers at the sectoral level by
fitting the structural MP gravity equation implied by the model using foreign affiliate
sales data and production data for local firms.31 Finally, using the effective technology
parameters and the MP barriers, we calculate the effective technology parameters for
30The gravity equations are derived from the model under the assumption that productivity
draws are uncorrelated across host countries. Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2011) use aggregated
multinational production data to calibrate h and d assuming two alternative values for ρ, ρ = 0
and ρ = 0.5. The goodness of the model measured by how it matches the patterns of the data is
extremely similar in both cases. The only variable where ρ = 0 performs better is in accounting
for foreign affiliate exports. As pointed out by (Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2013a) and more
recently by (Tintelnot, 2012), this is a consequence of the limitations of a model of MP that excludes
the fixed cost of operating an affiliate overseas. However, this simplified assumption buys us the
tractability of using the gravity equation for trade and MP, which is directly comparable to previous
work that has focused on the estimation of the mean productivity parameters using trade data at
the sectoral level.
31For every country h and sector j, the production of local producers
(
Ijhh
)
is calculated by
subtracting the production of foreign affiliates from total production.
30
every country-sector pair, solving the following system of equations:
T˜ jh =
∑
s
T js g
j
hs
−θ ∀j = 1 : J + 1
The effective productivity estimates that emerge from the gravity equation reflect the
average productivity of all producers in a given sector of the economy. Controlling
for factor and intermediate input prices, as well as for trade barriers, a country that
produces a larger share of its domestic demand exhibits a high effective productivity.
A relatively high effective productivity could be a reflection of highly productive
local producers, but it could also be a reflection of the access to superior technologies
available to foreign affiliates operating in the host market. Intuitively, a country that
produces a larger share of its output using domestic technologies has a higher relative
fundamental productivity. Conversely, if the share of foreign affiliate production is
high, the country has a relatively low state of technology in that sector. Therefore,
the mean of the absolute difference between T jh and its effective counterpart T˜
j
h in
each sector is a measure of the absolute transfer of technology generated by MP, while
the difference in the dispersion of effective and fundamental technology across sectors
is a measure of the effect of MP on comparative advantage.
1.4.1.1 Multinational Production and Trade Gravity Equations
The capacity to relate the model to observables in the data relies on the properties
derived from the seminal work of Eaton and Kortum (2002). In particular, the average
spending in country m on goods produced in country h by affiliates from country s is
equal over all exporters and sources of technology, implying that the share of goods
country m buys from country h using country s technologies is also the share of its
expenditure on these goods.
pijmhs =
X
j
mhs
Xjm
. (1.37)
By summing pijmhs across all source countries s,
32 we obtain county h’s trade shares,
reflecting the probability that country m will import sector j goods produced in
country h, regardless of the source of the technology used in production (pijmhs):
pijmh =
∑
s
pijmhs =
∑
s
X
j
mhs
Xjm
=
X
j
mh
Xjm
. (1.38)
32Note that pijmhs is independent across source countries, because a given source country s would
not set operations in two different host countries h in order to serve a given market m.
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Substitute the derived expression for pijmhs (see equation (1.29)) in equation (1.38):
Xjmh
Xjm
=
∑
s
[
T js
(
gjhs
)−θj (
cjhd
j
mh
)−θj∑
s T
j
s
∑
k
(
gjks
)−θj (
cjkd
j
mk
)−θj
]
Xjmh
Xjm
=
T˜ jh
(
cjhd
j
mh
)−θj∑
k T˜
j
k
(
cjkd
j
mk
)−θ , (1.39)
where T˜ jh =
∑
s T
j
s
(
gjhs
)−θj
. This implies that the effective technology (T˜ jh) employed
by a country to produce and compete in the international market is a combination of
the average productivity of the local producers in sector j and the average productivity
of the foreign affiliates operating in the domestic market. But the local economy has
a limited capacity to absorb foreign technologies, reflected by the cost of producing
in a foreign market (gjhs).
To get the specification that will be taken to the data, equation (1.39) is divided
by country m’s normalized import share:
Xjmh/X
j
m
Xjmm/X
j
m
=
T˜ jh
(
cjhd
j
mh
)−θ
T˜ jm
(
cjm
)−θ . (1.40)
Taking logs to both sides of the equation, we get the trade gravity equation:
ln
(
Xjmh
Xjmm
)
= ln
(
T˜ jh
(
cjh
)−θ)− ln(T˜ jm (cjm)−θ)− θ ln (djmh) . (1.41)
Next, we derive a gravity equation for bilateral MP to identify MP barriers (gjhs)
and the state of technology of local producers (T jh) for every country h and sector j
in the sample.
The volume of foreign affiliate sales from source country s in host country h
depends on two things: (1) the size of the markets foreign affiliates can access from
the host country, including the host market itself; and (2) the probability that foreign
affiliates from country s, by locating in market h, offer the lowest possible price to
consumers in market m (pimhs). Therefore, the sales of foreign affiliates from country
s located in country h in sector j are given by:
Ijhs =
∑
m
pimhsX
j
m
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Ijhs =
T js
(
gjhsc
j
h
)−θ∑
s
∑
k T
j
s
(
gjks
)−θ (
cjkd
j
hk
)−θ ∑
m
djmh
−θ × (pjh)−θ(
pjm
)−θ ·Xjm,
Ijhs =
T js
(
gjhsc
j
h
)−θ(
pjh
)−θ Ξjh (1.42)
where Ξjh =
∑
m
(
djmhp
j
h
pjm
)−θ
Xjm =
Xjh
2
Xjhh
,
Ijhs
Ξjh
=
Ijhs
Xjh
Xjhh
Xjh
=
T js
(
gjhsc
j
h
)−θ(
pjh
)−θ . (1.43)
In this equation, the term Ijhs/X
j
h represents the output share of country s’s foreign
affiliates in the total output of country h in sector j; while Xjhh/X
j
h corresponds to
the share of spending in country h on goods produced in country h, regardless of the
source of the technology used in production.
Dividing Ijhs/Ξ
j
h by its counterpart in the host country (I
j
hh/Ξ
j
h), we get:
Ijhs/Ξ
j
h
Ijhh/Ξ
j
h
=
T js
(
gjhs
)−θ
T jh
. (1.44)
This expression is analogous to the one for bilateral trade flows presented in equa-
tion (1.40). The only difference is that the unit cost of country h’s input bundle
cancels out of the gravity equation. Using technology from country s to produce in
country h entails hiring factors of production and buying intermediate input in the
host country h. Taking logs at both sides of equation (1.44), we get our preferred
normalization for estimation:
ln
(
Ijhs
Ijhh
)
= ln
(
T js
)− ln (T jh)− θ ln (gjhs) . (1.45)
Equation (1.45) implies that countries with a higher state of technology in sector
j should have larger market shares, both abroad and domestically. Therefore, a
relatively larger share of their domestic production should be in the hands of local
producers and they should also have a greater presence in foreign markets in sector j
relative to other countries. Conversely, less productive countries should have higher
shares of production in the hands of foreign producers and smaller market shares
abroad.
33
Bilateral Barriers to Multinational Production and Trade: gjhs and d
j
mh
To estimate MP and trade bilateral cost at a sectoral level, we assume a relationship
between djmh and g
j
hs, and observable data. In particular, the log of iceberg trade cost
ln(djmh) and the log of iceberg MP cost ln(g
j
hs) are modeled as a linear function of
distance, and whether countries share a common border, common language, regional
trade agreements, and common currency:
ln
(
djmh
)
= djk + b
j
mh + lan
j
mh + CU
j
mh +RTA
j
mh + ex
j
h + ν
j
mh, (1.46)
ln
(
gjhs
)
= djk + b
j
hs + lan
j
hs + CU
j
hs +RTA
j
hs + source
j
s + µ
j
hs, (1.47)
where dk represents an indicator variable of the distance between countries m and h
lying in the kth distance interval. Intervals are measured in miles: [0, 350], [350, 750],
[750, 1500], [1500, 3000], [3000, 6000] and [6000,max]. The variable bj indicates whether
two countries share a common border; lanj, whether they have a common language;
CU j, whether they belong to a currency union; and RTAj, whether they are part
of a regional trade agreement. Finally, νjmh and µ
j
hs denote the error terms of the
trade and MP gravity equations, respectively. They reflect the trade and MP cost
coming from all other factors and are assumed to be orthogonal to the regressors
for estimation proposes. These features of trade cost are similar to those of (Eaton
and Kortum, 2002a), and are extended to the specification of MP cost. Additionally,
based on empirical evidence showing that the elasticity of trade volumes to trade
barriers varies significantly across sectors (Do and Levchenko, 2007), we allow each
of these bilateral variables to have a different effect on trade (djmh) and MP cost (g
j
hs)
across sectors.
The asymmetric specification of the trade barriers in equation (1.46) follows
Waugh (2010), who includes an exporter effect
(
exjh
)
. This represents the extra
cost to country h of exporting a good to country m in sector j. In order to account
for bilateral trade volumes and relative price data, Waugh argues that trade cost must
be systematically asymmetric, with less developed countries facing a higher cost of
exporting relative to more developed countries.33
Following a similar argument, our specification for MP barriers includes a source
effect (sourcejs), which represents the extra cost to country s of producing a good in
33In the data, tradable prices are unresponsive to a country’s income level. Including an importer
effect in the trade cost specification will predict that less developed countries face higher prices
relative to more developed countries, a prediction that is inconsistent with the data. Therefore,
the assumption that less developed countries face higher costs of importing, compared with more
developed countries, is not appealing.
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country h in sector j. More specifically, less developed countries face systematically
higher cost to produce overseas.34 The inclusion of a source effect produces estimates
that are consistent with the observed patterns of prices and income data. Three
empirical observations are highlighted. First, the majority of the output is produced
by local producers—home bias—and it is positively correlated with the country’s
income level. Second, there is a systematic correlation between bilateral MP shares
and relative level of development: the larger the difference in relative income, the
larger the disparity in bilateral MP share between two countries. Finally, tradable and
non-tradable prices are positively correlated with income per worker. Section ?? in
the Appendix presents evidence to support the chosen specification in equation (1.47).
1.4.1.2 Estimated State of Technology: T jh and T˜
j
h
In order to recover the effective technology parameters T˜ jh and trade cost d
j
mh implied
by the pattern of trade at the sectoral level, we estimate trade gravity equation (1.41),
from which −ln
(
T˜ jm(c
j
m)
−θ
)
is recovered as an imported fixed effect.
ln
(
Xjmh
Xjmm
)
= ln
(
T˜ jh
(
cjh
)−θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
exporter fixed effect
− ln
(
T˜ jm
(
cjm
)−θ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
importer fixed effect
−θdjk − θbjmh − θlanjmh − θCU jmh − θRTAjmh − θexjh︸ ︷︷ ︸
bilateral observables
−θνjmh︸ ︷︷ ︸
error term
.
(1.48)
Isolating T˜ jm from the estimated importer fixed effect entails a two-step procedure,
as proposed by (Shikher, 2012).35 First, we compute the cost of an input bundle in
host country h and sector j (cjh), which is a function of wages wh, return of capital
rh, and intermediate input prices p
j
h (see equation (1.27)). There are data available
for wh and rh, but intermediate input prices at the sectoral level are not observable.
Therefore, tradable prices in each sector-country pair
(
pjh
)
, are obtained using both
the estimated importer fixed effect and data on share of expenditure on domestic
goods
(
Xjhh/X
j
h
)
. Finally, cjh is constructed to disentangle T˜
j
m from the importer fixed
34There appears to be no precedent in the estimation of asymmetric barriers for MP at either the
aggregate or the sectoral level. Previous efforts assume an aggregate and symmetric specification,
where the cost that country s faces to produce in country h is equal to the cost country h faces to
produce in country s. See (e.g., Ramondo and Rodr´ıguez-Clare, 2013a; Arkolakis et al., 2013; ?)
35See section 1.12.1 in the Appendix for details.
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effect. The bilateral trade cost djmh is computed based on the estimated coefficients:
d̂jmh = exp{d̂jk + b̂jmh + l̂an
j
mh + ĈU
j
mh + R̂TA
j
mh + êx
j
h + µ̂
j
mh}.
To estimate the bilateral sector-level MP cost
(
gjsh
)
, we fitted the following gravity
equation:
ln
(
Ijhs
Ijhh
)
= ln
(
T js
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
source fixed effect
− ln (T jh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
host fixed effect
−θdjk − θbjhs − θlanjhs − θCU jhs − θRTAjhs − θsourcejs︸ ︷︷ ︸
bilateral observables
−θµjhs︸ ︷︷ ︸
error term
,
(1.49)
where gjhs is computed based on the estimated coefficients:
ĝjhs = exp{d̂jk + b̂jhs + l̂an
j
hs + ĈU
j
hs + R̂TA
j
hs + ŝource
j
s + µ̂
j
hs}.
Note that the exporter êxjh and the source ŝource
j
s, components of the trade and MP
cost, respectively, are calculated using the exporter (source) and importer (host) fixed
effect estimated from the corresponding trade (MP) gravity equations. In particular:
êxjh = −1/θ [importer fixed effect+exporter fixed effect] ,
ŝource
j
s = −1/θ [source fixed effect+host fixed effect] .
Finally, using ĝjhs and T˜
j
s for every country pair and sector j, we solve for the
system of equations (1.50) in order to recover the technology parameters of local
producers (T js ):
T˜ jh =
∑
i
(gjhs)
−θT js ∀h, s = 1, ...J + 1, (1.50)

T˜ j1
T˜ j2
..
..
T˜ jN

=

gj11 g
j
12 .. .. g
j
1N
gj21 g
j
22 .. .. g
j
2N
.. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. .. ..
gjN1 g
j
N2 .. .. g
j
NN

×

T j1
T j2
..
..
T jN

.
The estimates derived from this procedure constitute the baseline for the analysis
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that follows. Note that the estimates of trade costs include the residual from the trade
gravity regression (µ̂jmh). This, together with the estimated fixed effects, ensures that
the model exactly fits the observed bilateral trade for every sector. This is not the
case for MP sales, however. Although the residual from the MP gravity equation
is also included in the MP cost calculation, in our baseline estimation we solve for
the fundamental technology parameters
(
T jh
)
using the system of equations in (1.50)
rather than relying on the source and location fixed effects estimated in the MP
gravity equation (1.49).
To ensure robustness, we estimate the productivity of local producers (T jh) with
the MP gravity equation, by exponentiating the host fixed effect. Then, the effective
technology parameters (T˜ jh) are computed, solving for each equation in (1.50) inde-
pendently for each country. In this case, we match bilateral MP exactly—given the
estimated MP cost and the fixed effect from the MP gravity—but we do not match
bilateral trade flows. The estimated technology parameters under both methods are
highly correlated (0.78) and in fact the second approach yields a more pronounced
difference in the pattern of comparative advantage between local and foreign produc-
ers. We choose to estimate the overall productivity from the trade gravity equation
in order to obtain estimates consistent with the ones obtained in trade-only models
where there is no separation between the overall and local productivity.
Note that the stochastic approach developed by Eaton and Kortum (2002) implies
that every country should buy a non-zero amount of goods from every country-sector
pair, and also should host operations for all source countries in each sector. In fact,
the MP bilateral matrix in each sector has many recorded zeros, even at a high level of
aggregation. This has consequences in the estimation of the gravity equations above
as well as in the computation of the equilibrium. The gravity equations are estimated
using Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML), suggested by Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006), to alleviate any bias from log-linearizing (equations 1.45 and 1.41)
in the presence of heteroskedasticity and the omission of zero trade flows. Results are
not much different when compared with the ones obtained by ordinary least squares
(OLS), although as expected the OLS overestimates the elasticity of trade and MP
flows to distance and other resistance variables. Regarding the computation, when
computing the equilibrium, we set trade and MP cost to be arbitrarily large for the
instances in which Xjmh and I
j
hs are zero.
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1.5 Multinational Production and Comparative Ad-
vantage
This section describes the basic patterns in how estimated sector-level technology
varies across local and foreign producers for all of the countries in the sample. In
particular, we measure the effect of MP activity on the strength of comparative
advantage. Using bilateral multinational gross output and international trade data
at the sectoral level, two measures of production technology are estimated. The first
corresponds to the technology of local producers (i.e., excluding foreign affiliates)
(T js ), while the second corresponds to the state of technology of all producers in the
economy (T˜ js ). Two sets of results are presented for the countries’ relative technology:
with respect to the United States and with respect to the global frontier. The global
frontier in each sector is calculated by taking the geometric mean of the two highest
values of T˜ js .
The baseline analysis uses the dispersion of productivities within each sector (θ =
4.2), which is the preferred value of Simonovska and Waugh (2010). As a robustness
check, results are presented for two alternative values for the dispersion parameter:
(1) the preferred estimation of Eaton and Kortum (2002), θ=8.28; and (2) a sectoral
θj estimated by Caliendo and Parro (2012).
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1.5.1 Local and Overall Productivity Patterns
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics of relative technologies both for local produc-
ers and for all producers. The first column reports the percentage change in the mean
absolute distance to the frontier across all tradable sectors between local producers’
productivity (T jn)
1
θ and all producers’ productivity (T˜ jn)
1
θ , a measure of the change
in absolute advantage due to MP
[(
T˜ jn/T
j
n
) 1
θ − 1
]
. The second column reports the
percentage change in the coefficient of variation across tradable sectors between local
producers’ productivity (T jn)
1
θ and all producers’ productivity (T˜ jn)
1
θ . The latter can
be interpreted as a measure of the change in comparative advantage implied by for-
eigner affiliate activity. In particular, the coefficient of variation across sectors is com-
puted for (T˜ jn)
1
θ and (T jn)
1
θ and the percentage change between them
[
CV (T˜ jn)
1
θ
CV (T jn)
1
θ
− 1
]
is recorded. Larger negative changes imply greater reduction in productivity disper-
sion across sectors and thus greater reduction in comparative advantage attributable
36See Table 1.18 in Tables and Figures for the values of θj by sector under this specification.
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to the effect of MP. Conversely, positive values imply that a country’s comparative
advantage has become stronger—productivity dispersion increases—as a consequence
of MP.
Table 1.1: Change in Absolute and Comparative Advantage
Variable Mean
Group 1 (10 countries) ∆CV -0.19
∆T 0.09
Group 2 (25 countries) ∆CV -0.29
∆T 0.17
All sample (35 countries) ∆CV -0.25
∆T 0.14
For different values of θ the results are remarkably similar. The correlation be-
tween the T ji ’s estimated under θ = 8.28 and the ones estimated under the baseline
(θ = 4.2) is above 0.90. Also, the average change in comparative advantage due to
MP is similar for both values of θ, −0.24 and −0.25, respectively. Moreover, there is a
strong positive correlation in the change in absolute advantage (0.50) and comparative
advantage (0.48) under alternative values of θ.
The left panel in Table 1.2 ranks countries based on the average technology up-
grade allowed by MP. In particular, Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary,
and Austria are the countries where absolute advantage has been affected most by
the activity of foreign affiliates in their local markets, while Israel, Greece, Belgium,
Australia, and New Zealand have seen the smallest increase in their mean productiv-
ity. In the right panel in Table 1.2, countries are ranked according to the change in
productivity dispersion between (T jh)
1
θ and (T˜ jh)
1
θ . As can be seen, Austria, Poland,
Czech Republic, Portugal, and Spain stand as the countries with the largest reduc-
tion in comparative advantage, while Bulgaria, France, Germany, and Latvia show the
largest increase in relative difference in productivity across sectors. Finally, Norway,
Greece, and the United Kingdom register the lowest reduction in relative technology
difference across sectors.
Ranked by technology level, the top panel of Table 1.14 in the Tables and Figures
shows the change in average and relative productivity for the ten most advanced
countries, and the bottom panel groups the rest of the countries in the sample. For the
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Table 1.2: Average and Relative Change in Productivity due to MP
Average Change Relative Change
Top 10: Largest Change Top 10: Largest Change
Countries Countries
Czech Rep. 0.41 Poland -0.53
Poland 0.35 Czech Rep -0.52
Lithuania 0.30 Spain -0.52
Hungary 0.29 Portugal -0.52
Austria 0.24 Canada -0.51
Netherlands 0.22 Austria -0.48
Slovakia 0.22 Italy -0.47
Portugal 0.22 Turkey -0.43
Sweden 0.20 Russia -0.42
Canada 0.17 Sweden -0.41
Turkey 0.14 Slovenia -0.39
Bottom 10: Smallest Change Bottom 10: Smallest Change
Countries Countries
Finland 0.09 Japan -0.14
France 0.07 Belgium -0.08
Switzerland 0.06 Denmark -0.07
Denmark 0.04 Greece -0.06
Norway 0.04 United Kingdom -0.06
New Zealand 0.04 Norway -0.04
Australia 0.03 Latvia 0.05
Belgium 0.02 Germany 0.08
Greece 0.01 France 0.14
Israel 0.01 Bulgaria 0.14
Notes: This table reports the ten largest (top panel) and ten smallest (bottom panel) countries
affected by MP, measured by the percentage change in the mean absolute distance to the United
States in T
1
θ
all − T
1
θ
mp across all tradable sectors.
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set of countries with the highest effective technology, the mean productivity increases
by 19 percent, while the differences in productivity across sectors are reduced by 9
percent due to multinational activity. The less advanced countries experience an even
higher increase in mean productivity (17 percent) as well as a larger reduction in the
heterogeneity of productivity across sectors (29 percent).37 The difference in means
across both groups is statistically significant, showing that, even when both groups
are clearly affected by MP, the impact on absolute and comparative advantage is
relatively larger in less advanced countries.38
1.5.2 The Effect of MP on Comparative Advantage
The results presented in the previous section suggest that MP is unevenly affect-
ing the average sectoral technology. In particular, the technology boost generated
by multinational firms operating in the host market is disproportionately larger in
comparative disadvantage sectors. As mentioned in Section 1.1, this is in part a
consequence of a larger foreign affiliate output share in low-productivity sectors.
Table 1.11 in Tables and Figures shows the correlation between the estimated
average productivity of local producers (T ji ) and the sectoral MP in country h. For
most countries in the sample, the correlation is negative and statistically significant
at the 10 percent level.39 When all of the countries and sectors are pooled, after
controlling for country- and sector-specific characteristics, the overall correlation is
negative and significant at the one percent level (−0.304). Figure 1.4 shows the result
of this conditional correlation along with a fitted regression line.40
To shed further light on whether sectors in which local producers show greater
disadvantage are the ones that receive the biggest boost from MP, making the compar-
ative advantage of the entire economy look weaker, consider the following regression:
37If instead of the entire sample, we compare the top ten and the bottom ten countries, the
already highlighted differences become even more pronounced for the change in absolute advantage
(0.22 for the bottom ten countries), while the change in the coefficient of variation stays virtually
the same.
38These results are in line with the findings of Levchenko and Zhang (2011). Exploiting the
temporal dimension, they found that over time countries increased their level of technology and also
experienced a reduction in the dispersion of relative productivity across sectors.
39Similar results are obtained if instead MP is normalized by absorption, calculated as output
minus exports.
40This correlation is similar to the one in Figure 1.1 presented in Section 1.1, but it replaces the
calculated total factor productivity (TFP ) with the state of technology estimated relying on the
structure of the model
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Figure 1.4: Multinational Production and Technology
log
(
T˜ jh
T jh
)1/θj
= β· log (T jh)1/θj + γh + γj + νhj (1.51)
On the left-hand side of the equation is the technological upgrade in country h in
sector j,
(
T˜ jh/T
j
h
)1/θj
, generated by multinational activity. On the right-hand side,
the regressor of interest is the mean technology of local producers (T jh). The speci-
fication includes country and sector fixed effects.41 The country effect captures the
average change in productivity due to MP across all sectors in each country—the ab-
solute advantage effect. The β coefficient picks up the impact of local producers’ pro-
ductivity on the relative difference between overall productivity and local producers’
productivity. In particular, a negative β implies that relative to the country-specific
average, the least productive sectors get the largest boost in technology from MP; see
Table 1.3 and Figure 1.5 below. The results are robust to alternative estimations of
average productivity and values of θ are illustrated in the Appendix A.
The results presented in this section stand as evidence of the role of MP in chang-
ing the pattern of comparative advantage in a country by affecting disproportionately
more those sectors in which local producers exhibit relative disadvantage. In this con-
text, sectoral trade models that ignore MP greatly understate the relative technology
differences across sectors among local producers.
To capture the reduction in comparative advantage generated by multinational
activity, we compute the change in average trade shares (Xjnn/X
j
n) when the coefficient
of variation of local producers’ technology is one percent larger than the coefficient
41All of the standard errors are clustered by country, to account for unspecified heteroskedasticity
at the country level. All the results are robust, however, to clustering at the sectoral level.
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Table 1.3: Pooled Regression Results
Dep.Variable: ln
(
T˜ jh
)1/θ
− ln (T jh)1/θ
ln
(
T jh
)1/θ
-0.951***
(0.038)
Observations 315
R2 0.850
Sector FE yes
Coutry FE yes
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the country level in parentheses. Significance is denoted: *
p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. This table reports the results of regressing the technology
upgrade due to MP in host country h in sector j
(
T˜ jh/T
j
h
)1/θj
on the productivity of local producers,(
T jh
)1/θj
.
Figure 1.5: Impact of Multinational Production in Technological Change
Notes: This figure shows the conditional correlation of the technology upgrade due to MP in host
country h in sector j
(
T˜ jh/T
j
h
)1/θj
(vertical axis) and the productivity of local producers,
(
T jh
)1/θj
(horizontal axis) after controlling for sector and country fixed effects.
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of variation of all producers in the economy, while keeping constant the average
productivity—or absolute advantage. In the next section, a counterfactual scenario is
constructed to illustrate the trade implications of the actual reduction in comparative
advantage due to MP.
The basic patterns of the data are illustrated with some examples for individual
countries. Figure (1.18) present scatterplots of tradable sector productivity both for
local producers and for the overall economy. On the x-axis, sectors are placed in order
of their distance from the global productivity frontier, such that the local producers’
comparative advantage sectors are furthest to the left. The two countries in the top
panel, Canada and Portugal, show a pronounced weakening of comparative advantage
according to our estimates. Japan does not exhibit much weakening of comparative
advantage: while there is an average productivity increase, there is no systematic
relationship in terms of distance to frontier between local producers and all producers
in the economy.
1.6 Welfare Analysis
This section computes the welfare impact of MP taking into account the affects of
multinational production on comparative advantage. After solving the model using
the preferred estimates of parameters for technology, MP barriers, and trade barriers
(following the algorithm set forth in Section 1.11 in the Appendix), we now proceed
to evaluate the fit of the model as well as its implications for welfare.
1.6.1 Model Fit
The goodness of the model can be evaluated by how closely it matches the patterns of
trade and MP data along several dimensions. Table 1.16 in Tables and Figures reports
statistics from the data and the calibrated model. It reports the mean, the median,
and the correlation between the model and the data for wages, return of capital,
and manufactured imports as a share of GDP, as well as inward and outward MP
as a share of total output. Figures 1.19, 1.20, 1.21, and 1.22 present the comparison
between the model and the data for each of this variables.
First, the ability of the model to replicate the income differences across countries
is tested by comparing the wages and return of capital in every country h relative
to the United States. This is a non-trivial test for the model, for two reasons: (1)
because trade and MP interact in every tradable sector, and (2) because the model
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includes a non-tradable sector, where multinationals have a significant presence. The
median relative wages of the model (0.79) are very close to those reported in the
data (0.71), although they are slightly higher in the model. The association between
relative wages in the model and wages observed in the data is very high (0.92).
Second, even though the fundamental technology parameters and the MP barriers
were not estimated to match the bilateral MP shares, the statistics presented for the
model and the data are similar. Even when the model overestimates the share of total
output produced by foreign affiliates, it is not by much—the median of the aggregate
MP-to-output ratio is 0.30 in the model and 0.26 in the data, while the correlation
equals 0.76. This is somewhat similar to the outcomes observed by comparing the
production of a country’s affiliates overseas with total production within the country’s
frontiers. Note that in the data the mean of the outward-MP-to-output ratio (0.21)
is considerably higher than the median (0.09), which tells us that the distribution of
outward MP to output is skewed to the left. The model replicates this pattern, as
shown by a high correlation with the data (0.8).
Finally, we assess how well the model captures the trade patterns observed in the
data. Looking at the ratio of total imports to GDP, we can see that the mean of
the model and the mean of the data are very close and they have a high degree of
correlation.
Next we use the model to construct a number of counterfactuals that allow us to
understand the mechanism underlying the relationship between MP and comparative
advantage.
1.6.2 Counterfactual 1: Gains from MP in a Multisectoral
Model
As mentioned previously, gains from MP are defined by the proportional change in
country h’s real income per capita as we move from a counterfactual equilibrium with
trade but no MP to the actual equilibrium. In a competitive model, total income
equals the total returns to factors of production. Therefore welfare—or real income
per-capita—is expressed by:
wh + rhkh
Ph
The gains form MP are computed then by solving the baseline model, calculating the
welfare, and comparing this welfare to a counterfactual scenario in which all countries
are assumed to be open to trade but close to foreign producers. In order to assess
the effect of heterogeneity in MP shares across sectors, Table 4 compares the gains
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from MP in a multi-sectoral model with the gains from MP in a uni-sectoral model.
The latter by definition assumes that MP shares are the same across all sectors of the
economy.
As can be observed in the table, the mean gains from MP are 15 percentage points
higher in a multi-sector framework compared with a uni-sector framework. The real
income increase following an opening to multinational activity is 27 percent compared
to the 12 percent obtained in an scenario where MP shares are homogeneous across
sectors. Either measured by the median or by the mean, the heterogeneity of foreign
affiliate sales across sectors almost double the gains in welfare associated to MP
activity. This exercise shows that uni-sector models significantly understate the gains
from multinational activity. Similar to the effect in gains from trade due to sectoral
heterogeneity (Levchenko and Zhang, 2013), deviations from equal MP shares across
sectors due to comparative advantage, significantly increases the gains from MP.
Table 1.4: Gains from MP in a Multi-sectoral Model
Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
MP Gains (Multisector) (%)
Counterfactual Vs 27.01 15.59 0.29 9.58 93.48
Baseline
MP Gains (Uni-sector) (%)
Counterfactual Vs 12.03 8.42 0.17 0.02 79.35
Baseline
1.6.3 Counterfactual 2: Proportional Technology Transfer
In order to assess the effect of MP on comparative advantage, this section presents
a counterfactual scenario where MP changes only the average productivity of the
economy, while keeping constant the country’s comparative advantage. To achieve
this outcome, we calculate the geometric average across sectors of the productivity
of local producers
(
T jh
)
and all producers in the economy
(
T˜ jh
)
. The ratio of the
two tells us the average productivity increase due to multinational activity. The
counterfactual effective productivity is calculated by increasing T jh by the increase
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factor
(
∏J
j=1 T˜
j
h)
1/J
(
∏J
j=1 T
j
h)
1/J in every tradable sector j. Figure (1.6) illustrates this exercise.
(
T˜ jh
)
count
= T jh ×
(∏J
j=1 T˜
j
h
)1/J
(∏J
j=1 T
j
h
)1/J ∀j = 1..J
Figure 1.6: Counterfactual 2: Proportional Technology Transfer
Notes: This figure displays the tradable-sector productivities, expressed as the ratio to the global
frontier productivity for the overall economy (dash lines) and for local producers exclusively (solid
blue line). The x-axis labels sectors in descending order of the ratio to the frontier of local producers
productivity (so that the sectors where local producers are relative more productive are on the left).
The dash red line represents the productivity for the overall economy in the actual equilibrium. The
dash blue line represents the overall economy productivity in the counterfactual scenario in which
MP affects all sectors proportionally. The average productivity is the same in the actual equilibrium
and in the counterfactual scenario (blue dash line and red dash line)
Table 1.5 compares the gains from trade in the actual equilibrium with the coun-
terfactual scenario. The magnitudes are substantial. The mean gains from trade in
the counterfactual scenario are almost double the actual gains from trade, going from
10.39 percent to 19.05 percent for the average country in our sample, with a minimum
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Table 1.5: Proportional Technology Transfer
Mean Median Std Dev Min Max
Gains from Trade (%)
Actual Gains 10.39 9.28 0.05 1.19 24.53
Counterfactual 19.05 17.42 0.08 9.18 33.81
Welfare Change (%)
Baseline Vs -3.55 -5.36 0.04 -13.34 1.13
Counterfactual
Trade Openness (%)
Baseline Vs 13.32 10.21
Counterfactual
gain of 9.18 percent and a maximum of 33.8 percent. Next, comparing the change
in real wage between the baseline and the counterfactual scenario, we find that the
sole effect of MP on comparative advantage is expressed in a reduction in real wage
of 3.55 percent. Trade openness, measured by the ratio of a country’s trade (exports
plus imports) to its GDP, is almost 13.3 percent higher in the counterfactual, where
MP does not affect the country’s comparative advantage.
If instead we impose a proportional increase in the productivity of local producers
in all sectors such that it matches the observed aggregate trade shares, rather than
the observed aggregate productivity, we get similar results.
1.6.4 Counterfactual 3: Multinational Production and Non-
Tradables
Multinational production is the only option available for producers in the non-tradable
sector to serve a foreign market. Therefore, it is not surprising that about 60 percent
of MP activity is in non-tradables. Moreover, non-tradables account for a significant
portion of the intermediate inputs used in the majority of tradable sectors. Thus,
access to cheaper non-tradable goods due to MP activity can increase the competi-
tiveness of tradable sectors, thereby improving the welfare of the economy.
Table 5 shows the change in welfare going from a counterfactual scenario, where
the barriers to investment in the non-tradable sector are arbitrarily large, to the actual
equilibrium. The results in the table show that real wages increase by 4.7 percent,
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Table 1.6: Multinational Production and Non-Tradables
Mean Median Std.Dev Min Max
Welfare Change (%)
Counterfactual Vs 6.53 4.69 0.05 1.54 12.33
Baseline
Tradable Price Index (%)
Counterfactual Vs 1.62 1.87 0.04 0.63 2.13
Baseline
while the reduction in the tradable price index is 1.9 percent.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that by omitting the sectoral heterogeneity of MP sales and there-
fore its impact on comparative advantage, existing models of trade and MP in uni-
sectoral frameworks systematically overstate the gains from trade and understate the
gains from MP. A unique industry-level dataset of bilateral foreign affiliate sales for
thirty-five countries documents a new empirical regularity: multinational production
is disproportionately allocated to industries where local producers exhibit compara-
tive disadvantage.
To quantify this phenomenon, the role of differing productivity levels across in-
dustries is incorporated into a Ricardian general equilibrium model of trade and
multinational production. This paper offers the first set of productivity estimates at
the sectoral level for local producers as well as for the entire economy. Compared
with previous uni-sectoral models, this paper offers more reliable estimates of funda-
mental technology, since previous literature does not effectively isolate the technology
corresponding to local producers at the sectoral level.
There are three main contributions stemming from this work. First, it shows that
comparative advantage plays a crucial role in determining the allocation of multi-
national production across sectors: foreign affiliate activity is higher on average in
sectors where the host economy has comparative disadvantage. The analytical results
and quantitative estimations reveal that the effect of multinational production on the
state of technology is higher in those sectors in which local producers are relatively less
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productive, implying that multinational production weakens a country’s comparative
advantage. Second, it shows that gains from trade are about half of what they would
be in the absence of sectoral heterogeneity in multinational activity. In particular, in
a counterfactual scenario in which multinational production affects only the average
productivity level of the host economy while keeping its comparative advantage un-
changed, estimated gains from trade would be twice as large (19.04 percent compared
with 10.4 percent). Multinational production not only closes the absolute technology
gap across countries, it also reduces the relative technology differences across sectors
within a country. Third, it shows that heterogeneity of foreign affiliate sales across
sectors is quantitatively important in accounting for welfare gains associated with
MP activity.
The results of this study highlight the importance of incorporating a sectoral
dimension in the analysis of MP activity. It distinguishes between the absolute and
comparative advantage effects of MP, which is essential to improve our understanding
of the welfare implications and the mechanism through which an economy responds
to multinational production.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1.7: Effect of Comparative Advantage on MP Allocation
Notes: This figure displays the tradable-sector productivities of local producers, expressed as the
ratio to the global frontier productivity for a representative economy. The x-axis labels sectors in
descending order of the ratio to the frontier (so that the sectors where local producers are relative
more productive are on the left). The Figure shows that the share of MP on the host country’s
output is higher in sectors where the relative productivity of local producers is low.
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Figure 1.8: Effect of MP on Comparative Advantage
Notes: This figure displays the tradable-sector productivities, expressed as the ratio to the global
frontier productivity for the overall economy (red) and for local producers exclusively (blue). The
x-axis labels sectors in descending order of the ratio to the frontier of local producers productivity
(so that the sectors where local producers are relative more productive are on the left). The Figure
shows that the red line is above the blue line for all tradable sector and that the red line is steeper
than the blue line; indicating that MP increases the productivity in all sectors but it affects more
the productivity of those sectors where local producers are relatively less productive.
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Figure 1.9: Heterogeneity of Bilateral MP/output Across Sectors
Notes: This figure displays MP/output for nine tradable sectors for four selected host economies
(Canada, Japan, Portugal and Sweden). The x-axis represent the source countries; the y-axis repre-
sent the sectors; and the bubbles represent the MP shares for each source-host-sector triplet. Source
countries with more presence in a host country-sector pair will have bigger bubbles. The selected
source countries are: United States, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia Federation, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom.
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Figure 1.10: Heterogeneity of Bilateral MP/output Across Sectors
Notes: This figure displays MP/output for nine tradable sectors for four selected source economies
(Canada, Japan, Portugal and Sweden). The x-axis represent the source countries; the y-axis rep-
resent the sectors; and the bubbles represent the MP shares for each source-host-sector triplet.
Source countries with more presence in a host country-sector pair will have bigger bubbles. The
selected host countries are: United States, Belgium-Luxembourg, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia Federation, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and United
Kingdom.
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Figure 1.11: Heterogeneity of MP across Sectors within a Country
Notes: This figure displays the sum of MP over output across all source countries for each host
country-sector pair. The x-axis represents the vale of MP/output in each sector, and the y-axis
show the selected host countries. The Box-and-Whisker plot shows the distribution of MP/output
across sectors for a give host country. Within the box lies 50 percent of the observations, and the
whiskers, are drawn to span all data points within 1.5 interquartile range of the upper and lower
quartile. Observations beyond the whiskers are shown by the blue points.
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Figure 1.12: Heterogeneity of MP across Countries within a Sector
Notes: This figure displays the sum of MP over output across all source countries for each host
country-sector pair. The x-axis represent the vale of MP/output in each host country, and the y-
axis show the nine tradable sectors. The Box-and-Whisker plot shows the distribution of MP/output
across countries for a give sector. Within the box lies 50 percent of the observations, and the whiskers,
are drawn to span all data points within 1.5 interquartile range of the upper and lower quartile.
Observations beyond the whiskers are shown by the blue points
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Figure 1.13: MP by Sector: France and United Kingdom
Notes: This figure displays the sum of MP over output across all source countries for France and
United Kingdom. The x-axis represent the vale of MP/output in each sector, and the y-axis show
the nine tradable sectors.
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Figure 1.14: Bilateral MP shares and Comparative Advantage
Figure 1.15: Bilateral MP shares (employment) and Comparative Advantage
Notes: The figure in the top panel depicts the partial correlation between the share of MP
(sales) for each source-host-sector triplet (MP sharejhs) in the y-axis and the ratio of productivities
(TFPhost/TFPsource) in the x-axis. The figure in the bottom panel depicts the partial correla-
tion between the share of MP (employment) for each source-host-sector triplet (MP sharejhs) in the
y-axis and the ratio of productivities (TFPhost/TFPsource) in the x-axis. These correlations are
conditional to source-host country fixed effects and sector fixed effects.
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Figure 1.16: Relationship Between U.S. MP shares and Comparative Advantage
Figure 1.17: Relationship Between U.S. MP shares and Comparative Advantage:
Value Added
Notes: This figure depicts the partial correlation between the share of MP of U.S foreign affiliates in
each host country-sector pair and the productivity of the host economy in each sector after netting
out the country and sector fixed effects.. It considers only the sales of U.S affiliates in the country of
operation (host country); that is, excluding all their exports to third countries. The y-axis represent
the vale of MP/output in each host country-sector pair, and the x-axis represent the productivity
of each host country-sector pair. The source of the data is the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
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Figure 1.18: Relative Productivities
Notes: This figure displays the tradable-sector productivities in selected countries, expressed as the
ratio to the U.S productivity for the overall economy (red circles) and for local producers exclusively
(blue circles). The x-axis labels sectors in descending order of the ratio to the frontier of local
producers productivity (so that the sectors where local producers are relative more productive are
on the left).
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Table 1.7: List of Countries
Reporting and Partner Countries
Australia* Italy* Spain*
Austria* Japan* Sweden*
Belgium-Luxembourg* Latvia Switzerland*
Canada* Lithuania Turkey*
Czech Republic* Mexico* United Kingdom*
Denmark* Netherlands* United States*
Estonia New Zealand*
Finland* Norway*
France* Poland*
Germany* Portugal*
Greece* Romania
Hungary* Russian Federation
Ireland* Slovakia
Israel Slovenia
Partner Countries (only)
Argentina India Malaysia
Bulgaria Egypt Philippines
Brazil Hong Kong Singapore
Chile India South Africa
China Indonesia
Croatia Korea
Note: The symbol (*) means that the country belongs to the OECD. A reporting country is one
that reports or declares the foreign affiliate activity. The other party involved in the transaction is
called the partner country. The activity reported by the reporting country could refer either to the
sales of affiliates from other countries operating in its territory—or inward MP—or to the sales of
locally based multinationals with affiliates operating in foreign markets—or outward MP.
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Table 1.8: Summary Statistics (Multinational Production)
MP/Production MP/Imports MP/Absorption
Non-Tradables Tradables Tradables Tradables
Declaring Economies (35 countries)
Mean 0.28 0.24 0.73 0.61
Median 0.25 0.23 0.72 0.50
Min 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02
Max 0.84 0.59 1.86 1.79
All sample (51 countries)
Mean 0.23 0.21 0.67 0.51
Median 0.14 0.19 0.56 0.38
Min 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.02
Max 1.41 0.59 2.67 1.79
Note: MP refers to the foreign affiliate sales from all source countries in a given host-sector pair.
The columns represent MP relative to production, imports, and absorption, where absorption is
defined as production minus exports. The table presents basic statistics for the average MP rela-
tive to output, imports, and absorption across sectors within a country. The non-tradable sector
includes construction; wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels; and transportation, storage,
and communication.
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Table 1.9: Multinational Production by Country
Country Number of MP/output Number of MP/output
Source Countries (Inward) Location Countries (Outward)
Australia 2 0.15 10 0.27
Austria 22 0.37 19 0.24
Belgium 7 0.10 20 0.26
Bulgaria 26 0.26 3 0.00
Canada 7 0.43 14 0.26
Czech Rep. 25 0.48 14 0.26
Denmark 13 0.18 22 0.29
Estonia 11 0.27 5 0.02
Finland 17 0.18 20 0.34
France 26 0.30 31 0.23
Germany 26 0.27 30 0.23
Greece 1 0.03 23 0.08
Hungary 27 0.64 9 0.00
Ireland 11 0.26 15 0.27
Israel 1 0.02 12 0.22
Italy 25 0.20 20 0.23
Japan 10 0.03 23 0.25
Lithuania 16 0.15 6 0.00
Note: Inward MP refers to foreign affiliate sales from all source countries in a given host-sector pair.
Outward MP refers to the sales of foreign affiliates in all host countries for each source-sector pair.
The second column represents the number of source countries operating in each country. Similarly,
the fourth column represents the number of host countries in which each country has operations.
The third and fifth columns represent the weighted average of the shares of inward and outward MP
relative to each country’s production. Averages are weighted by relative size of the sector in the
economy. The table contains statistics for tradable sectors only and thirty-five reporting countries.
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Table 1.10: Multinational Production by Country (Cont.)
Country Number of MP/output Number of MP/output
Source Countries (Inward) Location Countries (Outward)
Latvia 11 0.10 2 0.00
Mexico 7 0.26 3 0.15
Netherlands 20 0.32 27 0.21
New Zealand 2 0.02 6 0.16
Norway 14 0.19 19 0.28
Poland 24 0.44 16 0.15
Portugal 17 0.29 12 0.21
Romania 32 0.59 4 0.00
Slovakia 16 0.51 8 0.01
Slovenia 13 0.12 7 0.00
Spain 26 0.27 16 0.25
Sweden 21 0.40 23 0.27
Switzerland 3 0.17 25 0.24
Turkey 8 0.08 6 0.12
United Kingdom 30 0.43 28 0.23
United States 23 0.18 34 0.22
Note: Inward MP refers to foreign affiliate sales from all source countries in a given host-sector pair.
Outward MP refers to the sales of foreign affiliates in all host countries for each source-sector pair.
The second column represents the number of source countries operating in each country. Similarly,
the fourth column represents the number of host countries in which each country has operations.
The third and fifth columns represent the weighted average of the shares of inward and outward MP
relative to each country’s production. Averages are weighted by relative size of the sector in the
economy. The table contains statistics for tradable sectors only and thirty-five reporting countries.
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Table 1.11: Multinational Production and Comparative Advantage, Se-
lected Countries
Country Total MP MP/Production MP/Absorption MP/Demand
Canada -0.569 -0.646* -0.694* -0.642*
Denmark 0.223 -0.107 -0.157 -0.2023
France -0.229 0.352 -0.244 -0.114
Germany -0.556 -0.370 -0.506 -0.351
Greece -0.910* -0.903* -0.901* -0.936*
Italy -0.610* -0.678* -0.700* -0.675*
Japan -0.551 -0.685* -0.691* -0.693*
Mexico -0.644* -0.662* -0.652* -0.636*
Norway -0.541 -0.767* -0.720* -0.706*
Poland -0.393 -0.505 -0.592* -0.521
Spain -0.759* -0.759* -0.756* -0.729*
Turkey -0.494 -0.574 -0.598* -0.601*
United Kingdom -0.546 -0.355 -0.233 -0.246
Notes: This table presents the correlation between the mean productivity of each host country-sector
pair (T js )
1
θ and the importance of multinational production in total output for each country in the
sample. The relevance of MP is measured by its value in levels, as well as a fraction of sectoral
output, absorption (output minus exports) and demand (output+imports-exports).
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Table 1.12: Relationship Between Bilateral MP and Comparative Advan-
tage
Dep. Variable MPsharejhs
(1) (2) (3)(
T jhost/T
j
source
)
–0.0159*** –0.0347** –0.0389***
(0.0018) (0.0049) (0.0052)
R2 0.02 0.44 0.47
Host fe × Source fe No Yes Yes
Sector No No Yes
Corr Coef. –0.109*** –0.09*** –0.11***
Observations 2415 2415 2415
Notes: This table presents the results of the Least Square Regression between the share of MP for
each source-host-sector triplet (MP sharejhs) and the ratio of productivities (TFPhost/TFPsource).
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 ***
p < 0.01.
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Table 1.13: Productivity T jn and T˜
j
n
Country Average Change Relative Change
Australia 0.03 -0.22
Austria 0.24 -0.48
Belgium 0.02 -0.08
Bulgaria 0.14 0.14
Canada 0.17 -0.51
Czech Rep. 0.41 -0.52
Denmark 0.04 -0.07
Estonia 0.19 -0.28
Finland 0.09 -0.22
France 0.07 0.14
Germany 0.11 0.08
Greece 0.01 -0.06
Hungary 0.29 -0.37
Ireland 0.07 -0.27
Israel 0.01 -0.09
Italy 0.14 -0.47
Japan 0.03 -0.14
Note: The first column reports the percentage change in the mean absolute distance to the frontier
across all tradable sectors between local producers’ productivity (T jn)
1
θ and all producers’ produc-
tivity (T˜ jn)
1
θ . The second column reports the percentage change in the coefficient of variation across
tradable sectors in the distance to the frontier between local producers’ productivity (T jn)
1
θ and all
producer’s productivity (T˜ jn)
1
θ . In the baseline, θ = 4.0.
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Table 1.14: Productivity T jn and T˜
j
n (Cont.)
Country Average Change Relative Change
Latvia 0.10 0.05
Lithuania 0.30 -0.16
Mexico 0.15 -0.34
Netherlands 0.22 -0.29
New Zealand 0.04 -0.26
Norway 0.04 -0.04
Poland 0.35 -0.53
Portugal 0.22 -0.52
Romania 0.19 -0.27
Russia 0.20 -0.42
Slovakia 0.22 -0.29
Slovenia 0.09 -0.39
Spain 0.13 -0.52
Sweden 0.20 -0.41
Switzerland 0.06 -0.32
Turkey 0.14 -0.43
United Kingdom 0.07 -0.06
Average 0.15 -0.26
Note: The first column reports the percentage change in the mean absolute distance to the frontier
across all tradable sectors between local producers’ productivity (T jn)
1
θ and all producers’ produc-
tivity (T˜ jn)
1
θ . The second column reports the percentage change in the coefficient of variation across
tradable sectors in the distance to the frontier between local producers’ productivity (T jn)
1
θ and all
producer’s productivity (T˜ jn)
1
θ . In the baseline, θ = 4.0.
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Table 1.15: Comparison beteween T˜trade and T˜mp
Panel A: Sector by Sector Rank Correlations
Sector Code Sector Name Correlation Countries
S15-16 Food and Beverages 0.72 35
S17-19 Textiles apparel 0.61 35
S20-22 Wood, paper and printing 0.84 35
S23-25 Chemical products 0.91 35
S26 Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.65 35
S27-28 Basic and Fabricated Metal Products 0.56 35
S29-33 Computing, Machinery, Communication Equipment 0.81 35
S34-35 Transport Equipment 0.62 35
S36-37 Furniture and Other Manufacturing 0.64 35
Panel B: Fixed Effects Regressions
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var: log(T˜ jtrade)
log(T˜ jmp) 0.961*** 0 .9980*** 0.3236***
(0.0871) (0.0364) (0.0760)
Obsevations 315 315 315
R-squared 0.5284 0.4474 0.8657
Partial ρ 0.638 0.642 0.319
Sector FE no yes yes
Country FE yes no yes
Notes: This table reports the results of comparing the overall productivity estimates using the main
procedure adopted in the paperT˜ jtrade (i.e. using the gravity equation) with the overall productivity
estimates using the MP gravity equation T˜ jmp (i.e.to estimate the locals producers productivity T
j
h
and the MP barriers hjhs in order to calculate the overall productivity. Panel A reports the Spearman
rank correlations of the two alternative overlal productivity measures by sector. Panel B reports the
results of a fixed effect regression of T˜ jtrade on T˜
j
mp. In Panel B robust standard errors reported in
parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Partial ρ is the partial
correlation between the right-hand side and the left hand side variables, after netting out the fixed
effects included in the column.
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Table 1.16: The Fit of the Baseline Model with the Data
Model Data
Wages
Mean 0.761 0.650
Median 0.790 0.710
corr(model,data) 0.920
Imports/GDP
Mean 0.364 0.359
Median 0.342 0.291
corr(model,data) 0.829
Inward MP/Production
Mean 0.338 0.269
Median 0.302 0.258
corr(model,data) 0.758
Outward MP/Production
Mean 0.310 0.205
Median 0.070 0 .091
corr(model,data) 0.804
Note: This table reports the mean and median of wages relative to the United States, return to
capital relative to the United States, and imports as a share of GDP, both in the model and in the
data. In the data, Imports/GDP are the manufacturing imports as a share of GDP in the 2000s,
sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Wages, production and inward and
outward multinational production in the data are calculated as described in Section 1.19.
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Figure 1.19: Wages Relative to United States
Figure 1.20: Imports/GDP
Note: The Figure in the top represents the scatter-plot of wages in the data (x-axis) against the
model’s counterpart (y-axis). The bottom panel represents the scatter-plot of Imports/GDP in the
data (x-axis) against the model’s counterpart (y-axis). In the data, Imports/GDP are the average
manufacturing imports as a share of GDP over the period 2003-2007, sourced from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators. Wages, in the data are calculated as described in Section 1.19 using
UNIDO data. The solid line is the 45-degree line.
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Figure 1.21: Inward MP/Production
Figure 1.22: Outward MP/Production
Note: The Figure in the top represents the scatter-plot of Inward MP in the data (x-axis) against
the model’s counterpart (y-axis). The bottom panel represents the scatter-plot of Outward/GDP in
the data (x-axis) against the model’s counterpart (y-axis). In the data, Inward MP are calculated
by summing the foreign affiliate production of all possible sources for each host country-sector pair,
and then is normalized by the total output of the hots country in each sector. The solid line is the
45-degree line.
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1.8 Appendix A: Data Description
1.8.1 Multinational Production Data
Multinational production data at the bilateral sectoral level was gathered mainly
from unpublished OECD data, in particular, International Direct Investment Statis-
tics and the Statistics on Measuring Globalisation. This datasets contain information
concerning the economic activities of multinational firms (such as production, em-
ployment, number of affiliates, etc.) for thirty reporting countries belonging to the
OECD, and the fifty-five partner countries that are host or source of their MP op-
erations. Nominal data is reported in the currency of the reporting country, which
is converted to U.S. dollars using the average annual exchange rate provided by the
OECD.
The industry classification used is ISIC Revision 3. A total of seventy sectors and
sub-sectors are covered in the original data for agriculture, mining, manufacturing,
and services. We could potentially get a higher level of sectoral disaggregation, but
because of disclosure and confidentiality issues, many observations are available only
at a more aggregate level.42 Therefore, to maximize the accuracy and coverage of the
data, we aggregate it to nine tradable and four non-tradable sectors. In order to build
a dataset based on primary information for the largest possible set of countries, we
aggregate the information at roughly the 1-digit ISIC level, as shown in Table 1.17.
For those countries that do not belong to the OECD, or for which complete infor-
mation was not available in the OECD data, we draw information from the Foreign
Affiliate Statistics database provided by Eurostat. This dataset, reports information
for 41 source and 22 host countries at the source-host-sector triplet. A total of 117
sectors and sub-sectors are covered in the original dataset. Eurostat uses NACE Re-
vision 2, for which we develop a concordance to merge it with the ISIC classification
used by the OECD database.
In order to ensure that a zero was not mistaken for a missing value in the data,
we rely on two additional measures of multinational activity recorded in the dataset
(employment and the number of foreign affiliates in a given source-host-sector triplet)
as well as information on revenues reported by ORBIS and BEA. Whenever possible,
inward flows were chosen, given that it is more likely that multinational sales are
better reported by the host country than by the sending country. Moreover, the host
country also reports the ultimate sector of investment, which can be different from
42For some sector-country pairs, only a few affiliates are operating and therefore the full disclosure
of this information could reveal confidential data about a particular firm.
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Table 1.17: Sectors
ISIC Code Name
S15-16 Food, beverages, and tobacco
S17-19 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather, footwear
S20-22 Wood and paper products, publishing, printing
S23-25 All chemical products
S26 Non-metallic mineral products
S27-28 Basic and fabricated metal products
S29-33 Total machinery and equipment; medical and precision instruments
S34-35 Transportation equipment
S36-37 Furniture, recycling, and manufacturing n.e.c.
S40-45 Electricity, gas and water supply, construction
S50-55 Trade, repair, hotels and restaurants
S60-64 Transportation, storage and communications
S65-74 Finance, insurance, real estate, business activities
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the parent firm’s sector in the source country.
Given the different data sources used in its construction, it is important to as-
sess the quality of the dataset. Because of disclosure and confidentiality issues, the
accuracy of reported foreign affiliate sales increases with the aggregation level. This
means that we have better information about the total manufacturing sales of Ital-
ian multinationals in France, but less accurate information about how much of those
sales occur in the chemical and textile sectors. Therefore, we rely on two-dimensional
data to assess the quality of this three-dimensional dataset. The first one of the
two-dimensional datasets contains information on bilateral MP sales for total manu-
facturing in a given source-host pair, while the second one aggregates MP sales across
all source countries for any given host-sector pair and also across all host countries
for any given source-sector pair. Information for total manufacturing is used to assess
how well the sectoral disaggregation accounts for total manufacturing flows. These
two datasets constitute a benchmark for the aggregate flows, which can be used to
check the validity of more disaggregated information coming from other sources. To-
tal manufacturing foreign affiliate sales are calculated by summing them across the
nine manufacturing sectors and then comparing them with the total manufacturing
sales of foreign affiliates reported directly by OECD, Eurostat, and UNCTAD.
The final database comprises thirty-five countries, nine tradable sectors, and one
aggregated non-tradable sector. Each observation is averaged over the period 2003–
2007. After all of the quality controls have been applied to of this dataset, we get
positive MP values for 2,987 source-host-sector relationships, from a potential of about
11,900.
1.8.2 Trade and Production Data
Production data: gross manufacturing production data at the sectoral level is from
the 2012 UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database, which reports output, value added,
employment, and wage bills at a 2-digit ISIC Revision 3 level of disaggregation. The
data were further aggregated in order to match the classification used in the assembled
MP database. Production data at the 2-digit ISIC level was extensively checked for
quality. In cases where a country-year-sector observation had missing values, or were
production was lower than exports, those values were imputed based on information
from previous years as well as information on export patters. The production dataset
is also used to calibrate important parameters of the model, such as the share of value
added in production (βj) and the share of labor on total value added (αj), which are
75
calculated by taking the median of each parameter across countries for each tradable
sector. Note, however, that the UNIDO database does not contain information on
the non-tradable sector. Therefore, to calculate αJ+1 and βJ+1, we use the 2002
Benchmark Detailed Make and Use Tables for the United States. Table 1.18 lists the
sectors along with the key parameters values for each sector: αj, βj, and the taste
parameter ω. More important, we use the production data to compute the share of
output produced by local producers in country h and sector j. This is calculated
by subtracting from the output the total production of foreign affiliates, in every
country-sector pair.
Trade Shares : Bilateral trade data was drawn from Comtrade (4-digit SITC Re-
vision 2), and aggregated up to the 2-digit ISIC level, using a concordance that we
develop. Then we aggregate further to the sectoral aggregation shown in Table 1.18
to merge the trade data with production and MP datasets. Note that imports were
use for trade values, which were discounted by a factor of 1.2 because transportation
cost is included in the value. To calculate the trade shares
(
Xjmh/X
j
m
)
at a sectoral
level, we first compute a country’s exports in a given sector, by aggregating bilateral
exports across all partners countries. We then divide the value of country m’s im-
ports from country h by the demand of the importer for sector j goods (Xjm); which
is gross production minus exports, plus imports in sector j, yielding bilateral trade
shares. Also note that imports and exports are calculated using only the countries in
the sample.
Bilateral gravity variables : the distance measures used to estimate trade cost, as
well as data on common border and common language, are taken from the Centre
d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationals (CEPII). Information on trade
agreements comes from the RTA database maintained by the WTO.
Factor prices: For each country in the sample wages are calculated by dividing
the wage bill aggregated across all manufacturing sectors by total employment in
manufacturing; wages are then normalized by the U.S. wage. For the few countries
for which information on wage bill or employment was not available, the income
percapita reported by the Penn World Tables (PWT) was used.
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Table 1.18: Model Parameters
ISIC code Sector Name α β ω θ
S15-16 Food, beverages, and tobacco 0.351 0.256 0.209 2.84
S17-19 Textiles, wearing apparel, leather, footwear 0.515 0.308 0.103 5.59
S20-22 Wood and paper products, publishing, printing 0.401 0.339 0.025 9.50
S23-25 All chemical products 0.303 0.241 0.114 8.28
S26 Non-metallic mineral products 0.343 0.371 0.071 3.38
S27-28 Basic and fabricated metal products 0.396 0.273 0.014 6.58
S29-33 Total machinery and equipment; medical and precision 0.424 0.276 0.187 10.6
S34-35 Transportation equipment 0.467 0.252 0.175 1.84
S36-37 Furniture, recycling, and manufacturing n.e.c. 0.483 0.253 0.065 5.00
S-NT Non-Tradables 0.54 0.64
Note: This table reports the median of the labor share in value added (αj), the share of value added in total production (βj), and the taste parameter
for tradable sector j. The values of the dispersion parameter θ correspond to estimates of Caliendo and Parro (2011).
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To calculate the return of capital, we rely on the market clearing condition of the
model (rh/wh = ((1− α)Lh) / (αKh)), along with the data on labor and capital.43
Total labor force in each country (Ln) and capital stock are obtained from the PWT.
Total labor force is calculated as the ratio of real GDP (calculated as the product of
real GDP per capita and total population) and real GDP per worker. Total capital is
calculated using the perpetual inventory method (Kh,t = (1− δ)Kh,t−1 + Ih,t), where
Ih is the total investment in country h in period t; the depreciation rate δ is assumed
to be 6 percent. The initial value of K is equal to Ih,0/(γ+ δ), where γ is the average
growth rate of investment in the first ten years for which data are available.
Intermediate input coefficients: The intermediate input coefficients (γkj) are ob-
tained from the Direct Requirements Table in the 2002 Benchmark Detailed Make
and Use Tables for the United States, which uses the NAICS classification. Specifi-
cally, this data report the intermediate input in each row (k) required to produce one
dollar of final output in each column (j). Then, we use a concordance to the ISIC
Revision 3 classification to build a direct requirement table at the 2-digit ISIC level,
and then further aggregate to the ten-sector level classification used in this paper.
For a given column j, we can aggregate the rows k using the concordance. In order
to further aggregate the columns to the ten-sector level, we compute the weighted
average across columns, with the weights given by the relative importance of each
sector.
Prices of tradables and non-tradables : The price of non-tradables relative to the
United States
(
pJ+1n /p
J+1
usa
)
and the price of non-tradables relative to tradables in each
country
(
pJ+1h /p
T
h
)
are calculated using data from the International Comparison of
Prices program (ICP).44
43Where α is the aggregate share of labor in GDP, which is set to 2/3.
44The sectors grouped as tradables are: food and non-alcoholic beverages, alcoholic beverages
and tobacco, clothing and footwear, furnishings, household equipment, and household maintenance.
As non-tradables we group housing; water, electricity, gas, and other fuels; health; transport; com-
munication; recreation and culture; education; restaurants and hotels.
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Table 1.19: Intermediate Input Coefficients (γkj)
ISIC S15-16 S17-19 S20-22 S23-25 S26 S27-28 S29-33 S34-35 S36-37 S-NT
S15-16 0.42698 0.01428 0.00325 0.00299 0.00178 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.02200
S17-19 0.00139 0.43133 0.02012 0.00487 0.00492 0.00000 0.00409 0.01526 0.04584 0.00376
S20-22 0.09119 0.01537 0.42683 0.02177 0.05206 0.01314 0.01432 0.01046 0.13538 0.03858
S23-25 0.07866 0.19233 0.09395 0.50759 0.08068 0.04675 0.07382 0.05587 0.13819 0.05982
S26 0.01923 0.00285 0.00719 0.01080 0.26005 0.01002 0.01082 0.01109 0.00709 0.01215
S27-28 0.05982 0.01364 0.02972 0.02629 0.05872 0.47551 0.16597 0.15129 0.15656 0.01885
S29-33 0.01617 0.01586 0.03696 0.02881 0.03558 0.06016 0.30742 0.09851 0.03202 0.03468
S34-35 0.00352 0.00095 0.00379 0.00219 0.00443 0.00356 0.01111 0.36735 0.00212 0.01440
S36-37 0.00013 0.00824 0.00244 0.00157 0.00274 0.00136 0.00604 0.00415 0.08574 0.00772
S-NT 0.29500 0.30511 0.37570 0.39307 0.49900 0.38946 0.40636 0.28600 0.39700 0.78800
Note: This table reports the value of the intermediate input in row k required to produce one dollar of final output in column j (γkj).
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In order to estimate the productivity of each country-sector pair in levels rather
than relative to the United States, we need to estimate U.S. productivity in every
sector. To do this, we calculate the TFP in each tradable sector using the NBER-
CES Manufacturing Industry Database, which reports total output, input usage in
production, employment, and capital stock along with sectoral deflators for each. The
data are available at the 6-digit NAICS classification and they are converted into the
ISIC 2-digit classification using a concordance we have created. Finally, the share
of expenditures of traded goods (ξh) in each country is sourced from Levchenko and
Zhang (2012).
1.9 Appendix B: Estimated Parameters
1. Preferences
a) σ, where 1
1−σ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
b) η, elasticity of substitution between the tradable sectors
c) ξn, Cobb Douglas weight for the tradable sector composite good in country n
d) ωj, weights of each tradable sector in final consumption
2. Technology
a) j, elasticity of substitution in production across goods in sector j
b) αj, value added based on labor intensity
c) βj, valued added based on labor intensity
d) γkj, output industryj requirement from input industry k.
e) θj, dispersion of productivity draws in sector j
f) T jn, state of technology in country n and sector j
3. Multinational production and Trade barriers
a) djns, iceberg trade cost of exporting from country s to country n in sector j
b) hjsi, iceberg MP cost of produce in country s using technologies from country i
in sector j
4. Labor and capital endowment
a) Ln, stock of labor in each country
b) Kn, stock of capital in each country
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1.10 Appendix C: Proof of Propositions
1.10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: In a two-country, two-sector world economy, the lower the technology
of country 1 in sector a (country 1’s comparative disadvantage sector) relative to sector
b, the higher the probability that firms from country 2 will produce in sector a relative
to sector b in country 1.
Proof. Define the ratio of probabilities that country 2 will produce in country 1 as:
pia112
pib112
=
T a2
T b2
T a2
(
g−θ + d−θ
)− 1
θ + T b1
[
1 + (gd)−θ
]− 1
θ
T a2 (g
−θ + d−θ)−
1
θ + T a1
[
1 + (gd)−θ
]− 1
θ

Dividing and multiplying by T a1 :
pia112
pib112
=
T a2
T b2
 T
b
2
Ta1
(
g−θ + d−θ
)− 1
θ +
T b1
Ta1
[
1 + (gd)−θ
]− 1
θ
Ta1
T b1
(g−θ + d−θ)−
1
θ +
[
1 + (gd)−θ
]− 1
θ

For any set of parameter values T a2 , T
b
2 , and T
a
1 consistent with the assumption made,
a higher T b1 increases the comparative disadvantage of country 1 in sector a, increasing
the relative probability of hosting multinational production in that sector. In other
words, the stronger the comparative advantage of country 1 in sector b, the higher the
probability that goods in sector a in country 1 will be produced using the technology
of foreign affiliates from country 2. Formally, this means that:
∂
(
pia112
pib112
)
/∂T a1 < 0
∂
(
pia112
pib112
)
/∂T a2 > 0
∂
(
pia112
pib112
)
/∂T a1 =
T b2
T b2
[
T b2
(
g−θ + d−θ
)− 1
θ + T b1
[
1 + (gd)−θ
]]− 1(
T b1
)2 [
1 + (gd)−θ
]
 < 0
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∂(
pia112
pib112
)
/∂T a2 =[
T b2
(
g−θ + d−θ
)− 1
θ + T b1
[
1 + (gd)−θ
]]
T b2
 T a1
[
1 + (gd)−θ
]
(
T a2 (g
−θ + d−θ)−
1
θ + T a1
[
1 + (gd)−θ
])2
 > 0
1.10.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: The more heterogeneous the technology upgrade across sectors toward
comparative disadvantage sectors, the lower the dispersion of effective technologies and
the lower the gains from trade.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let us define two welfare scenarios for country 1
(and the same for country 2): First, one in which sectoral productivity increases
disproportionately toward comparatively disadvantaged sectors; and a second one in
which productivity increases homogeneously in both sectors due to MP.
Scenario 1: To construct the first scenario, we apply a common MP barrier across
all sectors (ga = gb = g). A common g in both sectors causes an uneven technology
upgrade across sectors. Using this assumption together with equation (1.14), we can
rewrite the expression of technology upgrade in sector j as follows:
T˜ j1
T j1
=
T j1 + g
−θT j2
T j1
= 1 + g−θ
T j2
T j1
Replacing this expression in equation (1.25) and using the mirror image assumption
(T a2 = T
b
1 and T
b
2 = T
a
1 ) yields:
GT(S1) =

(
1 + g−θ T
b
1
Ta1
)(
1 + g−θ T
a
1
T b1
)
(
(1 + (dg)−θ) + T
b
1
Ta1
(g−θ + d−θ)
)(
(1 + (dg)−θ) + T
a
1
T b1
(g−θ + d−θ)
)
−1/2θ
Scenario 2: To make this scenario comparable to scenario 1, we solve for the
set of ga and gb such that (1) the productivity upgrade across sectors is the same(
T˜ah
Tah
=
T˜ bh
T bh
)
; and (2) the average effective productivity in country 1
(
T˜a1 +T˜
b
1
2
)
is the
same when MP barriers are the same across sectors (ga = gb = g), as in scenario 1,
and also when they are not (ga 6= gb), as in this scenario.
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The first condition implies that:(
ga
gb
)−θ
=
(
T a1
T b1
)2
The second condition implies that:
g−θ
(
T b1 + T
a
1
)
= g−θa T
b
1 + g
−θ
b T
a
1
Substituting g−θa = g
−θ
b
(
Ta1
T b1
)2
from the first equations into the second equation
we get expressions for ga and gb:
g−θa = g
−θ
(
T a1
T b1
)
and
g−θb = g
−θ
(
T b1
T a1
)
Replacing the expressions for g−θa and g
−θ
b in equation (1.25), we get the gains
from trade in Scenario 2 (GT(S2)) are equal to:
(
1 + g−θ
)2(
1 +
(
dg
Ta1
T b1
)−θ
+
T b1
Ta1
((
g
Ta1
T b1
)−θ
+ d−θ
))(
1 +
(
dg
T b1
Ta1
)−θ
+
Ta1
T b1
((
g
T b1
Ta1
)−θ
+ d−θ
))

−1/2θ
The gains from trade are higher in the counterfactual scenario compared with the
actual equilibrium (GT(S2) > GT(S1)) if:
(
1+g−θ T
b
1
Ta1
)(
1+g−θ T
a
1
Tb1
)
(1+g−θ)
2 >
[
(1+(dg)−θ)+
Tb1
Ta1
(g−θ+d−θ)
][
(1+(dg)−θ)+
Ta1
Tb1
(g−θ+d−θ)
]
[
1+
(
dg
Ta1
Tb1
)−θ
+
Tb1
Ta1
((
g
Ta1
Tb1
)−θ
+d−θ
)][
1+
(
dg
Tb1
Ta1
)−θ
+
Ta1
Tb1
((
g
Tb1
Ta1
)−θ
+d−θ
)]
or:
(
1+g−θ T
b
1
Ta1
)(
1+g−θ T
a
1
Tb1
)
(1+g−θ)
2
[
1+
(
dg
Ta1
Tb1
)−θ
+
Tb1
Ta1
((
g
Ta1
Tb1
)−θ
+d−θ
)]
[
(1+(dg)−θ)+
Tb1
Ta1
(g−θ+d−θ)
]
[
1+
(
dg
Tb1
Ta1
)−θ
+
Ta1
Tb1
((
g
Tb1
Ta1
)−θ
+d−θ
)]
[
(1+(dg)−θ)+
Ta1
Tb1
(g−θ+d−θ)
] > 1
The above is true if the following three conditions are satisfied simultaneously:(
1 + g−θ T
b
1
Ta1
)(
1 + g−θ T
a
1
T b1
)
(1 + g−θ)2
>= 1
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[
1 +
(
dg
Ta1
T b1
)−θ
+
T b1
Ta1
((
g
Ta1
T b1
)−θ
+ d−θ
)]
[(
1 + (dg)−θ
)
+
T b1
Ta1
(g−θ + d−θ)
] >= 1
[
1 +
(
dg
T b1
Ta1
)−θ
+
Ta1
T b1
((
g
T b1
Ta1
)−θ
+ d−θ
)]
[(
1 + (dg)−θ
)
+
Ta1
T b1
(g−θ + d−θ)
] >= 1
It can be shown that the first condition is true as long as:
T a1
T b1
+
T b1
T a1
=
(
X +
1
X
)
>= 2
where X =
Ta1
T b1
. This is true for any ratio of productivities
Ta1
T b1
. Note that
(
X + 1
X
)
reaches its minimum, which equals 2, when X = 1. The second and third conditions
are always satisfied given that it is always true that X−θ > 0 and (X−1)−θ > 0.
Therefore, GT(S2) > GT(S1).
1.10.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3: The higher the heterogeneity of MP across sectors, the higher the
gains from MP. When the share of domestically produced goods is the same across
sectors (yahh = y
b
hh), the gains from MP attain a minimum. Therefore, uni-sectoral
trade-MP models understate the actual gains from MP as long as yahh 6= ybhh
Proof. The gains from MP are given by:
GMPh =

(
1 +
Ta1
T b1
d−θ
)
+
(
1 +
T b1
Ta1
d−θ
)
(
1 + (dg)−θ
)
+
Ta1
T b1
(g−θ + d−θ) +
(
1 + (dg)−θ
)
+
T b1
Ta1
(g−θ + d−θ)
−
1
2θ
The first-order condition of this expression is equal to zero when T ah = T
b
h. At
this point, GMPh attains a minimum given that the second-order condition is higher
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than zero, as shown below.
∂GMPh
∂T a1 /T
b
1
= − 1
2θ
[Y ]
[(
d−θ
(
1−X−2)) (2 + 2 (dg)−θ + (d−θ + g−θ) (X−1 +X))]
+
1
2θ
[Y ]
[(
2 + d−θ
(
X−1 +X
)) ((
d−θ + g−θ
) (
1−X−2))]
(1.52)
where Y = GMP
− 1
2θ
−1
h and X = T
a
1 /T
b
1 . The above equation is equal to zero only
when T a1 = T
b
1 . As shown below, the second derivative of GMPh is positive; therefore,
we reach a minimum when relative productivities are the same across sectors:
∂2GMPh
∂
(
T a1 /T
b
1
)2 > 0
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1.11 Appendix D: Equilibrium Solution
Given
{
Lh, Kh,
{
T jh
}J
j=1
, ξn
}N
n=1
,
{
ε, αj, θ
j, βj, {γk,j} ,
{
gjhs
}
N×N ,
{
djhs
}
N×N
}J+1
j=1
, and
η, we compute the competitive equilibrium of the model as follows.
1. Guess {wh, rh}Nn=1
a) Compute the prices from the following equations:
cjh =
[
(wh)
αj (rh)
1−αj]βj [J+1∏
k=1
(
pkh
)γkj]1−βj
δjmhs = chghsdmh
∆jms =
[∑
h
(
δjmhs
)−θj]− 1θj
∆˜jm =
∑
s
T js
(
∆jms
)−θj
∆˜J+1m =
∑
s
T J+1s
(
cJ+1m g
J+1
hs
)−θj
pjm = Γj
(
∆˜jm
)− 1
θj
Pm = Bm
(
J∑
j=1
ωj (pm)
1−η
) 1
1−η ξm (
pJ+1m
)1−ξn
b) Compute the final demand as follows: for any country n:
Y jm = ξn
wmLm + rmKm
pjm
ωj (p
j
m)
1−η∑J
k=1 ωk (p
k
m)
1−η ∀j ∈ {1, ..., J}
Y J+1m = (1− ξm)
wmLm + rmKm
pJ+1m
c) Compute the probabilities pijmhs as follows:
pijmhs =
T js
(
hjhs
)−θj (
cjhd
j
mh
)−θj∑
h
∑
s T
j
s
(
gjhs
)−θ (
cjhd
j
mh
)−θj
d) Total Demand. In this section we are looking for the Qkh that satisfies the
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following equation:
pjhQ
j
h = p
j
hY
j
h+
J∑
k=1
(1− βk) γj,k
(
N∑
m=1
N∑
s=1
pikmhsp
k
mQ
k
m
)
+(1− βJ+1) γj,J+1
N∑
s=1
piJ+1hhs p
J+1
h Q
J+1
h
e) Compute the factor allocations across sectors as follows: for any country n
N∑
m=1
N∑
s=1
pijmhsp
j
mQ
j
m =
whL
j
h
αjβj
=
rhK
j
h
(1− αj) βj
N∑
s=1
piJ+1hhs p
J+1
m Q
J+1
m =
whL
J+1
h
αJ+1βJ+1
=
rhK
J+1
h
(1− αJ+1) βJ+1
f) Update {w′h, r′h}Nn=1 with the feasibility conditions for factors: for any n
J+1∑
j=1
Ljh = Lh,
J+1∑
j=1
Kjh = Kh
2. Repeat the above procedures until {w′h, r′h}Nn=1 is close enough to {wh, rh}Nn=1.
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1.12 Appendix E: Estimation
1.12.1 Effective technology: two-step procedure
The importer fixed effect recovered from the gravity equation is given by:
Sjn =
T˜ jn
T˜ jus
(
cjn
cjus
)−θ
The share of spending on home-produced goods is given by:
Xjnn
Xjn
= T˜ jn
(
cjn
pjn
)−θ
Dividing it by US, we have:
Xjnn/X
j
n
Xjus,us/X
j
us
=
T˜ jn
T˜ jus
(
cjn
cjus
)−θ (
pjn
pjus
)−θ
= Sjn
(
pjus
pjn
)−θ
The ratio of price levels in sector j relative to US becomes
pjn
pjus
=
(
Xjnn/X
j
n
Xjus,us/X
j
us
1
Sjn
) 1
θ
Then, cost of the input bundles relative to the U.S can be written as:
cjn
cjus
=
(
wjn
wjus
)αjβj ( rjn
rjus
)(1−αj)βj (J+1∏
k=1
(
pkn
pkus
)γk,j)1−βj
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CHAPTER II
Multinational Production and
Intra-firm Trade
2.1 Introduction
The proximity-concentration tradeoff constitutes the basis of one of the most impor-
tant theories of multinational production. In stark contrast with the prediction of
the workhorse monopolistic competition model of trade and foreign direct investment,
several new empirical papers document that total foreign affiliates sales are subject
to gravity-style forces akin to those observed for aggregate exports (Yeaple, 2009;
Keller and Yeaple, 2013; Irarrazabal et al., 2013). That is, rather than avoid the
transportation costs associated with exports, multinational sales also decrease with
remoteness and other geographical variables.
A natural explanation for the observed patterns of bilateral foreign affiliate sales
is the existence of trade in intermediate inputs across countries within the boundaries
of the firm. The use of intermediate inputs produced by the parent introduces a
source of complementarities between trade and multinational production if in order
to produce overseas, foreign affiliates have to import intermediate inputs from their
home market.
Intra-firm trade is an important component of U.S. international trade. In partic-
ular, exports of manufactured goods from U.S. parents to their cross-border network
of affiliates account for 20 percent of U.S. exports; and intra-firm imports by foreign-
controlled U.S. affiliates from their foreign parent groups have generally accounted
for 20-25 percent of total U.S. imports 1. Thus, to reconcile the theory of horizontal
1Bureau of economic Analysis.
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multinational activity with the new empirical facts, new models have incorporated
intra-firm transactions in the workhorse framework of trade and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) (Helpman et al., 2004. HMY, henceforth).
A striking feature of intra-firm trade is its pronounced heterogeneity across firms;
not only at the aggregate level, but also at the sector-destination country level. In
particular, using detailed data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Ramondo et al.
(2014) have documented that intra-firm trade is concentrated among a small number
of large affiliates and it represents only a very small fraction of their input and their
total sales. For example, in 2004, the median manufacturing affiliate, measured by
sales, received none of its inputs from its parent firm,2 and sold 91 percent of its
production to unrelated parties, mostly in the host country. The skewness of intra-
firm flows toward large corporations, and the bias of multinational sales to local
unrelated parties are robust to both the country of destination and the industry of
operations.
These findings pose new challenges to the theory. First, existent models take it
for granted that all affiliates import from their parents and therefore are silent about
the selection and the skewness observed in intra-firm flows. Second, if intra-firm
trade is what causes affiliate sales to decline with increases in trade frictions, then
gravity forces will affect only those firms in the upper tail of the firm size distribution
but not the relatively small firms.3 Using the ORBIS dataset, we present evidence
showing that the gravity of foreign sales could not be explained solely by intra-firm
trade. In fact, we show that even firms that likely do not engage in intra-firm trade
exhibit a significant resistance to geographical barriers. In particular, we divide the
sample of firms by the likelihood of engaging in intra-firm transaction and show that
the standard gravity variables (i.e., distance, common border, common language, and
regional trade agreements) play a significant role in diminishing the observed foreign
2Of course, this does not rule out the possibility that an affiliate is importing intermediate inputs
from another affiliate who is part of the international production chain. Unfortunately, such flows
are not recorded in any of the available datasets. Nevertheless, the fact that the vast majority of
affiliates sell their output to unrelated parties alleviates part of these concerns. We discuss these
issues in more detail in a later section.
3The fact that foreign affiliate sales decline with increases in trade frictions (gravity of multina-
tional activity) also poses important challenges to the theory of multinational production based on
vertical integration. In contrast with horizontal intra-firm FDI models in which firms may or may
not engage in intra-firm trade, in models of vertical multinational production, intra-firm transactions
are a necessary condition for the existence of foreign affiliates, whose main role is to provide cheaper
intermediate inputs to their parents and to other affiliates within the corporation. Therefore, the
vertical integration theory of multinational activity could not rationalize the observed absence of
intra-firm flows among firm within a corporation that sell the majority of their output to unrelated
parties in the host market.
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affiliate sales of all firms, regardless of their size. As expected, gravity forces diminish
the sales of large affiliates which often engage in intra-firm trade. But the gravity
frictions also negatively and significantly affect the sales of the relatively small foreign
affiliates, which often do not trade with their parents and sell the vast majority of
their output to unrelated parties in the host market.4
The previous finding it is at odds with the predictions of new FDI intra-firm mod-
els, where the gravity of multinational production relies on the existence of intra-firm
flows. Therefore, to capture the former stylized fact and to account for the extensive
margin of intra-firm trade, this paper develops a multi-country model of heteroge-
neous firms, in which parents decide whether or not to supply foreign affiliates with
intermediate inputs and if so, optimally decide the fraction that will be imported from
the parent company. The proposed theoretical framework matches the distribution of
multinational sales as well as the intra-firm trade patterns observed in the data: the
less productive firms do not import intermediate inputs from their parent, whereas
the most productive ones engage in intra-firm trade. In the model, the selection is ex-
plained by the irreversible investment that a multinational corporation has to make in
order to establish an adequate platform to carry on cross-border transactions within
the boundaries of the firm on a regular basis. The high cost associated with these
important coordination efforts is a fact well explored in the international management
literature (Seuring and Goldbach, 2002).
This paper contributes to previous efforts to rationalize intra-firm trade patterns.
Irarrazabal et al. (2013) propose an HMY model of horizontal multinational produc-
tion with intra-firm trade from parents to affiliates. Their model assumes that the
final good produced by affiliates is assembled in a Cobb Douglas fashion using local
labor and intermediate inputs produced and shipped by the parent. As a consequence,
all firms engage in intra-firm trade and imported intermediate inputs from the par-
ent as a share of total cost are the same for all firms regardless of their productivity
level. Similarly, Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2013b) develop a general equilibrium
model of trade and multinational production under perfect competition in which for-
eign affiliates use an international input bundle in production, where some fraction
is obtained in the local market and the rest comes from the parent firm. This paper
differs from these approaches in that it endogenizes the existence of intra-firm trade
as well as the degree to which it occurs.
4The results are robust to whether the sample of firms is divided above and below the fiftieth
percentile or instead it is divided above the seventy-fifth percentile and below the twenty-fifth per-
centile. The results of the impact of gravity on multinational activity are also robust to different
econometric specifications.
91
Following Keller and Yeaple (2013), we assume that there are two ways in which
a foreign affiliate can absorb the productivity level of its parent company. Either
the affiliate establishes communication with its headquarters to receive the neces-
sary instructions (direct knowledge transfer) or alternatively, the parent can transfer
knowledge across borders by exporting intermediate inputs embodying technology to
its affiliates (indirect knowledge transfer). In the first case the affiliate incurs the
cost of transferring knowledge across countries; but it saves the transportation cost
associated with importing intermediate inputs from its parent. Therefore, under this
framework, multinational sales of more knowledge-intensive firms will suffer more
strongly from gravity, precisely because these companies face relatively high costs of
direct knowledge transfer, reducing the elasticity of intra-firm trade to changes in
transportation cost. In Keller and Yeaple (2013) model, although affiliates differ in
their share of imported intermediate inputs from the parent, all affiliates buy some
inputs from their headquarters. However, in the data, only a small fraction of firms,
often relatively large, import from their parent while a vast majority of them report
zero intra-firm flows.5
Our paper improves upon the previous theoretical framework in several dimensions
in order to reproduce several of the recently uncovered stylized facts of intra-firm
trade. First, in the model presented in this paper knowledge intensity is firm-specific
rather than sector-specific. This is based of the fact that the knowledge intensity
is more heterogeneous across firms within an industry than it is across industries.
Second, knowledge intensity affects not only the composition or degree of in-house
production versus imported intermediate inputs, but also the existence of intra-firm
trade itself. Therefore, firms could optimally decide not to engage in intra-firm trade
given that developing an international distribution channel within the firm entails a
fixed cost.6 Third, the share of imported intermediate inputs increases with firms
5In their appendix, Keller and Yeaple sketch an extension of the original model in which firms
have the option of paying a fixed cost for investing in information and communication technology
in order to lower the efficiency cost of knowledge transfer by reducing the efficiency loss of remote
production. An implication of this extension is that only the most productive firms produce a larger
fraction of their intermediate input in the host market, given that only these affiliates are able to
afford the fixed cost. However, this prediction is contrary to the patterns observed in the data in
which only the most productive firms engage in intra-firm trade. Instead, our model proposes a
very different type of fixed cost, which allows it to generate the observed selection. In our model,
in order to engage in intra-firm trade the corporation has to build a complex distribution network
that allows frequent trade between related affiliates operating in different countries.
6It might seem that the affiliate’s need for instructions from the parent firm would decrease
with time, as the affiliate moves along the learning curve. However, multinational firms develop
innovation at a high rate and new techniques will constantly be passed to the affiliates in the form
of direct technology transfer.
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productivity. Fourth, communication costs are higher, the higher the knowledge
intensity of the intermediate inputs and the larger the distance between the parent
and the foreign affiliate.7
From an empirical perspective, it has been a challenge to unveil the determinants
of multinational production and intra-firm trade. One of the reasons is the limited
data available to distinguish vertical and horizontal FDI. In fact, very often the
existence of intra-firm trade has been interpreted as evidence of vertical MP. This
is because under vertical integration foreign production will always result in intra-
firm flows from affiliates to parents or to other affiliates within the corporation.8
Nevertheless, horizontal MP can also rationalize intra-firm transactions from parents
to affiliates when the latter imports knowledge embedded in intermediate inputs. The
magnitude and direction of intra-firm flows could shed light on the relative importance
of these two alternative theories, given that horizontal MP will be compatible with
intra-firm transactions from the parent to the affiliate, while vertical MP will be
compatible with transactions in both directions, but more strongly from affiliates
to parent firms.9 Even though we recognize the richness of intra-firm transactions,
which also include sales from affiliates to parents as well as from affiliates to affiliates,
the model developed in this paper focuses on intra-firm trade from the parent to its
network of foreign affiliates, which is quantitatively important and consistent with a
model of horizontal multinational production.10
7For example, communications tend to be more cumbersome when firms are located in different
time zones, or in countries with different languages.
8Vertically integrated firms often set operations abroad to produce cheaper intermediate in-
puts within the boundaries of the firm in order to internalize any product contractibility issue and
potential spillovers of proprietary knowledge that could emerge from outsourcing.
9For the United States there are two main sources of information. One of them is the U.S. Census
Bureau, which administrates the information contained in the custom declaration that includes
information on ownership ties between the foreign and domestic parties involved in any transactions.
The other main source is the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis, which
conducts extensive surveys of multinational firms that include questions on the value of specific trade
flows between foreign and domestic units of the firm. The Census data provides comprehensive detail
on the goods traded between U.S. parents and affiliates overseas and also between foreign parents
and their affiliates operating in the United States. With these data it is possible to identify not only
the type of relationship between the parties involved in the international transaction, but also the
nationality of the parties. Unfortunately, the Census Bureau does not collect further information on
the activity of the foreign party in the transaction. On the other hand, the BEA data offer in-depth
information about affiliates’ operations, including total assets, sales, net income, employment, and
R&D. The BEA data also have information about international transactions between the affiliate
and related or unrelated parties, including the parent company, either in the host market or in third
markets. Unfortunately, foreign affiliates report related parties’ sales to third markets only in total,
not by country. For this reason, even when it is possible to track intra-firm transactions between
parents and affiliates, it is not possible to track the trade among foreign affiliates within the same
company.
10Zeile (2003), using detailed data from the Census Bureau, finds that U.S. intra-firm exports
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The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the main
source of data in our analysis and it also describes the main characteristics of multi-
national sales at the firm level. Section 3 presents the stylized facts that support the
main assumption in our model. Section 4 lays out the theoretical framework and de-
rives the analytical implications for intra-firm flows and multinational sales. Section
5 discusses the parametrization, the functional forms, and the estimation strategy of
some of the model’s key parameters. Section 6 presents the general equilibrium and
the gravity equations of affiliate sales for firms that do engage in intra-firm trade and
those that do not. Section 7 concludes.
2.2 Data
The primary source of data is ORBIS, which contains information at the level of the
firm for a wide range of countries. In particular, it contains detailed information about
the ownership structure of the firm, including the company’s degree of independence,
and its ultimate owner.11 Unlike the Census Bureau, ORBIS does not keep records of
the transactions between parents and their affiliate firms. Instead it offers information
about foreign affiliates’ operations, such as sales, employment, assets, and capital,
among others.12
For the purpose of this analysis we have constructed two samples. The first sample
comprises U.S. affiliate firms operating outside the United States, but whose ultimate
owners—or parents—are located in the United States. The second sample groups
affiliates operating in the United States, but whose parents are located overseas. In
both samples, we only consider foreign affiliates that are majority owned (or wholly
owned) and which operating revenue is known for at least one of the years in the
period (2004-2012).13
mainly consist of shipments from U.S. parent companies to their foreign affiliates, and U.S. intra-firm
imports mainly consist of shipments from foreign parent groups to U.S. affiliates.
11Alfaro and Chen (2012) assess the extent and coverage of this dataset using more aggregate
information from alternative sources. Because the focus here is on affiliates owned by U.S. parent
firms, as well as U.S. affiliates owned by foreign parents, we have used the aggregate values in the
BEA data to evaluate the accuracy of the information provided by Orbis.
12The best characterization of the intra-firm trade can be obtained from the Census Bureau,
but it lacks information about the activity of affiliates, including the type and destination of their
exports, which is contained in the BEA data.
13Therefore we only consider firms with a Global Ultimate Owner (GUO), a firm that exercises
the highest control over the affiliate and that owns at least fifty percent of the shares. We also
consider a company to be an ultimate owner if it has no identified shareholders or if its shareholders’
percentages are not known. The definition of global ultimate owner adopted in this paper, with a
minimum of 50 percent ownership, is also the one followed by international agencies and by the U.S.
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Our sample only contains firms in the manufacturing sectors and it covers more
than 9,000 U.S.-owned affiliates operating in thirty-four developed countries (see Ta-
ble 2.1). In order to construct a useful sample, the data were subjected to an extensive
cleaning-up process in which we eliminate firms whose operating revenue is below one
million dollars and with less than fifteen employees. Furthermore, to alleviate the
problem of potential outliers, we eliminate firms below the first percentile and above
the 99th percentile in the distribution of sales. The final sample comprises 8,572 for-
eign affiliates and 2,210 parents, covering 261 manufacturing industries for the period
(2004-2012).
2.3 Stylized Facts
In this section we introduce some key regularities about affiliate sales and the location
patterns of U.S. multinational firms. First, we show that the knowledge intensity of
U.S. parents is very heterogeneous across firms, even within very narrowly defined
sectors. Second, we show that the vast majority of U.S. parents operate in only one
foreign market regardless of the manufacturing industry; and for any given market-
sector pair, the market share of U.S. foreign production is concentrated in a very small
set of affiliates. Third, we present empirical evidence that intra-firm trade alone is not
enough to explain the observed strong dampening effect of distance on multinational
production. Overall, this section describes the motivation for this study and provides
support for the building blocks of the model proposed in section 4.
Fact 1: Research and development intensity is highly heterogeneous across multi-
national firms within a narrowly defined industry. The average research intensity
varies significantly across parent firms, even in very narrowly defined industries. Fig-
ure 2.2 shows the distribution of R&D shares for the pool of U.S. parents in the
sample, regardless of industry classification. As can be observed, the expenditure on
research and development is remarkably higher among the most productive U.S. par-
ent firms. In fact, more than 80 percent of the R&D expenditures in a given industry
is in the hands of a few very large firms. Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of parents’
R&D share for four selected 3-digit NACE sectors: (1) manufactured of parts and
accessories for motor vehicles—NACE 293 (top-left panel), (2) manufacture of other
special-purpose machinery—NACE 289 (top-right panel), (3) manufacture of basic
pharmaceutical products—NACE 211 (bottom-left panel), and (4) manufacture of
Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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air and spacecraft and related machinery—NACE 303 (bottom-right panel). Firm
productivity is measured by the value of output per worker of the U.S. parent, and
the share of R&D is calculated as the fraction of the research and development ex-
penditures of the firm relative to the total R&D expenditures of all U.S. parent firms
operating in the same 3-digit sectoral classification. It is clear that the concentration
of R&D expenditures in a few large parents is not being driven by sector-specific
characteristics.
However, ORBIS provides information on R&D expenditures for only one-third
of U.S. ultimate owners with at least one foreign affiliate. In order to assess how this
could bias our previous results, Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of productivity for
two groups of parent firms: those for which the ORBIS dataset contain information
regarding expenditures on research and development activities; and those for which
this variable is missing. Figure 2.4 highlights that those firms for which ORBIS does
not record information about R&D expenditures are on average less productive than
firms for which it does. Therefore, it appears from this evidence that even when
multinationals are responsible for the majority of the private R&D activities, the
largest share of the R&D expenditures in any given industry is mainly carried on by
a few very productive U.S. parent firms.
Fact 2: The distribution of foreign affiliate sales is fat-tailed, for each country-
sector pair.
A well documented fact is that firm sales follow a Zipf Law distribution (Gabaix,
2009 and di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2012). In addition, Ramondo et al. (2014)
show that intra-firm trade is concentrated among a small number of large affiliates.
In particular, firms below the mean of the size distribution do not trade with their
parent firms at all. In this section, we show that the distribution of sales of U.S.
foreign affiliates—as well as the sales of foreign affiliates in the United States—is fat-
tailed. This is the case not only overall, within an industry, or within a country, but
also for a given country-sector pair.
Figure 2.5 evaluates the participation of U.S. parents in foreign markets. Each
parent produces on average in two foreign economies, but fifty percent of the parents
only produce in one market besides United States. Strikingly, the mean coincide with
the number of markets penetrated by a firm in the 75 percentile of the distribution.
Ten percent of the parent firms produce in more than four markets and only five
percent of all firms set operations in seven or more foreign countries.
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Fact 3: Intra-firm trade alone cannot explain the observed gravity of multinational
sales.
Intra-firm trade from the parent to the cross-border network of foreign affiliates
has been the approach used in the literature to rationalize the gravity of multinational
production, meaning that aggregate foreign affiliate sales fall with geographical barri-
ers. Nevertheless, only the most productive foreign affiliates buy intermediate inputs
from their parent firms in the United States, a fact that is robust across countries and
also across industries (Ramondo et al., 2014). From the perspective of the existing
models, this implies that only sales of foreign affiliates located at the upper-tail of the
size distribution should suffer from gravity. Conversely, in this subsection we present
some evidence showing that the gravity of foreign sales could not solely be explained
by intra-firm trade. In fact, we show that even firms that likely do not engage in
intra-firm trade exhibit a significant resistance to geographical barriers.14
Ideally, we would like to test the existence of gravity for two groups of firms: those
that participate in intra-firm trade transactions and those that do not. Unfortunately,
for this paper we do not have access to intra-firm trade data at the firm level.15
Instead, we divide U.S. affiliates by size into two groups for any given host country-
sector pair. First, we split the whole sample of firms into two subsamples at the
50th percentile of the size distribution. This criterion is based on Ramondo et al.
(2014) who found that none of the affiliates below the median import intermediate
inputs from their parent firms.16,17 Second, we divide the sample of firms by those
that belong to the lower-tail (below 25th percentile) and the upper-tail (above 75th
percentile) of the firm size distribution, in each country-sector pair. Taking only the
extremes of the firm size distribution reduces the likelihood that relatively small firms
will engage in intra-firm trade, and increases the likelihood that the very large firms
14Most models of horizontal multinational production fail to account for the observed selection
of intra-firm trade, assuming instead that all firms will require some fraction of the intermediate
inputs from the parents. In section 2.4 we propose a model to account for the intensive and extensive
margins of intra-firm trade.
15To overcome this limitation we are working in a project to merge ORBIS firm-level data with
the Census Bureau data, to get a perspective of the transactions between U.S. multinationals and
their foreign affiliates as well as of the economic activity of U.S. affiliates overseas.
16Our criterion differs from Ramondo et al. (2014) in that their finding is established for the
median firm in a given industry and in a given region. Instead, we split the sample based on the
median firm in each country-sector pair.
17As discussed in the introduction to this paper, the fact that firms do not import intermediate
inputs from the parent firm does not mean they are not engaged in intra-firm trade with other
affiliates within the same corporation. Ramondo et al. (2014) find that regardless of firm size, the
majority of affiliates sell their output to unrelated parties in the host country. Unfortunately, intra-
firm imports from affiliates other than the U.S. parents are not captured by any of the available
data sources.
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will.
Below we present the results of the gravity equation that comes from different
specifications and samples. Table 2.2 presents the results of the regression for the
intensive and extensive margin of multinational activity (columns 1 and 2) as well as
for the extensive margin only (columns 3 and 4). It includes all U.S. multinational
firms in our sample, and the data have been aggregated up to the country-sector
level. As a proxy for geographical barriers, we have included the log of physical
distance (ln (disti,us)), a set of dummy variables indicating whether countries share
a common border (Borderi,us), have a common language (Languagei,us), belong to a
regional trade agreement (RTAi,us), and whether they have had a colony relationship
(Colonyi,us). In columns 1 and 3 we also control for some key characteristics of
the host country that could determine the scale of foreign operations and so directly
affect the volume of local sales and intra-firm trade. These controls include the capital
endowment relative to the United States, a measure of the size of the market (GDP
per capita), and a proxy for institutional quality measured by the Rule of Law variable
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators database of the World Bank. In order to
account for other country characteristics that are potential determinants of FDI and
that are not included in our regression, such as relative technology differences and skill
endowments, in columns 2 and 4 we include instead country fixed effects to control
for any country-specific characteristic that could affect the gravity of multinational
production. Notice that in both specifications sector fixed effects are included to
control for the observed sectoral heterogeneity of multinational production, which
can affect the impact of gravity variables on MP sales as well as on the number of
firms that produce overseas.
Consistent with previous studies, both the total affiliate sales and the number
of U.S. parents decrease with trade barriers, and in particular, they decline with
distance from the United States in both specifications. Having a common language
positively affects both margins of MP; nevertheless, it loses statistical significance
once we control for country fixed effect. The existence of a trade agreement between
the United States and the host economy significantly increases the affiliates’ sales but
negatively affects the number of firms that engage in foreign production. A potential
explanation is that trade agreements increase the sales of U.S. firms in the foreign
market by facilitating intra-firm transactions with the parent firm, but reduce the
number of firms that find it profitable to engage in multinational production given
that exporting becomes more attractive. Of the host country-specific variables, the
size of the host market (GDP) and the level of capital show the expected size and are
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significant. On the other hand, foreign affiliate sales fall in host country institutional
quality.18
To further explore whether the negative effect of geographical barriers on MP is not
driven only by those firms that engage in intra-firm trade, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4
present the results of gravity on number of firms and MP sales, respectively, but
this time dividing the sample into firms below and above the median of the firm size
distribution in each country-sector pair. Columns 1 and 2 show that, for both groups,
the number of firms and the MP sales decrease with distance, showing a negative and
statistically significant coefficient for firms below and above the median. Notice that
the coefficients on the distance variable in Table 2.4 are very similar when country
fixed effects are included.
Given that we are relying on the size of the firm as a proxy of its participation in
intra-firm trade, we reproduce the above exercise but this time we only consider firms
under the 25th percentile, which most likely do not engage in intra-firm trade, as well
as firms above the 75th percentile of the distribution, which most likely do conduct
intra-firm transactions.19 Tables 2.5 and 2.6 reproduce the gravity regression for the
group of firms in the tails of the firm size distribution. Consistent with previous
results for both groups of firms, foreign sales and number of firms are significantly
lower in countries far from the United States.
So far, the evidence shows that regardless of firm size, multinational sales are
significantly affected by gravity forces. Therefore, the data reject a model in which
the only source of MP gravity comes from intra-firm trade. The model presented
in the next section addresses two important issues. First, the observed selection in
intra-firm trade: only very a few large firms conduct intra-firm transactions across
borders within the firm. Second, the model proposes another source of gravity to
capture the fact that multinational firms that do not trade with their affiliates are
nonetheless significantly affected by gravity.
18At first glance, this seems a very surprising result, but it is possible that it is driven by the
fact that United States has less room to exploit its institutional comparative advantage in countries
with a high level of law enforcement. In light of the theory of the boundaries of the firm, this
finding could go with both of the leading theories in this vein: transaction costs theory and property
rights theory. According to transaction costs theory, better institutional setting reduces the need
for vertical integration, reducing the number of majority-owned affiliates. Incorporating this finding
with the property rights theory is more subtle: if contractibility is a more important element of the
investments carried out by the headquarters, then the result is consistent with the property rights
theory; as institutions advance, the need to provide more incentives to headquarters declines, leading
to less vertical integration.
19The fact that the firm size follows a Zipf law distribution, and also that the distribution of
foreign sales is fat-tailed, suggests that some firms above the median are not large enough to trade
within the firm.
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2.4 The Model
Our model is based on Helpman et al. (2004). Firms are heterogeneous in terms of
their productivity and goods are horizontally differentiated with each variety pro-
duced by a firm that acts as a monopolist competitor. A firm can enter the foreign
market either by exporting or by opening a foreign affiliate in the destination mar-
ket (FDI). In choosing between the two modes of entry, a firm faces a proximity-
concentration trade-off: establishing a foreign affiliate allows the firm to save the
transportation cost of exporting, but the saving is offset by the fixed cost of oper-
ating overseas. The model predicts a definitive hierarchy of firms: least productive
firms do not produce, low productive firms sell only to the domestic market, medium
productive firms export, and most productive firms turn into multinational corpora-
tions. Furthermore, similar to Irarrazabal et al. (2013) and Keller and Yeaple (2013),
we introduce parent-to-affiliate intra-firm trade to generate FDI-gravity akin to the
standard trade-gravity.
The model contributes to the literature in several ways. First, in order to be con-
sistent with the fact that intra-firm trade is concentrated among the most productive
multinational corporations with the majority of affiliates reporting zero intra-firm
trade, we introduce a fixed cost of intra-firm trade. Second, in contrast to Irarrazabal
et al. (2013), the share of imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate input
cost is not constant and varies with firm size. Unlike Keller and Yeaple (2013) and
consistent with the empirical fact that the share of intermediate inputs in total input
costs also increases with firm size, we tie firm productivity to firm knowledge intensity
(R&D). Finally, we show that FDI-gravity forces are present in the model even for
affiliates that do not import from their parents.
2.4.1 Consumer Demand
The world economy consists of N countries (indexed by i, n). Each country is popu-
lated by Ln utility-maximizing consumers, with each consumer inelastically supply-
ing one unit of labor (the only factor of production). A representative consumer in
country n derives her utility from the consumption of a homogenous good Q0 and
a continuum of differentiated goods that belong to the differentiated sector Qn. A
consumer’s preferences between the homogenous good and the differentiated goods
sector are represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function with an income fraction µ
100
spent on the differentiated goods
Un = Q
1−µ
0 Q
µ
n, µ ∈ (0, 1) (2.1)
Preferences over the differentiated goods are CES with elasticity of substitution σ > 1.
The consumption of each variety ω in the set of all available varieties in country n,
Ωn (endogenously determined), q
d(ω), enters the CES aggregation symmetrically:
.Qn =
 ∫
ω∈Ωn
qd(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
 σσ−1 . (2.2)
As is well known, the demand for each variety in country n is given by: qd(ω) =
Anpn(ω)
−σ. Here, pn(ω) denotes the price of variety ω in country n, and An is an
index of market size in country n.20
2.4.2 Production and Market Structure
The market for the homogeneous good is perfectly competitive, and it is freely traded
in the world economy. The production technology of the homogeneous product is
linear in labor: one unit of labor are required to produce one unit in country n.21
The price of the homogeneous good is normalized to one; in effect, the wage in country
n is pinned down by the numeraire and is equal to wn.
22
Each country n is endowed with an exogenously determined potential number of
firms (producers) Jn. Each firm produces a unique variety using a variety-specific
composite intermediate input. Productivity ϕ ∈ R++ is firm-specific, and it is drawn
from a known cumulative distributionG(ϕ) with probability density distribution g(ϕ).
Since ϕ is firm-specific, and each firm produces a unique variety, we index goods with
ϕ instead of ω. A firm with productivity draw ϕ requires 1
ϕ
units of the firm-specific
composite intermediate input Mϕ to produce one unit of variety ω(ϕ). The composite
intermediate input is produced by the firm from a CES aggregation of a continuum
20An ≡ µ XnP 1−σn . The aggregate price level of the differentiated goods sector in country n is denoted
by Pn, and Xn represents the total expenditures in country n.
21As long as 1 − µ, Ln, and the variable trade costs are large enough, the production of the
homogeneous good Q0 in country n ∈ {1, 2, . . . N} is strictly positive.
22The incomplete specialization assumption has been used by many researches for tractability
and simplification purposes (for example, see Chaney, 2008). Proceeding without the outside sector
will not alter the results presented in the paper.
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of intermediate inputs with elasticity of substitution η ≥ 1:23
Mϕ =
 ∞∫
0
β(z|ϕ) 1ηm(z) η−1η dz

η
η−1
. (2.3)
Four notes warrant attention here: (i) m(z) is the quantity of an intermediate input
of knowledge intensity z, with higher z indicating higher knowledge intensity; (ii)
β(z|ϕ) is the cost share of intermediate input z in the total cost of the intermediate
input bundle specific to the ϕ-firm, and
∫∞
0
β(z|ϕ)dz = 1 for any ϕ; (iii) β(z|ϕ)
is log-supermodular in z and ϕ. That is, while all firms employ the same CES
aggregation and use the same continuum of intermediate inputs, the share of each
intermediate input z in the total cost of intermediate composite is firm-specific. To
be precise, β(z|ϕ) is log-supermodular in z and ϕ if for z′ > z′′ and ϕ1 > ϕ2,
β(z
′ |ϕ1)β(z′′ |ϕ2) > β(z′|ϕ2)β(z′′ |ϕ1). In other words, firm ϕ1 is more knowledge-
intensive because it requires relatively more knowledge-intensive intermediate inputs
relative to the low-productivity firm ϕ2;24 and (iv) production technology of producing
intermediate inputs is common across all firms: one unit of labor is needed to produce
one unit of intermediate input z.
2.4.3 Mode of Entry
To gain access to the domestic market in country n, a domestic firm in country n
incurs a fixed cost of production of fnn units of labor. Exports from country i to
country n are subject to fixed cost fni (measured in units of labor in country i),
25
and iceberg-type variable trade costs, τni > 1. Firms from country i can also serve
country n via FDI by paying a fixed cost, f fdini (measured in units of labor in country
n). In so doing, a firm avoids the transportation costs associated with shipping the
final good, but incurs an additional fixed cost of operating an affiliate in country n.
Conditional on establishing a foreign affiliate in country n, a parent firm in country
i could let its affiliate produce the composite intermediate inputs M (standard HMY
setting), or the parent could choose to ship intermediate inputs to its affiliate, where
23It can be shown that the limit of the CES aggregator as η approaches one is Cobb-Douglas.
24The intermediate composite aggregation and the notion of log-supermodularity are taken from
Keller and Yeaple (2013). In contrast to Keller and Yeaple (2013), knowledge intensity is defined at
the firm level, not the industry level, a property that enables us to generate firm-level predictions
regarding intra-firm trade. For a formal treatment of the log-supermodular assumption and its usage
in the international trade context, see Costinot (2009).
25In fni the first subscript refers to the destination market and the second one to the origin
country.
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the fraction of inputs offshored and the volume of intra-firm trade are endogenous.26
A parent incurs a fixed cost, f intni (measured in units of labor in country i), to initiate
intra-firm trade and it also incurs the standard iceberg-type trade costs τni, for the
shipped intermediate inputs.
2.4.3.1 Intra-firm Trade and Knowledge Transfer
There are two ways in which parents can transfer knowledge to their foreign affili-
ates. (i) Embodied knowledge transfer : simply, a parent produces intermediate input
z and ships it to the affiliate in country n. (ii) Disembodied knowledge transfer :
parent firms directly transfer knowledge to their affiliates through remotely commu-
nication. Nonetheless, transferring the knowledge required to produce intermediate
input z entail communication cost, and the possibility for mis-implementation and
mis-interpretation. Differently put, knowledge is not perfectly codified and therefore
any knowledge transfer between a parent and its affiliate is subject to error. Intu-
itively, the higher the knowledge intensity of the intermediate input z, the higher the
costs of transferring knowledge from a parent to the affiliate. As mentioned above
the knowledge transfer costs are denoted by t(z). To capture the idea that the cost of
moving knowledge over space increases with knowledge intensity z, we assume that
t(0) = 0, limz→∞ t(z) > τni and t′(z) > 0.27
Finally, the production technology of the final good is invariant to the location of
the producer: regardless of who produces the final good (parent or affiliate), 1
ϕ
units
of Mϕ are needed to produce one unit of the final good. The decision to export, to
open an affiliate, or to outsource intermediate inputs affects production of the final
good only insofar as it affects production of the composite intermediate input Mϕ.
2.4.4 Partial Equilibrium
First, we characterize the geography of input sourcing. The decision whether to
outsource the production of intermediate input z is simply pinned down by com-
26If a parent in country i does not trade with its affiliate in country n, it has to transfer knowledge
by establishing direct communications with the affiliate’s manager. Here we assume an affiliate suffers
some productivity losses when it receives instructions remotely from its parent in order to produce
intermediate inputs by itself. Therefore, an affiliate needs tni(z) > 1 units of labor to produce one
unit of intermediate input z. A crucial assumption in our model is that tni(ϕ) is a function of
trade frictions τni. Nevertheless, the impact of distance, language, time zone differences, and border
on trade frictions, τni, is stronger on physical shipping compared with their effect on the cost of
knowledge transfer. Formally, 0 < ∂tni∂τ < 1.
27Notice that the cost of knowledge transfer is not firm-specific; however, the aggregate cost of
disembodied knowledge transfer for a given fraction of the intermediate inputs varies across firms.
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paring the cost of embodied knowledge transfer wiτni and disembodied knowledge
transfer wnt(z). The cost of obtaining input z from a foreign affiliate is c(z) =
min{wnt(z), wiτni}. Given our assumption on the function t(z), there exists an in-
termediate input with knowledge intensity z˜ such that : for any z < z˜, t(z) < $τni,
and for z > z˜, t(z) > $τni, where $ ≡ wiwn . Then, we define z˜(τni, $) = t−1(τni, $).
Conditional on serving market n by FDI, we characterize the cost of the composite
intermediate input for an affiliate with productivity draw ϕ,
CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$) =wnt¯ if I(ϕ) = 0,(∫ z˜(τni,$)
0
β(z|ϕ)(t(z)wn)1−ηdz + (τniwi)1−η
∫∞
z˜(τni,$)
β(z|ϕ)dz
) 1
1−η
if I(ϕ) = 1.
where t¯ ≡ ∫∞
0
β(z|ϕ)t(z)1−ηdz.28
The indicator function I(ϕ) equals one if an affiliate outsources some of the inter-
mediate inputs from its parent and zero otherwise. As we show below, the indicator
function depends on a firm’s productivity draw ϕ. Indeed, CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 1, ϕ) <
CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 0, ϕ).29
The elasticity of CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 1, ϕ,$) with respect to trade costs τni, εMC(τni, ϕ,$)
is given by:
εMC(τni, ϕ,$) =
(wiτni)
1−η ∫∞
z˜(τni,$)
β(z|ϕ)dz∫ z˜(τni,$)
0
β(z|ϕ)(t(z)wn)1−ηdz + (τniwi)1−η
∫∞
z˜(τni,$)
β(z|ϕ)dz
. (2.4)
In order to show that among all firms that decide to enter country n by establishing
a foreign affiliate, only a subset of those firms (the most productive) choose to ship
intermediate inputs to their affiliates, we introduce the following lemmas.
Lemma II.1. The elasticity of marginal cost of intermediate inputs with respect to
trade costs τni increases with firm productivity ϕ. For ϕ
1 > ϕ2, εMC(τni, $, ϕ
1) >
εMC(τni, $, ϕ
2) > 0.
Lemma II.2. Let θ(τni, ϕ,$) be the share of imported inputs, M(τni, ϕ,$), in total
intermediate input costs TC(τni, ϕ,$): θ(τni, ϕ,$) =
M(τni,ϕ,$)
TC(τni,ϕ,$)
= εMC(τni, ϕ,$).
28It is assumed that wnt¯ < wiτni for some ϕ; otherwise no firm chooses FDI without intra-firm
over exporting.
29The results emanate from firm optimization and the definition of z˜(τ,$).
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Then, (i) θ increases with ϕ, (ii) θ declines with trade costs for all firms, and (iii)
the rate of decline in θ is slower in the more knowledge intensive firms.
Despite the fact that all firms that engage in intra-firm trade choose to import the
same range of intermediate inputs (notice that t(z) and τni are not firm-specific), the
share of imported intermediate inputs in total intermediate input costs varies across
firms in a way consistent with the log-supermodularity assumption. Accordingly, all
the variations in the share of imported intermediate inputs to total costs are on the
intensive margin, not the extensive margin.30 Lemma II.1 is of great importance in
the current setting: more knowledge-intensive firms are more vulnerable to trade costs
because they are more dependent on imported intermediate inputs from their parents
(Lemma II.2). Reframing, the firm-level gains from trade liberalization (savings in
marginal cost) are positively related to firms knowledge intensity (i.e. productivity).
To sum up, the two lemmas above highlight the role of firm knowledge-intensity,
trade frictions, and the interaction between the two in shaping intra-firm trade at the
firm level. More knowledge-intensive firms require more knowledge-intensive interme-
diate inputs; therefore, a more knowledge-intensive affiliate imports a higher share of
its intermediate inputs from its parent. This is precisely because the more knowledge
intensive the intermediate inputs are, the higher is the cost of transferring knowledge
through direct communication between parents and affiliates.
Consequently, an increase in trade costs raises the marginal cost for more knowledge-
intensive affiliates disproportionately more than for less knowledge-intensive firms.
Similar to Keller and Yeaple (2013), changes in trade costs impact a firm’s decision
regarding embodied and disembodied knowledge transfer, yet the degree of substi-
tution between them is significantly less for more knowledge-intensive firms. For
more knowledge-intensive affiliates an increase in trade costs leads to less decrease in
the share of imported inputs in total intermediate input costs. The reason for this
is that the more knowledge-intensive affiliate’s ability to substitute embodied with
disembodied knowledge transfer is constrained by the large demand for the highly
knowledge-intensive inputs.
Embodied vs. Disembodied Knowledge Transfer: Given the isoelastic de-
mand faced by all firms, profits for an affiliate in country n which parent is in country
30If we let t(z) be dependent on firm productivity, both the extensive and the intensive margin of
imported inputs will vary across firms, and all the results presented in the paper will be reinforced.
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i can be written as:
piaffni = ϕ
σ−1BnCMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$)1−σ − wi(f fdini + I(ϕ)f intni ), (2.5)
where Bn ≡ 1σ
(
σ
σ−1
)1−σ
An.
31
An affiliate chooses to outsource intermediate inputs from its parent if and only
if the increase in its profits due to the decrease in the marginal cost of intermediate
inputs is large enough to cover the fixed cost of intra-firm trade;
ϕσ−1Bn
[
∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$)
] ≥ wif intni , (2.6)
where ∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$) ≡ CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 1, ϕ)1−σ − CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 0, ϕ)1−σ
denotes the gains in variable profits as a result of the decline in the marginal cost of
intermediate input once an affiliate starts trading with its parent. In the Appendix,
we show that the left-hand side of equation (2.6) is continuous and strictly increasing
with ϕ. As a result, there exists a productivity cutoff ϕintni such that all affiliates with
productivity above the cutoff choose to import a fraction of their intermediate inputs
from their parents, whereas, conditional on FDI, firms with productivity below the
cutoff point do not import from parents.
Proposition 1. There exists a productivity cutoff ϕintni such that
I(ϕ) =
1 if ϕ ≥ ϕintni0 otherwise
That is, only the most productive foreign affiliates in country n engage in intra-firm
trade with their parents.
The productivity cutoff ϕintni is simply pinned down by equation (2.6):
(ϕintni )
σ−1Bn
[
∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕintni , $)
]
= wif
int
ni . (2.7)
As usual, the FDI cutoff ϕfdini < ϕ
int
ni is found by equating export profits pini(ϕ) with
31Notice that the marginal cost of producing the final good is given by
CMni(ϕ,·)
ϕ , which we require
to be strictly decreasing with ϕ. This can be done by imposing a specific functional form on CMni (ϕ, ·)
such that the marginal cost of the final good is decreasing with ϕ or, equivalently, we assume that a
firm’s draw ϕ is transformed to actual firm productivity via a strictly increasing function f(ϕ) such
that the marginal cost of the final good decreases with ϕ.
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FDI profits without intra-firm trade pifdini
(ϕfdini )
σ−1Bn
[
CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 0, ϕfdini , $)1−σ − (wiτni)1−σ
]
= wi(f
fdi
ni − fni). (2.8)
The exporting cutoff to country n is given by:
ϕσ−1ni Bn(wiτni)
1−σ − wifni = 0 (2.9)
To complete the characterization of varieties produced and consumed in country n,
the zero profit cutoff (ZPC) is as usual,
ϕσ−1nn Bnw
1−σ
n − wnfnn = 0 (2.10)
Parameter Restrictions and Firm Hierarchy: Consistent with the literature, we
impose the following restrictions on the model’s parameters to sustain a firm hierarchy
as in HMY.
• Exporters are more productive than nonexporters: ϕii < ϕni; if, under symmet-
ric countries, fni > τ
1−σ
in fii.
• Exporters are less productive than multinational firms: ϕni < ϕfdini ; if f fdini >
(τni$)
σ−1t¯1−σfni, and t¯ < $τni.
• Multinational firms with nonzero intra-firm trade are more productive than
multinationals with zero intra-firm: ϕintni > ϕ
fdi
ni ; if f
int
ni > f
fdi
ni − fni.
The geography of foreign affiliate sales: Country i foreign affiliate sales in
country n, raffni (ϕ), are given by
raffni (ϕ) = σϕ
σ−1Bn
[
CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$)
]1−σ
(2.11)
Proposition 2. (Gravity): Country i foreign affiliate sales in country n, raffni (ϕ),
decrease with trade costs τni. Let ε
r
ni(ϕ, τni) < 0 be the elasticity of affiliate sales with
respect to trade costs, then the absolute value of εrni(ϕ, τni) increases with ϕ. In other
words, the sales of more knowledge-intensive firms (affiliates) are more sensitive to
trade costs. That is, FDI-Gravity is more pronounced for more knowledge-intensive
firms.
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2.5 Parameterization, Functional Forms, and Es-
timation
In this section we provide functional forms for the log-supermodular function β(z|ϕ),
the cost of disembodied knowledge transfer, and the distribution of productivity
draws. Before proceeding further, we set η = 1, and therefore Mϕ is a Cobb-
Douglas composite intermediate input: Mϕ = C.exp
{∫∞
0
β(z|ϕ)lnm(z)dz}.32 As-
suming wi = 1 for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, domestic producers’ composite intermediate
input cost is given by CMnn = 1, while
CMni (τni, ϕ, I) =
t¯ if I = 0,exp{∫ z˜
0
β(z|ϕ)ln t(z)dz + ∫∞
z˜
β(z|ϕ)ln τnidz
}
if I = 1
Following Keller and Yeaple (2013), we set the knowledge transfer function t(z) =
exp {z}. Let φ(ϕ) denote ϕ-firm’s knowledge intensity where φ(ϕ) weakly increases
with ϕ. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that φ(ϕ) takes two values low
and high: φ(ϕ) ∈ {φl, φh}. We adopted a very simple reduced form to connect the
well documented relationship between firm size and knowledge intensity; specifically,
for any ϕ(φ) > ϕintni , φ = φ
h and φ = φl otherwise. This greatly simplifies the anal-
ysis without altering our results regarding the correlation between intra-firm trade
and firm knowledge intensity. We are still able to use this simple functional form to
compare intra-firm trade across firms with different knowledge intensities. Accord-
ingly, we change the notation slightly: we use β(z|φ) instead of β(z|ϕ). The cost
share function β(z|φ) is log-supermodular in z and φ; therefore, we let β(z|φ) be an
exponential with parameter 1
φ
.33
We additionally assume that the costs of disembodied technology transfer also
vary with destination-origin pair characteristics. Broadly, the factors that are widely
used in estimating trade costs between countries are also expected to affect the costs of
disembodied technology transfer but with a lower order of magnitude. Hence tni(z) =
gnit(z), where gni = τ
α
ni, and α ∈ (0, 1).34 Also t¯ni = gniexp
{∫∞
0
β(z|φ)ln t(z)dz}.
With the functional forms at hand, the marginal cost of obtaining the composite
intermediate input for an affiliate with knowledge intensity φ ∈ {φl, φh} is:
32C ≡ ∫∞
0
β(z|ϕ)lnβ(z|ϕ)dz is constant.
33β(z|φ) = 1φexp
{
−z
φ
}
. It is straightforward to check that logβ(z|φ) is supermodular and∫∞
0
β(z|φ)dz = 1.
341 < gni < τni. Akin to τni, gni denotes the costs of disembodied knowledge transfer as a
function of distance, common border and language, time zone differences, colonial origins, etc.
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CMni (τni, I, φ) =

t¯ = ταniexp{φ} if I = 0,
exp
{
φ
(
1− τ
α−1
φ
ni
)
+ αlnτni
}
if I = 1
(2.12)
provided that τni > gniexp{φl}.35
2.5.1 Foreign Affiliate Sales: Firm-Level Gravity
Foreign affiliate sales are given by equation (2.11). Given the functional forms pro-
vided in this section, we have:
rfdini = σϕ
σ−1Bn (ταniexp(φ))
1−σ , (2.13)
and
rintni = σϕ
σ−1Bn
(
exp
{
φ(1− τ
α−1
φ
ni ) + αlnτni
})1−σ
. (2.14)
Accordingly, the elasticity of foreign affiliate sales with respect to trade costs is given
by:
εrni(φ, τni, I) =

(1− σ)α < 0, if I = 0,
(1− σ)
(
(1− α)τ
α−1
φ
ni + α
)
< 0, if I = 1
(2.15)
It is straightforward to verify that the sales of affiliates who import from their parents
respond relatively more than affiliates who do not. Furthermore, for affiliates who
import from their parents, their sales are more responsive to change in trade costs
the higher the knowledge intensity:
∂εrni(φ,τni)
∂φ
< 0.
2.6 General Equilibrium
To solve the model we assume that firm’s productivity is distributed Pareto with
shape parameter κ:36
35This assumption is needed in order for the FDI cutoff to be well defined. φl is small enough
such that exp(φl) ≈ 1.
36The assumption that κ > σ − 1 ensures that the distribution of firm size has a finite mean. In
general, G(ϕ) = 1 −
(
ϕmin
ϕ
)κ
, κ > 2, and ϕmin = 1. In this section we assume that all firms in
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G(ϕ) = 1− ϕ−κ, for ϕ > 1, and κ > σ − 1.
The relevant cutoffs for country-pair (n, i) are given by:
Zero profit cutoff ZPC : ϕσ−1nn =
fnn
Bn
Export cuttoff : ϕσ−1ni =
fni
Bn
τσ−1ni
FDI cutoff : (ϕfdini )
σ−1 =
f fdini − fni
BnC1ni
Intra-firm cutoff : (ϕintni )
σ−1 =
f intni
BnC2ni
where:
C1ni ≡ τα(1−σ)ni exp {φ(1− σ)} − τ 1−σni > 0
C2ni ≡ exp{φ(1− τ
α−1
φ
ni ) + αlnτni}1−σ − τα(1−σ)ni exp {φ(1− σ)} > 0
As shown in Figure 2.1, the proximity-concentration trade-off of the standard
HMY model is strongly present in our framework.37 However, we have an additional
line representing the profits for affiliates who import from their parents, piint, and
also the line denoted by pifdi is not parallel anymore to the domestic profit line. Also
notice that in most models of FDI and intra-firm trade, the line representing the
profits for affiliates who do not import from parents pifdi is missing since by default
all affiliates import from their parents.
a given sector share the same knowledge intensity given by the mean of knowledge intensity of all
firms operating in that particular sector. In this case, our model becomes very similar to Keller and
Yeaple (2013) with the exception of affiliates’ endogenous selection into intra-firm trade.
37In the figure, proximity is represented by the slope of each profit line, while concentration is
represented by the y-axis intersection.
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Figure 2.1: Profit from domestic sales, exports, FDI and intra-firm trade
Notes: This figure shows the different productivity cutoffs for different firms, where (ϕD)
1−σ
represents the cutoff for domestic producers, (ϕX)
1−σ
represents the cutoff for exporters, (ϕfdi)
1−σ
represents the cutoff for firms engaging in multinational production, and (ϕintra)
1−σ
represents the
cutoff for foreign affiliates that also engage in intra-firm trade.
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Aggregate Price Index: The aggregate price index in country n is given by:
P 1−σn = Jn
∞∫
ϕnn
pnn(ϕ)
1−σdG(ϕ) +
N∑
i 6=n
Ji
∞∫
ϕni
pni(ϕ)
1−σdG(ϕ), (2.16)
pni(ϕ) =

σ
σ−1
τni
ϕ
if ϕni < ϕ < ϕ
fdi
ni
σ
σ−1
ταniexp(φ)
ϕ
if ϕfdini < ϕ < ϕ
int
ni
σ
σ−1
exp(φ(1−τ
α−1
φ
ni )+αlnτni)
ϕ
if ϕintni < ϕ
Evaluating the integration and using the Pareto distribution assumption:
P−κn =
κ
κ− (σ − 1)
(
σ
σ − 1
)−κ(
µXn
σ
)κ−(σ−1)
σ−1
Ξn (2.17)
where:
Ξn ≡
N∑
i=1
Ji
(
τ−κni f
σ−1−κ
σ−1
ni + Ii 6=n
{
(f fdini − fni)
σ−1−κ
σ−1 C
κ
σ−1
1ni + (f
int
ni )
σ−1−κ
σ−1 C
κ
σ−1
2ni
})
.38
Since the mass of firms is exogenously given, the aggregate profits of country n
firms, including affiliates’ profits, are strictly positive. Accordingly, total income in
country n is the sum of labor income and aggregate profits of all country n firms:
Xn = wnLn + Πn. As in Chaney (2008), we assume that each consumer in country
n holds wn shares in a completely diversified mutual global fund with s dividends
per share in terms of the numeraire. Additionally, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002b)
and Chaney (2008), Ji is proportional to the size of the labor force in country n;
Jn = wnLn. Therefore, Xn = wnLn(1 + s), and Jn =
Xn
1+s
. In the Appendix, we show
that s is a function of the model’s exogenous parameters: s = σ−1
σ(κ−1)+1 .
The aggregate equilibrium price level in country n is the solution of equation (2.17)
in terms of the model’s exogenous parameters. Once Pn is obtained, we can retrieve
all the relevant cutoffs, trade flows, foreign affiliates sales, and economic welfare.
2.6.1 Aggregate Sales: Gravity Equations
The model delivers three gravity equations: (i) aggregate export sales from country i
to country n: Xni, (ii) country i foreign affiliates sales in country n, with no intra-firm
38The indicator function Ii 6=n = 1 if i 6= n and zero otherwise.
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trade between parents and affiliates, Xfdini , and (iii) country i foreign affiliate sales in
country n, for affiliates that import from parents; X intni .
Xni =
µXnXiτ
−κ
ni δni
Ξn
(2.18)
Xfdini =
µXnXi {ταniexp(φ)}−κ λni
Ξn
(2.19)
X intni =
µXnXiexp
{
φ
(
1− τ
α−1
φ
ni
)
+ α(lnτni)
}−κ
ϑni
Ξn
(2.20)
where:
δni ≡ f
σ−1−κ
σ−1
ni −
[
f fdini − fni
τ
(1−σ)(α−1)
ni exp(φ(1− σ))− 1
]σ−1−κ
σ−1
,
λni ≡
[
f fdini − fni
1− τ (1−σ)(1−α)ni exp(φ(σ − 1))
]σ−1−κ
σ−1
−
[
f intni
(ταniexp(φ))
σ−1C2ni
]σ−1−κ
σ−1
ϑni ≡
 f intni(
exp((φ(1− τ
α−1
φ
ni ) + αlnτni)
)σ−1
C2ni

σ−1−κ
σ−1
Notice that Ξn is reminiscent of the multilateral resistance term in Eaton and
Kortum (2002b).39 Ξn is a measure of country n remoteness relative to all trading
countries; whereas, the bilateral terms δni, λni, and ϑni depend only on country i
and country n parameters.40 Relative to the standard gravity equation (e.g., from
a Melitz style model with no FDI), the impact of trade frictions on exports is more
involved. In an model without FDI, aggregate exports from country i to country n can
be decomposed into the intensive and extensive margins, with the average exporter’s
39With a slight abuse of notation, we redefine Ξn to be:
Ξn ≡
N∑
i=1
Li(1 + s)
(
τ−κni f
σ−1−κ
σ−1
ni + Ii 6=n
{
(ffdini − fni)
σ−1−κ
σ−1 C
κ
σ−1
1ni + (f
int
ni )
σ−1−κ
σ−1 C
κ
σ−1
2ni
})
40Our assumptions about firm hierarchy and the necessary parameter restrictions to maintain
it are sufficient for both δni and ϑni to be positive. On the other hand λni is positive if f
int
ni >
(ffdini − fni)C2niC1ni .
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sales being invariant to variable trade costs and the mass of exporting firms negatively
associated with trade costs. In the presence of FDI sales, variable trade costs impact
both the mass of exporters and the average export sales per firm. In Chaney (2008),
for instance, δni is a function of fixed costs of export fni, and does not depend on
τni. Here, δni is a function of τni, and therefore the response of Xni to changes in τni
depend on changes in δni and τ
−κ
ni . Formally, let ξX,τ be the elasticity of aggregate
export sales between countries i and n with respect to variable trade costs τni, and
ξδ,τ is the elasticity of δ with respect to τ , then:
ξX,τ = −κ− |ξδ,τ | < 0, (2.21)
where:
ξδ,τ = −κ− (σ − 1)
σ − 1
[
f fdini − fni
τσ−1C1ni
]σ−1−κ
σ−1 −1 [
(1− σ)(α− 1)τ (1−σ)(α−1)−1exp (φ(1− σ))
(τσ−1C1ni)2
]
τ
δ
< 0
Likewise, the elasticity of aggregate foreign affiliate sales with respect to trade
costs, for affiliates that do not import from their parents and those that do, are
respectively given by:41
ξXfdi,τ = −ακ+ ξλ,τ < 0 (2.22)
ξXint,τ = −
[
τ
α−1
φ
ni (1− α) + α
]
κ+ ξϑ,τ < 0 (2.23)
where
ξϑ,τ = (κ− (σ − 1))
[
τα(1−σ)
exp(φ(1− σ))
C2ni
(
(α− 1)τ α−1φ
)]
< 0
Aggregate affiliate sales (for importer affiliates) decrease as trade costs increase. It
is straightforward to show this since the second term of equation (2.23) is negative
for any α ∈ (0, 1). The finding that foreign affiliate sales are negatively correlated
with trade costs for the affiliates who import from their parents is not surprising
and consistent with models of multinational production and intra-firm trade. We are
mainly interested in the gravity equation for affiliates who report zero intra-firm trade
with their parents. The intra-firm trade mechanism that puts gravity forces in play
ceases in the case of small affiliates who never import from parents. Nonetheless, as we
41Deriving the sign of ξλ,τ is not trivial. In general, ξλ,τ is negative if α and f
int
ni are large enough
(see the Appendix for details). Nonetheless, ξXfdi,τ is negative as long as α is not very close to zero.
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show in equation (2.22), sales of non-importer affiliates are still suffering from gravity
forces,42 since affiliates sales are negatively affected by the distance from headquarters
and other common trade frictions.
In order to comment on the role of intensive and extensive margins in the gravity
equations above, in line with Chaney (2008), we formally introduce the impact of
changing variable trade costs on the intensive margin (sales of existing firms) and the
extensive margin (sales of new entrants). By differentiating aggregate exports from
country i to country n, Xni = Ji
∫ ϕfdini
ϕni
rni(ϕ)dG(ϕ), we obtain the following expression
for the elasticity of Xni with respect to τni:
43
ξX,τ =
Intensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− σ) +
Extensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
κ− (σ − 1)
ϕσ−1−κni − (ϕfdini )σ−1−κ
[
ξϕfdi,τ (ϕ
fdi
ni )
σ−1−κ − ϕσ−1−κni
]
, (2.24)
where ξϕfdi,τ denotes the elasticity of FDI cutoff with respect to variable trade costs.
If ξϕfdi,τ is negative then both the sales of existing exporters and the sales of new
exporters decrease with trade costs. In fact, ξϕfdi,τ < 1 for any value of α ∈ (0, 1).44
Moreover, consistent with our finding that the number of foreign affiliates in the lower
tail of firm size distribution decreases as the distance from headquarters increases,
the elasticity of FDI cutoff with respect to trade costs is positive, 0 < ξϕfdi,τ < 1.
45
Interestingly, even when the FDI cutoff increases with τ , as in HMY, the ratio of the
number of multinational firms to the number of exporters increases as trade costs
increase.46
The same analysis for the aggregate sales of affiliates who do not import from
parents, Xfdini , is executed:
ξXfdi,τ =
Intensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
α(1− σ) +
Extensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
κ− (σ − 1)
(ϕfdini )
σ−1−κ − (ϕintni )σ−1−κ
[
ξϕint,τ (ϕ
int
ni )
σ−1−κ − ξϕfdi,τ (ϕfdini )σ−1−κ
]
(2.25)
The elasticity of intra-firm cutoff with respect to variable trade costs is denoted
by ξϕint,τ .
47 In the Appendix we show that if the fixed cost of intra-firm trade is
sufficiently high, the impact of trade costs on the extensive margin is negative as
42See the Appendix for formal derivations and the conditions for FDI gravity to hold.
43We use Leibniz’s integral rule to differentiate the aggregate exports expression.
44Specifically, ξϕfdi,τ =
αexp(φ(1−σ))−τ(1−σ)(1−α)ni
exp(φ(1−σ))−τ(1−σ)(1−α)ni
< 1.
45For large enough values of α.
46Notice that if the FDI cutoff is ∞, the model collapses to Chaney’s model and ξX,τ = −κ.
47ξϕint,τ =
1
1−σ
∂lnC2ni
∂lnτ > 0.
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well.48
The impact of variable trade costs on the intensive and extensive margins for
affiliates who import from their parents is as follows:
ξXint,τ =
Intensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− σ)
[
(1− α)τ
α−1
φ
ni + α
]
−
Extensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
(κ− (σ − 1))ξϕint,τ . (2.26)
Both sales per existing affiliates and the sales of new importer affiliates decline as
trade costs increase. An intriguing result here is that although the impact of trade
costs on the intensive margin is unambiguously larger for importer affiliates than for
non-importer affiliates, the relative impact on the extensive margin for non-importer
affiliates relative to importer affiliates is ambiguous: the sales of new entrants/existing
non-importer affiliates might decline more than their counterparts for importer affili-
ates as trade costs increase. In effect, the overall impact of trade costs on the aggregate
sales of non-importer affiliates might even be stronger than its impact on the overall
sales of importer affiliates because of the extensive margin responses to increasing
trade costs. In other words, gravity forces could be stronger for affiliates who do not
report intra-firm trade relative to affiliates who import from their parents.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper begins by documenting a new empirical regularity: foreign affiliate sales
decrease with trade costs regardless of whether they engage in intra-firm transactions.
This is at odds with existing models of multinational production and intra-firm trade
in which the observed gravity of foreign sales is explained by affiliates’ need for in-
termediate inputs from their parents. Furthermore, as reported in Ramondo et al.,
intra-firm trade is highly concentrated among a small set of large multinationals and,
in fact, the vast majority of U.S foreign affiliates do not even engage in cross-border
transactions with other firms within the same corporation.
In order to reconcile the theory and the evidence, we propose a unified framework
to improve our understanding of the nature and structure of multinational firms and
their complex network of affiliates. To account for the extensive margin of intra-firm
trade and the gravity of MP for firms of all sizes, including those that do not engage
in intra-firm trade; this paper develops a multi-country model of heterogeneous firms,
48In fact, we also show the conditions under which the FDI gravity equation holds even with
positive extensive margin. In general, this will be the case for a wide range of parameter values.
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in which parents decide whether or not to supply foreign affiliates with intermediate
inputs and if so, optimally decide the fraction that will be imported from the parent
company. In our model an affiliate’s marginal cost is affected by the parent’s decision
regarding the method of knowledge transfer. On the one hand, exporting interme-
diate inputs embodying knowledge to an affiliate entails the standard iceberg-type
trade costs as well as a fixed cost of establishing an adequate platform to carry on
cross-border transactions within the boundaries of the firm. On the other hand the
marginal cost of direct knowledge transfer from parent to affiliates through remotely
communication increases with geographical barriers but rises less than the costs of
exporting intermediate inputs. As a result, in equilibrium (i) only the most produc-
tive multinational firms choose to export to their affiliates and (ii) foreign sales for
both the affiliates who import from their parent and those who do not are affected
by gravity forces.
The model constructed in this paper provides a guide to further develop a quanti-
tative framework that allows us to measure the gains from multinational production
and the consequent transfer of knowledge across countries in an economy where ex-
ports, foreign sales, as well as intra-firm transaction across borders, are subject to
selection and concentrated in a few large firms.
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Tables and Figures
Table 2.1: List of Countries
Countries
Australia* Italy* Spain*
Austria* Japan* Sweden*
Belgium-Luxembourg* Latvia Switzerland*
Canada* Lithuania Turkey*
Czech Republic* Mexico* United Kingdom*
Denmark* Netherlands* United States*
Estonia New Zealand*
Finland* Norway*
France* Poland*
Germany* Portugal*
Greece* Romania
Hungary* Russian Federation
Ireland* Slovakia
Israel Slovenia
Note: The symbol (*) means that the country belongs to the OECD.
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Figure 2.2: Research and Development Share
Notes: this figure shows the density of the parent’s R&D expenditure share in each of the 104
manufacturing sectors of the NACE classification at 3-digit level of disaggregation. The share of
R&D is calculated as the fraction of the total Research and Development expenditure of the firm
relative to the total R&D expenditure of all U.S parents operating in the same 3-digit level
industry. The density is shown for the pool of firm-sector pairs in the sample
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Figure 2.3: Density of Firms’ R&D Shares for Selected Industries
Notes: this figure shows the density of the parent’s share of R&D expenditure for four selected
3-digit NACE sector classifications: (1) manufacture of parts and accessories for motor
vehicles—NACE 293 (top-left panel); (2) manufacture of other special-purpose machinery—NACE
289 (top-right panel); (3) manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products—NACE 211 (bottom-left
panel); and 4) manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery—NACE 303 (bottom-right
panel). The share of R&D is calculated as the fraction of the total research and development
expenditure of the firm relative to the total R&D expenditure of all U.S parents operating in the
same 3-digit sectoral classification.
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Figure 2.4: Density of Firm Productivity by R&D group
Notes: this figure shows the productivity density for two groups of parent firms: those for which
ORBIS data contain information regarding the expenditure on research and development activities
(Known R&D); and those parents for which there are missing values for R&D (Unknown R&D).
The productivity density is shown for both groups in four selected industries at 3-digit NACE
sector classification: (1) manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles—NACE 293
(top-left panel); (2) manufacture of other special-purpose machinery—NACE 289 (top-right panel);
(3) manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products—NACE 211 (bottom-left panel), and 4)
manufacture of air and spacecraft and related machinery—NACE 303 (bottom-right panel). Firm
productivity is measured by the output per worker of the U.S parent. Only one third of the U.S
parent firms (that have at least one affiliate overseas) show positive values for R&D expenditures.
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Figure 2.5: Market Penetration
Notes: this figure represents the density of the number of markets in which U.S. parent firms
produce. The vertical lines represent the cutoff at the 50, 75, 95 and 99 percentile, respectively.
Half of the firms have operations in only one or two foreign countries. Only a few parents engage
in multinational activity in more than seven foreign markets.
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Table 2.2: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable MP sales N. of firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln Dist –0.6999*** –0.7044*** –0.5525*** –0.0893**
(0.2165) (0.1190) (0.0687) (0.0427)
Border –2.8115*** –0.6675 –0.0831 1.7173***
(0.6920) (0.6752) (0.2231) (0.2990)
Language 0.3939* 1.0690 0.3643** 0.3681
(0.2069) (0.9952) (0.0711) (0.3664)
Colony –0.0449 1.1371*** 0.5632** 1.9199***
(0.1822) (0.3812) (0.0648) (0.1366)
RTA 1.5951*** 1.5730** –0.1314 –0.3411*
(0.3972) (0.7277) (0.1237) (0.1896)
Capital (relative US) 2.1510*** 2.1014***
(0.6134) (0.2844)
ln GDPperc 0.5664* 0.7646***
(0.3928) (0.1184)
Rule of Law –0.0198** –0.0196**
(0.0094) (0.0028)
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 1779 1779 1880 1880
Notes: Dependent variables: foreign affiliate sales relative to parent sales operating in each host
country-sector pair in columns (1) and (2); number of U.S. parents with at least one affiliate in
each host country-sector pair in columns (3) and (4). The regressors include the natural log of the
distance between the U.S. and the host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the
host market in a regional trade agreement (RTA), a dummy for common border (border), common
language (language), and whether or not the host market and United States had a colonial
relationship (colony). Other controls include the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural
log of GDP per capita, and a measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of
Law). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 **
p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.3: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable Number of firms
(<50p) (>50p) (<50p) (>50p)
ln Dist –0.3536*** –0.5443*** –0.4954*** –0.4774***
(0.0573) (0.0819) (0.0743) (0.0672)
Border n/a n/a –0.3300 -0.1060
(0.2440) (0.2142)
Language 0.1747 0.7719*** 0.2371*** 0.3315***
(0.1282) (0.1938) (0.0790) (0.0738)
Colony 1.3362*** 0.7263** 0.4838*** 0.3913***
(0.1330) (0.2360) (0.0651) (0.0608)
RTA 0.5152*** –0.2478 0.0628 –0.1443
(0.1543) (0.2291) (0.1388) (0.1243)
Capital (relative US) 1.8563*** 1.6531***
(0.2701) (0.2720)
ln GDPperc 0.5076*** 0.4968***
(0.1232) (0.1153)
Rule of Law –0.0129*** –0.0136***
(0.0031) (0.0029)
Country FE Yes Yes No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 938 942 938 942
Notes: Dependent variables: number of US parents with at least one affiliates in each host
country-sector pair. The regressors include the natural log of the distance between the U.S. and
the host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the host market in a regional trade
agreement (RTA), a dummy for common border (border), common language (language), and
whether or not the host market and United States had a colonial relationship (colony). Other
controls include the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural log of GDP per capita, and
a measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of Law). Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. n/a mean
not available, because a variable is collinear with country fixed effects
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Table 2.4: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable MP Sales
(<50p) (>50p) (<50p) (>50p)
ln Dist –0.8568*** –0.8399*** –0.2594 –0.4007*
(0.1601) (0.1235) (0.0687) (0.2660)
Border –0.9984** –0.3156 –1.4844 –2.3741***
(0.4678) (0.7528) (0.2231) (0.8410)
Language 1.6716 1.1554 0.3216** 0.3004
(1.4587) (0.9505) (0.0711) (0.2294)
Colony 0.3474 1.2135** 0.5915** –0.0531
(1.3918) (0.4905) (0.0648) (0.1904)
RTA 0.8893 1.5286** –0.7275 1.7651*
(1.3877) (0.6900) (0.1237) (0.1896)
Capital (relative US) 1.4399*** 1.8031***
(0.2844) (0.6635)
ln GDPperc 0.7646*** 0.9009**
(0.1184) (0.4539)
Rule of Law –0.0196** -0.0197*
(0.0028) (0.0102)
Country FE Yes Yes No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 875 904 875 904
Notes: Dependent variables: foreign affiliates sales relative to parent’s sales operating in each host
country-sector pair. The regressors include the natural log of the distance between the U.S. and
the host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the host market in a regional trade
agreement (RTA), a dummy for common border (border), common language (language), and
whether or not the host market and United States had a colonial relationship (colony). Other
controls include the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural log of GDP per capita, and
a measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of Law). Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
125
Table 2.5: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable Number of firms
(<25p) (>75p) (<25p) (>75p)
ln Dist –0.2780*** –0.4082*** –0.3604*** –0.2499***
(0.0289) (0.0479) (0.0674) (0.0600)
Border n/a n/a –0.1449 0.1369
(0.2123) (0.1782)
Language 0.0830 0.3979*** 0.2649*** 0.3179***
(0.2251) (0.0976) (0.0732) (0.0662)
Colony 0.2217 0.4821*** 0.3449*** 0.2496***
(0.2114) (0.1272) (0.0616) (0.0534)
RTA 0.3339*** –0.4197*** –0.0920 –0.1666*
(0.1089) (0.1226) (0.1129) (0.1011)
Capital (relative US) 1.3084*** 1.2075***
(0.2844) (0.2343)
ln GDPperc 0.3277*** 0.2043**
(0.1117) (0.0926)
Rule of Law –0.0080** -0.0061***
(0.0029) (0.0023)
Country FE Yes Yes No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 762 780 762 780
Notes: Dependent variables: Number of U.S. parents with at least one affiliates in each host
country-sector pair. The regressors include the natural log of the distance between the U.S. and
the host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the host market in a regional trade
agreement (RTA), a dummy for common border (border), common language (language), and
whether or not the host market and United States had a colonial relationship (colony). Other
controls include the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural log of GDP per capita, and
a measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of Law). Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. n/a mean
not available, because a variable is collinear with country fixed effects
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Table 2.6: Gravity Equation of MP (country-sector level)
Dep. Variable MP Sales
(<25p) (>75p) (<25p) (>75p)
ln Dist –1.0994*** –0.7857*** –0.6170* –0.8584***
(0.1897) (0.1464) (0.3553) (0.2971)
Border –5.0072** –0.2373 –1.8248 –3.4116***
(0.2.1279) (0.7628) (1.2137) (0.9378)
Language 3.8818* 1.7033 0.5525** 0.6566**
(1.1.7287) (1.1007) (0.2874) (0.2631)
Colony 2.1475 1.8609 –1.0250*** –0.0164
(1.7119) (1.2184) (0.2286) (0.2220)
RTA 2.1991 2.1108** 0.3802 1.8904***
(1.6473) (0.9123) (0.6421) (0.4956)
Capital (relative US) 1.0083*** 2.5191***
(0.9921) (0.7881)
ln GDPperc –0.4518 1.1348**
(0.5731) (0.5132)
Rule of Law 0.0083** –0.0318***
(0.0146) (0.0114)
Country FE Yes Yes No No
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N.Observations 703 753 703 753
Notes: Dependent variables: foreign affiliate sales relative to parent sales operating in each host
country-sector pair. The regressors include the natural log of the distance between the U.S. and
the host market (ln Dist); a dummy for the participation of the host market in a regional trade
agreement (RTA), a dummy for common border (border), common language (language), and
whether or not the host market and United States had a colonial relationship (colony). Other
controls include the level of capital endowment (Capital), the natural log of GDP per capita, and
a measure of the institutional quality of the host country (Rule of Law). Robust standard errors
reported in parentheses. Significance is denoted: * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
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2.8 Appendix A: Proofs
Lemma II.1: The elasticity of marginal cost of composite intermediate input with re-
spect to trade costs τni is increasing in firm’s productivity ϕ. For ϕ
1 > ϕ2, εMC(τni, $, ϕ
1) >
εMC(τni, $, ϕ
2) > 0.
Proof. The proof is based on Keller and Yeaple (2013). By contradiction method,
assume that εMC(τni, $, ϕ
1) < εMC(τni, $, ϕ
2). Then,
∞∫
z˜
β(z|ϕ1)dz
z˜∫
0
β(z|ϕ2)t(z)1−ηdz <
∞∫
z˜
β(z|ϕ2)dz
z˜∫
0
β(z|ϕ1)t(z)1−ηdz. (2.27)
Without loss of generality we set $ = 1. By definition, if β(z|ϕ) is log-supermodular
in z and α, then for z′ > z′′,
β(z′|ϕ1)β(z′′|ϕ2)t(z)1−η > β(z′|ϕ2)β(z′′|ϕ1)t(z)1−η. (2.28)
Integrate with respect to z′′ over [0, z′) and with respect to z′ over [z′,∞), and replace
z′ with z˜ we get
∞∫
z˜
β(z|ϕ1)dz
z˜∫
0
β(z|ϕ2)t(z)1−ηdz >
∞∫
z˜
β(z|ϕ2)dx
z˜∫
0
β(z|ϕ1)t(z)1−ηdz (2.29)
Contradiction
Lemma II.2: let θ(τni, ϕ,$) be the share of imported inputs M(τni, ϕ,$) in total
composite intermediate input costs TC(τni, ϕ,$). Then, θ(τni, ϕ,$) =
M(τni,ϕ,$)
T (τni,ϕ,$)
=
εMC(τni, ϕ,$) is i) increasing in ϕ, ii) the import cost share is declining in trade
costs for all firms, and iii) the rate of decline in the import cost share is slower in the
more knowledge intensive firms.
Proof. Part i) follows immediately Lemma II.1. For part two, the elasticity of θ(τni, ϕ)
with respect to τni is given by (w.l.o. ∂t(z)/∂τ = 1)
ξθ,τ = −(η − 1)(1− θ(τ, ϕ))− ∂z˜(τ)
∂τ
β(z|ϕ)τ∫∞
z˜(τ)
b(z|ϕ)dz < 0. (2.30)
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The third part is implied by the monotone likelihood ratio property: β(z|ϕ
i)∫∞
z˜ β(z|ϕ1)dx
<
β(z|ϕ2)∫∞
z˜ β(z|ϕ2)dz
, and θ(τ, ϕ1) > θ(τ, ϕ2)
Proposition 1: There exists a productivity cutoff ϕintni such that
I(ϕ) =
1 if ϕ ≥ ϕintni0 otherwise
That is, only the most productive foreign affiliates in country n engage in intrafirm
trade with their parents (import intermediate inputs form their parents).
Proof. An affiliate chooses to import from its parent if,
ϕσ−1Bn
[
∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$)
] ≥ wif intni , (2.31)
The first term in the left hand side of the equation above ϕσ−1 is increasing in ϕ.
The second term ∆CMni (τni, I(ϕ), ϕ,$) ≡ CMni (τni, I(ϕ) = 1, ϕ)1−σ − CMni (τni, I(ϕ) =
0, ϕ)1−σ is also increasing in ϕ. Notice that C(I = 0, ϕ1) > C(I = 0, ϕ2),49 whereas
C(τ = 1, I = 1, ϕ1) = C(τ = 1, I = 1, ϕ2). By Lemma II.1, εMC(., ϕ1) > εMC(., ϕ2),
then moving from no intra-firm trade to importing any fraction of intermediate inputs
from parents yields larger saving in the cost of producing the intermediate composite
input for the higher knowledge-intensive firm (more productive).
Proposition 2: Country i foreign affiliate sales (conditional on opening an affil-
iate) in country n, raffni (ϕ) are decreasing in trade costs τni. Let ε
r
ni(ϕ, τni) < 0 be
the elasticity of affiliate sales with respect to trade costs, then the absolute value of
εrni(ϕ, τni) is increasing in ϕ. In words, the sales of more knowledge intensive firms
(affiliates) are more sensitive to trade costs. That is, FDI-Gravity is more pro-
nounce for more knowledge intensive parents-affiliates.
Proof. Notice that
εrni(ϕ, τni, I) = (1− σ)εMCni (ϕ, τni, I) (2.32)
The proof then follows immediately from the properties of εMCni (ϕ, τni, I). Moreover,
when I = 0, as explained in the text t¯ is increasing with τni. Thus the proof is
complete.
49Notice that C(I = 0, ϕ) = t¯ = ∫∞
0
β(z|ϕ)t(z)1−ηdz, which is indeed increasing in ϕ under the
assumptions about β(z|ϕ) and t(z).
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2.9 Appendix B: Detail Derivations
Dividends per share s: In the text we claim that s = σ−1
σ(κ−1)+1 . Let Πn be the
aggregate profits of all firms in country n, including foreign affiliates profits,
Πn =
N∑
i=1
Jn

ϕfdiin∫
ϕin
piin(ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
ϕintin∫
ϕfdiin
pifdiin (ϕ)dG(ϕ) +
∞∫
ϕintin
piintin (ϕ)dG(ϕ)
 , (2.33)
and ϕfdinn = ϕ
int
nn = ∞. The domestic/export profits, non-importer foreign affiliates
profits and importer affiliates profits are denoted by piin(ϕ), pi
fdi
in (ϕ), and pi
int
in (ϕ),
respectively. Using the functional forms of the profits, the Pareto distribution, the
cutoffs’ equations and integrating, we get
Πn =
σ − 1
σκ
N∑
i=1
Rin +R
fdi
in +R
int
in (2.34)
Rin, R
fdi
in and R
int
in denote the values of the aggregate sales of exporting to country i,
the aggregate foreign affiliates sales-who do not import-, and the importer aggregate
affiliate sales, respectively. Indeed, Rfdinn = R
int
nn = 0. Let Π denote the world aggregate
profits: Π =
∑
n∈N Πn, then
Π =
σ − 1
σκ
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈N
Rin +R
fdi
in +R
int
in (2.35)
=
σ − 1
σκ
Y (2.36)
Here, Y is the world total sales/expenditures. World’s total profits Π is also given by
the dividends per share times the total number of shares. Thus, Π =
∑
n∈N sLn =
σ−1
σκ
Y = σ−1
σκ
∑
n∈N Ln(1 + s), where the last equality follows from balanced trade and
the fact that Xn = Ln + Πn = Ln + sLn. Then,
s =
Π∑
n∈N Ln
=
σ − 1
σκ
(1 + s)
→ s = σ − 1
σ(κ− 1) + 1
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Derivation of Gravity Equations
Aggregate exports from country i to country n is given by50
Xni = Ji
ϕfdini∫
ϕni
σϕσ−1
(
µXn/P
1−σ
n
)
τ 1−σni dG(ϕ) (2.37)
Evaluating the integration, using the formula for the aggregate price level, and sub-
stituting out the cutoffs and Ji = Xi/(1 + s), we obtain the gravity equation derived
in the text. Similarly, non-importer affiliates’ aggregate sales and importer affiliates’
aggregate sales can by expressed by
Xfdini = Ji
ϕintni∫
ϕfdini
σϕσ−1
(
Xn/P
1−σ
n
)
[ταniexp(φ)]
1−σ dG(ϕ) (2.38)
X intni = Ji
∞∫
ϕintni
σϕσ−1
(
Xn/P
1−σ
n
)(
exp(φ(1− τ
α−1
φ
ni ) + αln)
)1−σ
dG(ϕ) (2.39)
Using the same steps as before, we get the gravity equations for non-importer affili-
ates’ sales and importer affiliates’ sales.
FDI- Gravity: Affiliates who do not import from parents:
In the text we claimed that the sales of non-importer decrease in trade frictions;
equation (2.22). In order to prove this formally we use our analysis of the inten-
sive/extensive margin. Remember that we can disentangle the impact of trade costs
on affiliates’ sales into the intensive and the extensive margins;
ξXfdi,τ =
Intensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
α(1− σ) +
Extensive margin︷ ︸︸ ︷
κ− (σ − 1)
(ϕfdini )
σ−1−κ − (ϕintni )σ−1−κ
[
ξϕint,τ (ϕ
int
ni )
σ−1−κ − ξϕfdi,τ (ϕfdini )σ−1−κ
]
(2.40)
The extensive margin is negative if and only if, ξϕfdi,τ (ϕ
fdi)σ−1−κ > ξϕint,τ (ϕint)σ−1−κ.
This will be the case if, αC
M (.,I=0)1−σ−τ1−σ
εMCCM (.,I=1)1−σ−αCM (.,I=0)1−σ >
(
ffdini −fni
f intni
)(1−σ)(σ−1−κ) (
C2ni
C1ni
)(1−σ)(σ−1−κ)
.
For FDI cutoff be well defined, we require f intni > (f
fdi
ni − fni)C2niC1ni . If f intni is way larger
than the last term then the last term of the previous inequality becomes very small
50Notice that we do not include the intrafirm export in the total exports. It is easy to show that
total intrafirm exports is constant share of the importer total affiliates sales.
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and approaches zero as f intni → ∞. Therefore, there exists f intni < ∞ such that the
extensive margin is negative. If this condition does not hold, all what we need to have
FDI-gravity is − ξϕint,τ (ϕ
int
ni )
σ−1−κ−ξ
ϕfdi,τ
(ϕfdini )
σ−1−κ
ϕfdini )
σ−1−κ−(ϕintni )σ−1−κ
< α(σ−1)
κ−(σ−1) , which is easily satisfied for
reasonable parameter values. If either of these two conditions is satisfied, FDI sales
must be negatively correlated with trade frictions.
Derivation of the marginal cost of intermediate input composite: equation
(2.12)
CMni (τ, φ, I) =
τ
αexp
{∫∞
0
1
φ
exp(−z/φ)zdz
}
if I = 0
exp
{∫ z˜
0
1
φ
exp(−z/φ)(αlnτ + z)dz + lnτ ∫∞
z˜
1
φ
exp(−z/φ)dz
}
if I = 1
(2.41)
Integrating by parts and substituting out z˜ = (1 − α)lnτni, the required results are
obtained.
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